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Abstract 
 
This thesis contributes to the debate about media power by advancing a new 
theoretical perspective. I critique existing theories of media power and argue that 
media power as it operates in today’s complex media environment can be understood 
as being based on interactions between the culturally and communicatively symbolic 
components of media communication and the material features and processes of 
media through which such symbolic communication occurs. I develop and apply an 
analytical model capable of spanning these two domains and their complex qualities. 
To develop the model I adopt a neo-materialist ontology based on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notion of rhizomatic assemblages, Hertog and McLeod’s multi-
perspectival frame analysis and DeLanda’s theory of the assemblage. I argue that this 
approach can capture both the symbolic and the material dimensions of media that 
function through networked, complex and emergent interactions. My analytical 
model is based on four pillars: hybridity, materiality, choreography and coding. I 
used the model to guide my empirical fieldwork investigation of three case studies: a 
public demonstration, an animal rights protest aimed at undermining a well-known 
brand and the high-profile leaks by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden in 2013. 
Ethnography, content analysis and interview data were used to assess my model’s 
suitability for making sense of these three cases. Finally, in the conclusion I propose 
four future themes that this thesis reveals are significant for research on media 
power: the importance of institutional adaptation, the role of emotion and affect, the 
significance of computation and the materiality of technology.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
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the question of power, as traditionally formulated, does not make sense in the 
network society […] new forms of domination and determination are critical 
in shaping people’s lives […] albeit in new forms and with new actors. 
 
(Castells, 2009: 45) 
 
The media and communication landscape has undergone a series of tectonic shifts in 
the past decade (González-Bailón, 2015). Established media institutions have faced 
several years of decline; and more recently – in some areas at least –renewal and 
growth (Anderson, Bell, & Shirky, 2012). In parallel with the changes occurring to 
the industrial media, the adoption and use of personal and social media has enabled a 
rapid growth in “mass self-communication” [my emphasis] (Castells, 2009) which 
has augmented, undermined and reinforced institutional media interests in a range of 
ways unforeseen even five years ago (Newman, Fletcher, Levy, & Nielsen, 2016). 
As a consequence of this shift in the balance of media power, technology companies, 
such as Google, Facebook and Twitter, their attendant software and digital 
infrastructure have come to play a more central role in the communication of 
everyday life through the control and management of data and information flows 
(Bell, 2014; 2016).  
 
Such developments, symptomatic of the contemporary “Network Society” (Castells, 
2000) or “Networked Information Economy” (Benkler, 2006) have reinvigorated a 
range of issues pertinent to studies of media and communication and, perhaps more 
significantly, opened up new and previously largely unforeseen areas of scholarship 
drawn from other fields. For instance, the ability to establish and circulate 
representations of societal issues has been transferred in broad terms from the 
preserve of the media industries to constellations of digitally-networked individuals 
such as citizen journalists (Breindl, 2016) or digital activists (Allen, 2016). 
 
The rise in influence of digital media platforms and communication channels has 
meant that the algorithms and other computational processes running in the 
background of such platforms are increasingly playing a role in influencing and 
determining information flows. Moreover, the dominant commercial orientation of 
such technology is refocusing critical attention on the political economy of media 
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communication, rather than the more reception-based and culturally-determinist 
perspectives on media power prevalent in recent literature.  
 
The materiality of technology infrastructure presents itself too in the growth of 
mobile and wearable technologies that increasingly brings locative and other 
physical infrastructure of the built and ‘real world’ environment into media 
production processes. This evolution in the significance of the materiality of media 
and communication fits neatly into a much broader conceptual development: neo-
materialism. Originating in sociology and philosophy neo-materialism focuses on the 
centrality and validity of matter and the material components – understood as “a 
commitment to the mind-independent existence of reality” (DeLanda, 2006: 1) - of 
the social realm.  
 
This approach argues for a broader interpretation of society’s material structures and 
forces than that offered by a Durkheimian positivism or a classical Marxist economic 
determinism. Rather it has sought to account for the everyday materiality of society 
found in previously inert or inanimate objects, such as the built environment, 
technological devices, computer code and physical space (Coole & Frost, 2010). 
Importantly, such material objects gain agency and operate in conjunction with the 
hitherto dominant analyses of language and symbolic representation in mediating 
power.  
 
It is at the intersection of these current trends and trajectories that this thesis situates 
itself. Specifically, the thesis is interested in the ways that theories of media power 
are being reshaped by both the developments in technology as well as the renewed 
theoretical focus on the materiality of media seen over the past decade. Having 
introduced the broad concerns that this thesis seeks to address, the following section 
will define what media power is and how it operates. Finally, the section will outline 
the three research questions that will be investigated by the thesis in order to provide 
both a theoretical as well as empirical contribution to the field. 
 
Defining Media Power 
 
Defining in clear terms the operational terms and concepts adopted in the thesis is 
important for two reasons. Firstly, it is essential to clarify the object of analysis, that 
is: media power, and ensure that the theoretical context and model subsequently 
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adopted in the empirical analysis is consistently applied. Secondly, defining exactly 
what is meant by media power is also a crucial analytical task in itself due to the 
continued conceptual debates occurring around the term. As Freedman (2014) has 
recently noted: “despite its increased use in political, academic, and professional 
circles it is far from clear precisely what we mean by media power” (Freedman, 
2014: 2).  
 
Couldry and Curran (2003) have refined this challenge by asserting that media power 
has two ‘faces’. They suggest that the definition of media power depends on the 
direction from which it is approached. From one direction, they argue, the media is a 
location where “other powerful forces” in society “wage their battles (big business 
against labor, old professional and class elites against new cultural ones, and so on)” 
(Couldry and Curran, 2003: 3) (emphasis in original).  
 
From such a perspective the media is merely a conduit for other actors to exert power 
in society; the media is a site that has no power within itself (Castells, 2007: 242) 
and is “merely the door through which the contestants for power pass en route to 
battle” (Couldry and Curran, 2003: 3). Viewed from the other direction, however, 
Couldry and Curran argue that media power is the media’s ability to exert a symbolic 
power (Couldry and Curran, 2003, 4) or definitional power which defines the shared 
reality of everyday life (Couldry, 2001: 5). 
 
From this perspective, media power is understood as a “definitional, analytical, and 
interpretive authority” (Freedman, 2015: 273) that functions by processing and 
creating meaning within society (Hackett and Carroll, 2006: 27) and, ultimately, “by 
framing what we take in, providing context and understanding and creating 
understandings that shape attitudes and action” (Russell, 2016: 143).  
 
Media Power: How does it operate? 
 
Taking the definition outlined above as the ‘what’ of media power, the next step in 
setting out the context in which this thesis will undertake its analysis is to understand 
and account for the ‘how’ of media power – that is, how it is constituted, how it 
functions and how does it achieve its outcomes. 
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Undertaking this task is not as straight-forward as it may seem, however, as despite 
the media’s central role in exerting a power to shape and define contemporary 
society’s shared, everyday experiences, it is a phenomenon that is not commonly 
recognised, let alone understood (Couldry, 2001; Couldry and Curran, 2003). 
Similarly, Hackett and Carroll (2006) argue that even after many years of research, 
key questions relating to media power, for example “[d]o media reinforce hierarchies 
and social inequalities, or challenge them? Do media solidify the status quo or 
catalyse progressive social change?” remain “open questions” (Hackett and Carroll, 
2006: 27). 
 
In response to this context, Couldry and Curran argue that in order to understand the 
‘how’ of media power it is important for researchers to examine what goes on within 
media’s “blackbox” – that is, understand “how decisions are made, who influences 
them and who doesn’t” and to “analyse the consequences of those decisions (and 
exclusions)” (Couldry and Curran, 2003: 5). For Freedman (2014), in order to 
undertake such analyses of decision-making (and thus meaning-making) processes 
operating within media power we need to understand  
 
the relationships—between actors, institutional structures, and contexts—that 
organise the allocation of the symbolic resources necessary to structure our 
knowledge about, and by extension our capacity to intervene in, the world 
around us (Freedman, 2014: 274) 
 
Crucially, as alluded to in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, the constitutive 
properties of - and relationships between - this constellation of actors, structures and 
contexts has been changing significantly over the past decade. Whereas, once such 
constellations influencing media power would have been comprised of ‘elites’ – that 
is: corporate actors and forces or state actors and forces (Davies, 2007) the growth of 
new media technologies – in particular the emergence and widespread adoption of 
the internet and networked media – has brought about quantitative and qualitative 
changes.  
 
In quantitative terms, for example, it can be argued that through the mass adoption 
use of social networking platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, self-
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publishing platforms, such as blogs1 and online forums, and more recently private 
messaging services such as WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger (Kemp, 2018) it can 
be argued that the public have been allocated a greater role and increased agency in 
terms of media production, distribution and consumption.  
 
Thus, media’s ability to shape and define meaning; attitudes and actions in society 
has arguably become more widely diffused across the social realm – shifting from a 
smaller number of elite-oriented ‘formal’ media sites, such as state-backed or 
corporate publishers and broadcasters out into the public domain populated by 
‘informal’ media sites and actors. Moreover, the media technologies underpinning 
and enabling such a shift, for example digital social networks and self-publishing 
platforms - and the organisations behind them - have become increasingly embedded 
in the relational constellation of media actors and thus must be taken into account 
when attempting to delineate and define a view of how contemporary media power 
operates. 
 
From a qualitative perspective, this rise of digital media and its attendant 
technologies has meant that media can be understood “not merely as transmitters - 
the old ‘‘mass media’’ function - but rather as data collectors, storage houses, and 
processing centers” for information and data (Packer, 2013: 297). Such a perspective, 
drawing on the renewed interest in the German media scholarship of Friedrich 
Kittler, focuses attention on the material qualities of media and the ways in which 
they shape media’s interaction with the actors, structures and contexts in which it 
exists to “reconfigure power/knowledge relationships via the production of truth” 
(ibid.).  
 
Adopting terminology from software development, Russell (2016) argues that media 
power in a digitally-networked era has both a “front-end” and “back-end”2  (Russell, 
2016: 149). Such a turn of phrase neatly encapsulates the primary concerns of media 
power in a digitally- driven world. Russell asserts that in a world where 
communication is digital, media power must be studied in ways that take into 
                                               
1 The term ‘blog’ derives from a contraction of ‘Weblog’ – the name originally given to a self-publishing 
platform where users would publish often personal opinions and news. More detailed background and historical 
context of media platforms and institutions are provided in subsequent chapters. 
2 These terms emerge from software development. Although they are not explicitly defined and can have different 
connotations depending on the context in which they are applied, they can be understood as follows: Front-end 
refers to the publicly-visible elements pf software, such as the user or graphical interface whereas the Back-end is 
the hardware or infrastructure which, often, shapes or controls the Front-end. Russell uses the terms here to imply 
the media power functions through symbolic, visible as well as more material, structuring elements. 
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account the ‘front-end’ of media, that is the representational content produced, 
published and communicated - both by formal media actors and institutions and the 
informal, digitally-empowered public – and the back-end, that is the hitherto hidden 
or invisible infrastructural domain of media, including the technologies, algorithms, 
laws and protocols that contain and shape representational content (ibid.). 
 
Recognising contemporary media power, then, as the interaction between both the 
culturally and communicatively symbolic components of media communication as 
well as the material features and processes through which such meaning is made, 
requires researchers to develop and apply an analytical model capable of spanning 
these two domains and their complex qualities.  
 
Before unpacking and defining the notion of contemporary media power adopted in 
this thesis and the analytical model operationalised in its investigation, it is useful to 
add some clarifying commentary regarding the distinction between both the 
representational and material aspects of media power, the implications this may 
present and the way in which the thesis will address such issues.  
 
While both the symbolic and material functions of media exert power by influencing 
the production and definition of the world around us, arguably the nature of such 
definitional qualities differ insomuch as the purely representational dimensions of 
media power are ideological, whereas the material dimensions of media power are 
epistemological (Packer, 2013: 295). That is, while media power’s ‘front-end’ is 
concerned with how information is selected and (re)presented from existing sources 
of knowledge based on competing opinions and agendas, its 'back-end’ is largely 
concerned with the media’s ability to determine and shape what information 
becomes available as a source of knowledge. In other words, media “determine the 
brute facticity of what data are selected, stored, and processed … they make possible 
new forms of knowledge” (ibid.: 296). 
 
While definitionally distinct, these two aspects of media power are arguably inter-
related. Media power is not a binary function; its ability to shape and set truth and 
reality requires it to operate at both a representational (ideological) as well as 
material (epistemological) level. Returning to Russell’s dual typology, media power, 
in Russell’s terms, has both a front-end and back-end. 
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From an empirical perspective, it is important to be alert to each of these levels or 
layers operating within media power to enable, first and foremost, its effective 
analysis in contemporary society. But it is also important to ensure a clarity of 
approach that can rise above any excessive theory-building present in the scholarly 
environment. As Bollmer has noted: “the encounter between cultural studies’ past 
and today’s theories of media materiality needs a bit more nuance, or else these two 
forms of media studies do little more than name fabricated exteriors each uses to 
define their difference from the other” (Bollmer, 2015: 97).  
 
It is the aim of this thesis to address such concerns by taking into account the fact 
that cultural and symbolic approaches to media emerge from earlier (cultural) 
materialist contexts while, similarly, materialist approaches have emerged from 
culturally hermeneutic contexts. Recognising this theoretical inter-relationship 
should enable the analysis of contemporary media power undertaken in this thesis to 
be made with a more nuanced, more rounded – indeed, hybrid - view of the material 
as well as cultural/symbolic dynamics and components in operation. In turn, this 
should allow for the development and adoption of a robust conceptual and 
methodological basis and enable an empirical analysis of the actors, processes, 
decisions and actions present in contemporary media power. 
 
Research Questions 
 
Adopting the definition of media power outlined above and seeking to explore 
further its evolving features and characteristics, this thesis makes an original 
contribution to knowledge by advancing both a new theoretical perspective and 
empirical exploration of the field of contemporary media power. It does this by 
addressing three research questions: 
 
RQ1. Firstly, the thesis will answer the question: what could a revised theory of 
media power look like given the transformations that have occurred within the 
media landscape over recent years? This will be achieved by undertaking a 
review of relevant literature examining conceptual developments in political, 
sociological and philosophical perspectives on power. Based on this review any 
gaps, convergences and divergences between them are identified and assessed in 
order to ascertain how media power concords with the complete notion of power 
in society more generally. By doing so, the thesis will establish a sense of the 
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potential ‘shape’ - that is the boundaries, constituent parts and operational forces 
- which a contemporary theory of media power might encompass.  
 
RQ2. Secondly, the thesis will address the question: can an analytical model be 
developed that will allow researchers to effectively identify and analyse 
contemporary media power? This question will be answered by establishing a 
model that will enable the thesis to empirically test the who, what, how and why 
of contemporary media power as outlined in the theoretical perspective 
developed in RQ1 above.  
 
RQ3. Thirdly, the thesis will take the analytical model developed in response to 
RQ2 and assess whether if offers researchers value. Can the analytical model of 
contemporary media power developed in RQ2 be validated through empirical 
analysis? The question will be answered by taking the analytical model, 
developing an appropriate set of methods for empirical analysis and testing it 
across a series of three case studies.  
 
In answering these questions, the thesis will proceed according to the following 
structure: Chapter 2 will set the scene for an investigation of contemporary media 
power by undertaking a comprehensive review of the literature surrounding the 
chronological evolution and inter-relation of social, political and media power. In 
doing so, the chapter locates the origins of media power scholarship within the wider 
political and social traditions from which it has emerged, and by which it has been 
directly influenced. From this survey and discussion, the chapter concludes by 
answering RQ1 and presenting a revised theory of media power. 
 
Chapter 3 addresses the central challenge set in RQ2 by developing an analytical 
model to empirically investigate the revised theory of media power developed in the 
previous chapter. In doing so, the chapter firstly sets out the underlying ontological 
position on which the analytical model will be developed in order to adequately 
account for the neo-materialist nature of contemporary media power (Coole and 
Frost, 2010).  
 
This is achieved through the adoption of Assemblage Theory (DeLanda, 2006), 
which is then integrated with media framing theory (Reese, 2001) in order to 
translate the thesis’ ontological status into a media and communications-oriented 
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perspective. Next, the core variables – the who, what, how and why of the analytical 
model - are identified and defined. Finally, four over-arching analytical pillars: 
hybridity, materiality, choreography and coding, are developed in order to 
operationalise the model in the subsequent empirical analysis.    
 
Building on this analytical model, Chapter 4, sets out the research approach adopted 
in the thesis, the data collection and analysis methods used in the subsequent 
chapters containing empirical work. The chapter sets out in practical terms how the 
analytical model developed in Chapter 3 is used to explore, build on and validate the 
revised theory of media power established in Chapter 2. Crucially, the chapter will 
review and discuss core methodological concerns, including the ethical approach 
adopted in the analysis, limitations of the chosen methods, sampling and selection 
considerations and reflexivity.  
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will present the empirical analyses conducted in the thesis across 
three case studies: Demo2012, animal rights activists versus Adidas and 
#AskSnowden respectively. These case studies are analysed using the core pillars of 
the analytical model developed in Chapter 3 with analysis proceeding 
chronologically to enable full investigation of the media assemblages’ evolution 
emerging through each event. In each case study media power is assessed by the 
development of a heavily territorialised, coded assemblage which establishes a media 
frame interpreting and defining the event or issue.  
 
Finally, Chapter 8 highlights the original contribution to knowledge made by the 
thesis by revisiting the original research questions and summarising and discussing 
the theoretical and empirical evidence analysed in the thesis. It concludes by 
providing pointers toward future work.  
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Chapter 2  
 
Power and Media: A Review of the Existing Literature 
  
  18 
Over the past half-century the horizons of scholarship in political, sociological and 
philosophical perspectives on power have become transformed by a number of 
conceptual shifts. In this relatively short period of time theoretical accounts of power 
have shifted from viewing it as an unproblematic, visible force with clear causal 
effects playing a normative role within democratic institutions (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1962; Dahl, 1957); to a covert force located within (often elite) economic, social and 
cultural structures (Lukes, 1974, Bourdieu, 1984; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; 
Giddens, 1984; Gramsci, 1971) and, most recently, becoming dissolved and diffused 
into an ever-present, circulatory, series of symbolic-material networks instantiated 
across the social field (Clegg, 1989; Foucault, 1977b; Foucault, 1984; Latour, 2005a; 
Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). 
 
By undertaking a review of relevant literature, this chapter will identify and assess 
the gaps, convergences and divergences between contemporary accounts of key 
conceptual developments in political, sociological and philosophical power and 
assess them against approaches to media power in order to ascertain to what extent 
and in which ways contemporary media power can be seen to align and operate in 
accordance with the complete notion of power in society more generally. By doing 
so, the chapter will conclude by providing a sense of the boundaries, constituent 
parts and operational forces of the two domains and therefore provide an outline 
shape of what a theory of media power might look like given the transformations that 
have occurred within the media landscape over recent years. 
 
Origins of Contemporary Power: The Conflictual Tradition  
 
The origins of contemporary accounts of power can be located in the community 
power debates that occurred between American social and political scientists in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. These debates broadly contested the level of 
“democraticness” of US society (Haugaard, 1997: 10), placing at the heart of the 
debate the issue of whether power was accreted and dispensed by a central elite 
(Hunter 1953; Schulze 1958; Mills 1956) or widely diffused among a plurality of key 
decision-makers (Bachrach & Baratz 1962). 
 
Critiquing this elitist model, Dahl (1958) argued that by studying presumed pre-
existent power structures in local communities, community power theorists merely 
demonstrate that certain groups within American society have a “high potential” for 
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power, rather than actual power. That is, while groups may exist that have potential 
for exerting power over a community, in reality these groups display a heterogeneity 
that diffuses and thus reduces capacity for power: 
 
The actual political effectiveness of a group is a function of its potential for 
control [i.e. power] and its potential for unity. Thus a group with relatively 
low potential for control but high potential for unity may be more politically 
effective than a group with a high potential for control but a low potential for 
unity. [emphasis in original] (Dahl, 1958: 465)  
 
In Dahl’s view community power theory had evolved an unsatisfactory and 
“unsophisticated” conceptualisation of power based on presumption, rather than 
quantifiable values. In response to this elitist perspective, Dahl (1957) adopted the 
Weberian definition of power as occurring when “A has power over B to the extent 
that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”  (Weber, 1978: 
53). This enabled Dahl to develop a theory of power articulated as a conflict between 
two parties (Dahl, 1957: 202-203).3  
 
Dahl’s theory, based on causal and observable outcomes, arguably resolves the 
inadequacies of the elite conceptualisations of power through its ability to be 
empirically verified as a “careful examination of a series of concrete decisions” 
[emphasis in original] (Dahl, 1958: 466). For Dahl, this conflictual theory of power 
represented a normative approach due to the centrality of conflict and decision-
making within democracy and democratic processes. In Who Governs? Democracy 
and Power in an American City Dahl’s applied his theory to an analysis of the US 
city, New Haven (Dahl, 1961) which revealed that no single elite exerted control or 
power, thus providing both an operationalisation of his model and, crucially, 
vindicating his earlier democratic pluralist perspective.  
 
Despite its initial significance, however, Dahl’s attempts to develop a theory of 
conflictual power provoked further methodological critique by Bachrach and Baratz 
(1962). While broadly supportive of Dahl’s conceptualisation of power, Bachrach 
and Baratz drew attention to an operational component of power they argue is found 
                                               
3 In later articulations of this formulation Dahl (1968) substitutes the letters ‘C’ and ‘R’ for ‘A’ and 
‘B’, although the meaning remains the same 
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within decision-making processes but is missing from both Dahl’s conflictual model 
and earlier community power theorists. They ask: 
 
Can a sound concept of power be predicated on the assumption that power is 
totally embodied and fully reflected in “concrete decisions” or in activity 
bearing directly on their making? (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962: 948) 
 
Bachrach and Baratz believe that this cannot be the case owing to the mobilisation of 
bias within organisations or institutions that effectively shapes the ability of 
individuals to make some decisions, while restricting them from making others. They 
described this as “nondecision-making power” (ibid.: 952) and defined it as: 
 
the manner in which the status quo oriented persons and groups influence 
those community values and those political institutions … which tend to limit 
the scope of actual decision-making to “safe” issues (ibid.).  
 
Conceptualised as the “two faces of power” (ibid.: 947) these seen and unseen 
applications of power provide a crucial reappraisal of Dahl’s model that incorporate 
organisational bias into the conflictual tradition. Such bias is characterised by 
Bachrach and Baratz as the “dominant values, the myths and the established political 
procedures and rules of the game” (ibid.) that can be mobilised in shaping 
democratic decisions.  
 
Methodologically Bachrach and Baratz’s revision of the conflictual model of power 
retains Dahl’s emphasis on empirical verifiability. If decision-making power can be 
observed and quantified, then nondecision-making power too can be examined 
through close analysis of which actors in any power conflict ultimately gain and 
which lose from existing bias (ibid: 952; Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1970).  
 
Responding to these pluralist theories of power, Lukes (1974) offers a radical 
reappraisal of decision-making and nondecision-making power by describing them 
as the first and second “dimensions of power” respectively (Lukes, 1974: 15). To 
these dimensions, Lukes introduces a third which critiques pluralist approaches on 
account of such theories’ strict adherence to an interpretation of power where 
“interests are consciously articulated and observable” (ibid: 24-25). Even Bachrach 
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and Baratz’s attempts to understand nondecision-making power as control of the 
political agenda nevertheless interprets nondecisions as intentional acts “consciously 
articulated and observable” (ibid.) within the conventional decision-making process. 
Without this normative framework nondecisions become merely unobservable and 
thus unquantifiable events.  
 
Such an ambiguity leads Lukes to further critique Dahl and Bachrach and Baratz’s 
pluralist theories of power as adopting a “too methodologically individualist view of 
power” (ibid.: 26) that privileges causal, observable conflict between two 
individuals. This account, according to Lukes, is a deficient account of power 
because power can also be exercised in ways that are unseen but remain central to 
the exercise of power. Lukes asserts: “is it not the supreme exercise of power to get 
another or others to have the desires you want them to have – that is secure their 
compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?” (ibid.: 27). 
 
Interpreting power this way enables Lukes to introduce the Marxist notion of false-
consciousness, that is: a “function of collective forces and social arrangements” 
which conceals individuals’ “true interests” (ibid.: 26). From this perspective Lukes 
elaborates his ‘third dimension’ of power that incorporates social forces and 
institutional practices into questions of individual agency. The resulting 
conceptualisation shifts analyses of power from actual, observable conflict to what 
Lukes terms “latent conflict”: the “contradiction between the interests of those 
exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude” [emphasis in original] 
(ibid.: 28).  
 
Using these insights Lukes reworks Dahl’s Weberian formula to recognise the 
central role of interests. In Lukes’ revised formula power occurs when “A exercises 
power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests” (ibid.: 37). At 
the core of Lukes’ third dimension of power, then, is a conflation of power and 
knowledge in as much as “people’s wants may themselves be a product of a system 
which works against their interests” (ibid.: 38).  
 
Such a distinction marks a significant conceptual break with pluralist notions of 
power and represents a step-change in the epistemological development of power by 
marking a conceptual terminus for the conflictual tradition (Clegg, 1989; Gohler, 
2009). Lukes’ introduction of false consciousness into power debates requires not 
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just a normative evaluation of “[f]airness in decision-making” or “neutrality in 
structural practices” but moreover demands “a cultural environment which allows 
people to make decisions which reflect their interest rather than the interest of 
others” (Haugaard, 1997: 18). 
 
The third dimension of power, however, is not without limitations and Lukes himself 
revisits some of its core problems (Lukes, 2005). Lukes argues that his critique of the 
pluralists remains overly narrow in focus owing to its interpretation of power as a 
conflictual ‘power over’. This perspective risks painting a “reductive and simplistic 
picture of binary power relations” while ignoring the transformative or productive 
potential of power later identified by theorists of power (Lukes, 2005: 109).  
 
In seeking a conceptual escape route form this position Lukes draws on Antonio 
Gramsci’s Marxist studies of power (Gramsci, 1971) which invoke a more subtle and 
complex investigation of the tension between the determinacy of social structures 
and their interaction with individual agency. Gramsci’s approach arguably provides a 
conceptual bridge between the Hobbesian, conflictual tradition of power with a 
theory of power emerging from re-readings of Niccoló Machiavelli’s political 
thought (Machiavelli, 2003). Machiavelli sought to understand how power could be 
used to influence and manage individual agency within society and thus opened up 
renewed debate about how power might be exercised through the strategic creation 
of consensus. This revitalised engagement and synthesis of the conflictual and 
consensual traditions of power opening up new horizons for the development of 
theories of power. 
 
Consensual Approaches: Power, Duality and Discursivity  
 
Antonio Gramsci conceptualised power as operating according to a “dual 
perspective” of “force and consent” or “violence and civilisation” (Gramsci, 1971: 
169), which he terms hegemony.4 Crucially, hegemony rejects the centrality of force 
or violence in achieving power, instead seeking to understand and explain how 
domination operates in such a way as to generate consent.  
 
                                               
4 Although the term hegemony pre-exists Gramsci’s use, his interpretation of hegemony can be best described as 
a synthesis of the original ancient Greek concept of leadership within military (or political) alliances and the use 
of the term by the Russian Social Democratic Party in the late 19th and early 20th century to denote tactical 
alliances between the minority working and peasant classes. For further analysis, see Fontana (2006).. 
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Central to this consensual power is Gramsci’s concept of the “integrative state” 
where the traditional distinction between State (as a political entity) and Civil 
Society collapses and “a proper relation” between the two entities is established 
(Gramsci, 1971: 238).5 This relation creates a situation where the State is no longer a 
separate space within society where power is located and thus the primary site of 
domination (through coercion or violence). Instead, the state is now an integral part 
of the social and cultural fabric of civil society making it “limited and circumscribed 
and responsive and subordinate” (Fontana, 2006: 33). Gramsci agues this is a 
strategic move differentiated from strategies of power adopted by previous ruling 
classes. Earlier strategies, Gramsci asserts, were: 
 
essentially conservative in the sense that they did not tend to construct an 
organic passage from others into their own, i.e. to enlarge their class sphere 
“technically” and ideologically. Their conception was that of a closed caste. 
The [hegemonic] bourgeois class poses itself as an organism in continuous 
movement, capable of absorbing the entire society, assimilating it to its own 
cultural and economic level (Gramsci, 1971: 260). 
 
This transformation enables dominant classes to co-opt the social and cultural world-
view of subordinate social groups resulting in a shared world-view and values.  
 
Thus, as Fontana (2006) notes: Gramsci's concept of hegemony “can be understood 
as the generation and organisation of consent” and as a result “is directly related to 
the mechanisms and processes by which knowledge and beliefs are first produced 
and second disseminated” (Fontana, 2006: 43). Significantly, while Gramsci’s 
connection between power and knowledge offers a direct antecedent to Lukes’ third 
dimension of power, Gramsci’s hegemonic power represents a crucial break with the 
problematic notion of false consciousness present in Lukes’ work (2005: 109). 
 
Drawing inspiration from Machiavelli, Gramsci asserts that instead of a normative 
logic of true and false, hegemonic power is exercised through a relativist appraisal 
and selection of competing ideologies present within civil society. This enables 
dominant classes to undertake the strategic "’formation and development’ of 
                                               
5 Crucially, Gramsci makes the distinction between State/Civil Society in politically and economically developed 
Western nations, e.g. Italy, and less developed nations. In particular, Gramsci’s question: why did the revolution 
succeed in (less developed) Russia and not other (developed) Western nations provides the backdrop for his 
thinking around - and exposition of - hegemony.  
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‘subjective conditions’” (Fontana, 2006: 42) among subordinate classes. Hegemony, 
in essence, is the ability to exert power at an overt, normative democratic or 
institutional level through the strategic and covert exertion of power at a subjective 
level. By doing so, hegemony opens up a new interpretive horizon for power as a 
domination through consensus.  
 
Despite this conceptual shift, however, Gramsci’s model is arguably limited by the 
Marxist worldview underlying his analysis that prioritises economic and class-based 
variables. Putting to one side this “utopian” political agenda (Haugaard, 2006: 50), 
however, we can recognise hegemony’s significance in moving conceptualisations of 
power further forward by seeking to “theorise … how power has a consensual aspect 
that facilitates relations of domination” (ibid.). Taking key elements of hegemony 
beyond its Marxist framework enables us to seek to answers to broader questions 
concerning domination through consensus at a more integrated sociological level.  
 
One of the most comprehensive attempts to answer such questions is found in 
Giddens’ The Constitution of Society (Giddens, 1984). Giddens; work attempts to 
overcome the traditional dualism of subjectivist and objectivist schools of thought 
(1984; 1981; 1979) by establishing a theory of social order in which subjective 
individual agency interacts with objective social structures to reflexively create 
reality as a series of social practices.  
 
This Theory of Structuration adds a crucial variable to conceptualisations of power 
by introducing the notion of social practices as recursive human activity instead of 
permanent and overly determining social structures. For Giddens these practices 
create the conditions in which individual agency, and thus power, can be exercised 
(Giddens, 1984: 2; 14). Within such a conceptualisation, power remains a primarily 
conflictual phenomenon operating at the level of the individual as “the capacity to 
achieve outcomes” (ibid.: 257) and occurs when “something has happened that 
wouldn't otherwise, based on the agency of an actor” (Giddens, 1979: 91). 
 
The dominance of agent-centred causality, however, is tempered by the assertion that 
power is "instantiated in action" (ibid.: 91) as individuals reproduce the social 
structures within which they exist. Thus, power as structural reproduction through 
individual agency is both enabling and constraining. Enabling social structures create 
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power resources for actors; however, these resources are then exercised at an 
individual level as domination and constraint over others (Haugaard, 1997: 107). 
 
By locating domination and consensus within the everyday (re)production of social 
structures by individual actors this duality of power becomes internalised and 
perpetuated through a tacit form of social knowledge which Giddens terms “practical 
consciousness knowledge” (1984: 41-42). Practical consciousness knowledge differs 
significantly from Marxist approaches to power where ideology is invoked – either 
as false-consciousness (Lukes, 1974) or hegemony (Gramsci, 1971) – to achieve and 
perpetuate domination by concealing ‘true consciousness’ or alternative 
interpretations of society. Giddens rejects wholesale the idea that power is 
“inherently oppressive” (1984: 257) and rather asserts that “sectional interests” are 
not “germane to [power’s] definition" (ibid.: 15).  
 
Instead, power relations within structuration exist asymmetrically placing “mutual 
autonomy and dependence” at the centre of power’s conceptualisation (Giddens, 
1979: 93). As a result, individuals are conceived as “semi-autonomous agent[s]” that 
always possess some power within social structures and choose to act as they do 
“through a critical evaluation of the costs associated with alternative courses of 
action” (Haugaard, 1997: 109-110). What emerges, then, from Giddens’ Theory of 
Structuration is arguably a robust sociological conceptualisation of power that 
overcomes earlier tensions between agency and structure and shifts power away from 
Marxist concerns of political economic co-option. 
 
Laydar (1985), Barbalat (1987) and Clegg (1989), however, critique Giddens’ work 
for replacing structural constraints with an overly subjectivist ontology. They argue 
variously that Giddens’ work on structuration focuses too much on individual agency 
and thus downplays more objective interpretations of durable and determining social 
structures which are replaced with "a reality of structure [as] a practical 
accomplishment of the reproduced conduct of situated actions with definite 
intentions and interests" (Giddens, 1976: 127). This represents an incongruity in 
Giddens approach to power as despite asserting that “sectional interests” are not 
relevant to definitions of power, Giddens un-problematically aligns structuration 
with “definite intentions and interests” thus returning us to Lukes and Gramsci’s 
earlier political conceptualisations of power.  
The issue of “sectional interests” left problematically unresolved by Giddens is 
  26 
addressed in greater depth by Bourdieu (1984; 1989). Bourdieu develops a model of 
power, like Giddens, premised on the duality of structure and agency but that 
accounts for the strategic manipulation of its constituting elements. Like Giddens 
(1984), Bourdieu (1977) asserts that objectivist and subjectivist perspectives of 
society exist in a dialectical relationship:  
On the one hand, the objective structures that the sociologist constructs, in the 
objectivist moment, by setting aside the subjective representations of the 
agents, form the basis for these representations and constitute the structural 
constraints that bear upon interactions; but, on the other hand, these 
representations must also be taken into consideration particularly if one wants 
to account for the daily struggles, individual and collective, which purport to 
transform or to preserve these structures (1989: 15).  
Bourdieu terms the two elements within this dialectic ‘Habitus’ (the structures 
forming the basis and constraint for actors) and ‘Field’ (representations of social 
activity transforming or preserving structures).  
Habitus and Field can only function relationally and in doing so both enable and 
constrain actors. A Field is composed of actors participating in subjective social 
activity based on their knowledge of the world around them. This knowledge is 
consequently shaped by their Habitus that is, in turn, constituted by objective 
structures. Thus, Habitus enables actors to make sense of the world around them, 
while at the same time limiting the scope of action based on existing social 
structures.  
Bourdieu makes an important conceptual break with Giddens, however, by asserting 
that the creation of constraint occurs through the relational positioning of individual 
or collective actors through specific strategies applied by actors that “occupy a 
higher position in one of the hierarchies of objective space” (1989: 16). These 
strategies are necessary to maintain hierarchical positions within society and function 
by generating what Bourdieu terms ‘symbolic capital’ – that is “the form that the 
various species of capital assume when they are perceived and recognised as 
legitimate”6 (ibid.: 17).  
                                               
6 Bourdieu continues Giddens’ general conceptual break with a classical Marxist economic 
determinism by devising a wider interpretive framework for ‘capital’ based on empirical research. As 
well adopting economic capital as one resource of what Bourdieu terms the “fundamental powers” he 
also introduces cultural capital and social capital, which operate as non-economic forces in construing 
symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1989). 
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Operationalising this model of power through an analysis of elite culture, Bourdieu 
(1984) demonstrates how “strategies of condescension” are used to reify “good taste” 
by establishing the habits and dispositions of certain elite social groups as natural to 
those who exist within the culture and thus differentiating them from other arbitrary 
cultures or ways of life. Once this elite – albeit arbitrary - culture has become 
naturalised it becomes a scarce commodity conferring superiority on those within the 
particular habitus and as a result “legitimises existing relations of domination” within 
a framework of consensual conventionality (Haugaard, 2002: 227-228).  
The centrality of strategic agency in shaping structural social relations in Bourdieu’s 
theory is crucial in returning analyses of power to concerns of accounting for social 
change. In Bourdieu’s interpretation, power is applied strategically by social groups 
to ensure arbitrary cultures and practices are established as the natural order or truth 
and which, in turn, prevents “a potential for knowledge which is undistorted by 
power” (Haugaard, 2002: 229) from existing. This challenges Giddens Theory of 
Structuration which fails to address adequately the question of how social practices 
and structures evolve. The source of this limitation is arguably Giddens’ over-
reliance on the ontological security of practical consciousness knowledge (Giddens, 
1984: 50) which closes down the possibility for conflict and challenge and thus 
perpetuates an individual’s structural reproduction of society (Haugaard, 1997: 113-
114). 
As a result, structuration fails to account for conflict and domination and lacks a 
conceptual space to understand how social practices change and evolve. In contrast, 
Bourdieu moves the conceptualisation of power back towards a concern with 
domination by keeping his model of power open to the exercise of strategic agency 
in order to shape societal structural relations. By integrating this perspective, 
Bourdieu is able to articulate power as a duality that can either transform or 
perpetuate structures of consensual domination (1984; 1989).  
This view of power is addressed head-on by Laclau (1980) and Laclau and Mouffe 
(1987; 1985) which adopt a radical reinterpretation of Gramscian hegemony to 
identify a conceptual escape route from false consciousness, economic determinism 
and other normative concerns of classical Marxism by investigating the discursive 
function of power.  
The focus on discourse arises from a post-structuralist ontology that argues reality 
and meaning is constituted through language, and in particular the destabilising 
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system of differences that generates meaning. This meaning is constructed 
relationally through the interaction of words rather than through any essentialist 
notion of meaning located in the underlying signification of language (Saussure, 
1960). Laclau and Mouffe extend the epistemological relativism of purely linguistic 
discourse to discourses constituted by “the ensemble of phenomena in and through 
which social production of meaning takes place” (Laclau, 1980: 87). Adopting this 
interpretive position enables them to conclude that within society there exists “no 
single underlying principle fixing” meaning (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 111). Such a 
perspective requires that earlier theories of power premised on a normative true or 
false consciousness (Bourdieu, 1984; Gramsci, 1971; Lukes, 1974)7 or ontological 
security (Giddens, 1984) must be rejected. Equally, classical Marxist notions of 
economic determinism are also undermined as through Laclau and Mouffe’s reading 
even the economic is now discursive (Haugaard and Lenter, 2006: 48).  
One fundamental problem arising from a discursive theory of power is that the 
relational logic of meaning creates a situation whereby an ultimate “transcendental 
signified” is absent and thus extends “the domain of play and signification infinitely” 
(Derrida 1978: 280 cited in Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 112). Thus, if meaning can 
never be fully fixed, how can power be exercised? Laclau and Mouffe respond to this 
critique by conceptualising power through “nodal points” that function as “privileged 
discursive points” partially fixing meaning “to dominate the field of discursivity, to 
arrest the flow of differences” (ibid.).  
These nodal points are generated through the use of “articulatory practices” (ibid.: 
114-115) that are “constituted in the general field of discursivity” (ibid.) which, in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s radical Marxist project, is the liberal democratic framework of 
Western society. Within this framework, then, institutional actors strategically devise 
and implement articulatory practices in discourses relevant to their position in civil 
society in order to create nodal points and fix meaning in their favour. By locating 
power in the flow of discursive meaning any reference to a “transcendental or 
originative subject” (ibid.) disappears and the operational capacity of power, as well 
as its strategic management, is hidden within the consensual framework of liberal 
democracy. 
                                               
7 Although it should be noted that Gramsci’s interpretation of true and false consciousness is 
perceptibly close to Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive approach in as much as he acknowledges the role 
of a relativistic and strategic selection of the most appropriate ideology necessary to derive power. 
See: Fontana (2006). 
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Laclau and Mouffe’s account of power as a hegemonic discursive practice is not with 
critique, however. It can be argued that the Post-Marxist position from which they 
analyse power (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987) risks limiting the wider potential of their 
theory by constraining it to considerations of democratic politics, however radical 
(Clegg, 1989: 183). A further critique is made by Bocock (1986) who argues that 
certain articulatory practices operate as more durable practices that permanently fix 
meaning in society through what Clegg calls “essential nodality” (1989: 184). For 
example, money operating as a “cash nexus” creates an essential nodality by 
generating “purely external links between people in society” that “obscur[e] and 
mystif[y]” discursively symbolic social relationships (Bocock, 1986: 108). Thus, it is 
the “impersonal” materiality of money that comes into play to stabilise and fix 
meaning by effectively placing it outside Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive 
conceptualisation of power.  
 
Despite these limitations, however, Laclau and Mouffe open the door for more 
explicit analyses of power's embeddedness within society’s fabric. Such 
embeddedness potentially collapses agent-centric and structural traditions and 
dissolves power into complex networks of macro and micro-level, material and non-
material instantiations characterised by the work of Michel Foucault, Bruno Latour, 
Michel Callon and Stewart Clegg, among others.  
 
Constitutive Power: Networked Perspectives  
 
While Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive theory of power operates within a liberal 
democratic framework – albeit from a radical Marxist perspective - Michael 
Foucault’s extensive theoretical account of power8 engages with, but importantly 
goes beyond the juridico-legal framework of modern democracies. Instead, Foucault 
turns his attention to accounting historically for the “modes of objectification that 
transform human beings into subjects” (Foucault, 1983: 326).  
 
Such a project marks a distinct break with both the conflictual and consensual 
traditions of power by opening up the possibility to conceive power as a productive 
force. Significantly, Foucault’s analysis of power enables us to understand how 
                                               
8 I will not be attempting to provide a comprehensive overview of Foucault’s engagement with power 
given the scale and scope of his work and also the fact that Foucault’s analyses of power emerge as “a 
unity with differences of emphasis rather than of fundamental substance” (Bernauer and Rasmussen 
1987) For exemplary overviews of Foucault’s work on power, see Haugaard (1997) and Clegg (1989) 
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power comes to constitute reality both discursively and through the creation and use 
of distinct disciplining apparatuses or dispositifs. As with Laclau and Mouffe, 
Foucault interprets power as not possessing a “distinct origin” or “basic nature” 
enacted through agency or structure to achieve causal outcomes. Rather power is a 
relational force “rooted in the whole network of the social” that “applies itself to 
immediate everyday life (Foucault, 1983: 345; 331). This form of power, Foucault 
asserts: 
 
categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him 
to his identity, imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognise and 
others have to recognise in him. It is a form of power that makes individuals 
subjects (ibid.: 331). 
 
As such, power operates from “within the social body, rather than from above it” 
(Foucault, 1980: 39) [emphasis in original] by establishing ‘domains’ of everyday 
practices (Foucault, 1977b: 194). This gives rise to a conception of power possessing 
constitutive – that is, positive, productive as opposed to negative, restrictive – 
capacities (Haugaard, 1997: 41). For example, within modern democracies 
individuals are given individual sovereignty by the government or state. In granting 
this freedom, however, the government or state gains the ability to regulate, control 
and modify individual behaviours without the need for physical domination.  
 
In accordance with this principle, power acts as a form of subjectifying knowledge 
produced and managed through a range of discursive practices conceived as  
“systems of communication” (1983: 337). Building on Laclau and Mouffe (1985; 
1987) and Bourdieu’s work (1984), these systems or “discursive formations” 
(Foucault, 1989: 38) constitute meaning and exercise power through the selective use 
and appropriation of language and other symbolic systems. In turn they become 
accepted within everyday life as a “language of truth” and thus gain power to define 
and shape individual subjectivities (Haugaard, 1997: 56).  
 
In addition to this discursively-created power Foucault further identifies the 
application of “physical resources” or “objective capacities” to enforce “normal 
subjectivity” within society (Foucault, 1983: 337). The combination of discursive 
formations and material resources or capacities come to constitute disciplinary 
practices, or more specifically apparatuses (dispositifs) that function as a 
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“heterogenous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, 
regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures […] in short, the said as much as 
the unsaid” (Foucault, 1977a: 194). Examples identified in Foucault’s work include 
the surveillance and assessment of penal, educative and psychiatric institutions 
(Foucault, 1977b; 1984).  
 
Foucault’s engagement with power culminates in the, arguably unfinished, 
development of a more generalised theory of power (Haugaard, 1997: 72). Emerging 
from his detailed yet diverse studies analysing power’s strategic deployment in 
social, medical and cultural institutions predominantly established during the early 
phases of industrial capitalism. Foucault’s work traces the outlines of what he terms 
“governmentality” (Foucault, 2009), which is is understood as “the way in which the 
conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed” (Foucault, 1983: 341).  
Governmentality yields a number of related and fecund concepts, such as biopolitics, 
biopolitical power and a concern for self-management through ‘technologies of the 
self’. Drawing together such concepts Foucault attempts to provide a generalised 
account of the way contemporary disciplinary apparatuses and technologies come to 
be applied to the regulation of – and resistance by – individuals (Foucault, 2008). 
 
It can be argued, however, that the core elements of Foucault’s general theory of 
power have been realised in greater detail posthumously. For example, Deleuze 
(1992) asserts that post-World War II the dominant episteme of Foucault’s 
disciplinary society has been transformed into the Control Society. The Control 
Society has emerged, Deleuze argues, as a result of the proliferation of 
communication and computation technologies, such as telecommunication networks, 
the rise of computing, invention of the internet and rise of information-based 
economies.  
 
Such an episteme, in turn, operates in close alignment with Foucault’s notion of 
biopolitical power – or biopower – and is marked by an intensification of apparatuses 
of governmentality whose functions become increasingly immanent to the social 
field. That is, while disciplinary power is exercised through “closed […] and 
quantitative logics” that “fixed individuals within institutions but did not succeed in 
consuming them completely” in the control society Foucault’s biopower becomes 
premised on “open, qualitative and affective” relations (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 24) 
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that captures, controls and manipulates the entire body through the continual and 
real-time modulation of social relations, values and expectations (Deleuze, 1992). 
 
Building on the Foucauldian interpellation of individuals into complex and immanent 
networks constituting the social field, Actor-Network Theory (ANT) arguably offers 
a “much more radical” (Munro, 2009: 132) theory of power than either Lukes (1974) 
or Foucault (1977b) articulated. ANT, like Foucauldian power, finds its key concepts 
and articulations diffused throughout studies within a number of scholarly fields. 
ANT’s radical – as well as contested and controversial - agenda (Latour, 1998; 
2005a) is one that attempts to renegotiate the relationships in society between micro- 
and macro-level and material and non-material entities (Callon and Latour, 1981).  
 
Such a project asserts that society is not a concrete space constituted through 
individual agency or social structures but is rather “a circulating entity” [emphasis in 
original] (Latour, 1998: 17) that is best conceived as a network (in the Deleuzian 
rhizomatic sense9) - which is continually produced and transformed through the free 
association and interaction of actors (Law, 1998: 2).  
 
Crucially, ANT draws inspiration from Foucault’s earlier deconstruction of the 
human sciences and rejects the anthropocentric dominance of social theories of 
power (Munro, 2009: 125). It refuses to allow the physicality or materiality of nature 
and the phenomenologically-based ‘social’ to play different parts in any analysis of 
power relations (Callon, 1986: 3). As a result, ANT conceptualises power through a 
“generalised symmetry” between material and social actors which must be 
interpreted agnostically to prevent a premature, anthropocentric determination of 
power while “the identity of the implicated actors … is still being negotiated” 
(Callon, 1986: 3-4). 
 
ANT’s conceptualisation of power is best exemplified through what its leading 
protagonists term the “sociology of translation” (Callon, 1986). This analytical 
mechanism accounts for how “networks of interest are actually constituted and 
reproduced through conscious strategies and unwitting practices constructed by the 
actors” (Clegg, 1989: 204). Translation typically occurs through four “moments” 
(Callon, 1986: 6-15): The first, problematisation, occurs when an actor or actors 
                                               
9 For a detailed, if obtuse, account of rhizomes and rhizomatic networks see Chapter 1 in Deleuze  and 
Guattari (1987). 
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identify and articulate a specific problem or question, determine a network of actors 
requisite for its resolution and position themselves as an “obligatory passage point” 
through which all negotiations must pass prior to a solution being found. Obligatory 
passage points are operationally consanguineous to Laclau and Mouffe’s “nodal 
points” (1985) as both confer an indispensability on actor(s) by making them a 
“conduit through which traffic must necessarily pass” (Clegg, 1989: 205). 
 
Once problematisation has occurred then actor(s) must seek out allies and lock them 
into place to solidify and support the resolution of their problem. This process is 
achieved through interessement, that is: the stabilisation of the identities of actors 
implicated in the problem and achieved through actor(s) coming between requisite 
allies and competing problematisations which present a potential source of tension in 
the model (Callon, 1986: 8-9). Significantly, interessement can utilise both material 
and/or immaterial actors, redefined as abstract or non-figurative “actants” (Latour, 
2005a: 54; 71) prior to their stabilisation.  
 
Thirdly, enrolment, refers to instances where interessement has been successful. That 
is, it “designates the device by which a set of interrelated roles is defined and 
attributed to actors who accept them” (Callon, 1986: 10). If all three moments are 
achieved, then the final process required for effective translation of interests occurs: 
the mobilisation of actors. Mobilisation refers to the methods and devices used to 
ensure that the interests defined initially are effectively represented by enrolled 
actors and do not “betray or undercut” (Clegg, 1989: 205) the representations needed 
to resolve the original problematisation. Once mobilisation has been achieved it’s 
possible to see how power has been exercised, then, through the negotiation and 
creation of a “constraining network of relationships” (Callon, 1986: 15). 
 
This abstraction of power is, however, more complex when operationalised owing to 
the additional ANT notion of controversy (Callon, 1986: 16). Controversies are 
defined as either strategically planned or socially contingent events occurring within 
the generalised symmetry of ANT. Such events destabilise the representations of 
actors and, thus, challenge, problematise or undermine the translation process and 
consequently generates the need for continual (re)negotiation of an actor’s actions. 
ANT, then, presents a radical conceptualisation of power that attempts to account for 
the ways in which strategic actors and contingent non-human forces shape reality 
through associative and productive networks.   
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If ANT is perhaps best seen as a methodological or applied theory for mapping 
power within complex symbolic-material networks, Clegg (1989) establishes a more 
comprehensive framework for interpreting power from an organisational position. 
Recombining earlier agent-centric theories of power (Dahl, 1957) with post-modern 
or post-structuralist constitutive approaches (Callon, 1986; Foucault, 1977b; Law, 
1986) Clegg devises a tripartite model of power characterised by relational “circuits” 
(Clegg, 1989). Each circuit instantiates a specific type of power, from agent-centric 
causality to the socially constructed domain and finally a constituting system 
determining the social domain, which operate across circuits simultaneously. The 
interaction between these multi-variant functions of power can be articulated as 
follows:  
 
While episodic, one-dimensional conceptions of agency and power may tell 
us something about the nature of power relations between an already 
constituted A and B, it can tell us nothing about the constitutive nature of the 
relational field in which A and B presently are nor how this privileges and 
handicaps them respectively, in relation to those resources that are constituted 
as powerful (Clegg, 1989: 208-209). 
 
In Clegg’s model, then, the conflictual approach to power is resurrected as a useful 
way of understanding episodic instances of direct causal agency where interests are 
exercised at an individual level, rather than, say, broader instances of the 
“constitutive agency of an ontologically instantiating human being” (ibid.: 187). 
More significantly, Clegg updates Dahl’s agent-centric notion of power by stressing 
that the constituting agency need not be human (ibid.). For example, Clegg expressly 
acknowledges that agency can be constituted through collective organisational 
decisions or expressed as more material forms, such as databases or other 
technological forms of control, providing an explicit link to Foucauldian and ANT 
perspectives on power. Episodic power can be understood as occurring, then, when 
there are “systematic relationships between agencies and events” that exist within a 
clearly “delimited framework” of wider social and systemic circuits of power 
(ibid.: 212). 
 
Clegg’s second, ‘social’, circuit of power operates by “fixing or refixing relations of 
meaning and of membership [i.e. identity or subjectivity]” (ibid.: 224) in order to 
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strategically manage episodic power. For meaning and membership to become fixed, 
stable power relations have to be established through the creation of “obligatory 
passage points” which render power “solid, real and material” (ibid.: 207). 
 
Problematically, the creation of obligatory passage points is highly contingent on the 
ability of episodic exercises of power to enrol other agencies, stabilise power 
networks and establish alliances that consequently fix meaning and membership 
(ibid.: 225). The process of successfully exercising episodic agency and stabilising 
power relations at a social level is a continual conflict. Furthermore, this conflict is 
itself embedded within and influenced by the third, constitutive circuit of power 
exercised at a systemic level.  
 
Systemic power operates by constituting certain manifestations of dispositional 
power while preventing others from being realised. That is, depending on the 
particular constitution of systemic power: “[c]ertain fixtures of meaning are 
privileged, certain membership categories are aligned with these meanings […] and, 
consequently, a specific organisational field […] or ‘actor network’ is constructed” 
(ibid.). Importantly, however, given the contingent and fluid relationship between 
power within and across each circuit Clegg’s model remains open to destabilisation 
and transformation. 
 
Central to this contingent transformation of social and systemic power is the concept 
of “organisational outflanking” (ibid.: 218) which can be adopted as both a strategy 
for social control as well as social change. For example, at a system-level, dominant 
actors in a system can use power strategically to establish a situation that prevents 
resistance by individuals. In turn, this creates an “absence of collective organisation 
to do otherwise” at a social level (Clegg, 1989: 226). Organisational outflanking, 
however, can also be adopted as a form of resistance to create change at a social and 
systemic level. Such change can be endogenous due to contingencies within episodic 
power outcomes that destabilise and transform meaning and membership; or due to 
innovation in the techniques used to facilitate systemic power, such as technological 
developments or collective action (Clegg, 1989: 224).  
 
Alternatively, change can be exogenous due to the “result of environmental 
contingencies which disturb the fixed fields of force” within social or systemic 
circuits (Clegg, 1989: 224). As a result, Clegg outlines an increasingly 
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comprehensive and complex model that arguably brings us closer to an 
understanding of how micro and macro; material and non-material actors become 
enmeshed in networked flows of power. 
 
Such a perspective highlights the potential of contemporary power to organise and 
shape reality through continually contested organising processes shaped both from 
within and through externalities. which, importantly, incorporate material as well as 
symbolic components. These developments in the field of power are crucial as they 
provide a conceptual framework for contemporary articulations of power and, 
moreover, provide a direction and set of qualities which will enable a deeper 
identification and understanding of the shape of contemporary media power. 
 
The Liberal Media and Power 
 
The modern, liberal, mass media emerged from the political transformation of 
modern democracy that occurred in the eighteenth-century when early democratic 
models were subjected to social and economic pressures forcing them to expand and 
enfranchise greater numbers of individuals in society (Curran, 2002). This 
transformation led to a model of mass democracy that developed a symbiotic 
relationship with mass media and “enormously strengthened” the democratisation of 
British – and later American – society (Curran, 2002: 4-5; Louw, 2005: 8-48). 
 
According to this interpretation, the liberal media operates as an institution that 
performs a number of important functions in the maintenance of democratic society. 
Firstly, the liberal media acts as a “watchdog” (Keane, 1991: 16) to keep a check on 
abuses of power; it also works to improve “the circulation of ideas and information 
in society, making government more transparent […] improving the level of debate” 
(Louw, 2005: 45) and finally, by doing so, enables rational decision-making to take 
place (Curran, 2002: 225-227). 
 
The normative framework most often deployed for understanding liberal media’s 
engagement with power is Habermas’ public sphere (Curran, 2002; Dahlgren, 1995; 
Bennett and Entman, 2001; Davis, 2007).10  Habermas (1989) asserts that in the 
                                               
10 For a comprehensive overview of alternative models see Curran J. (2002). Media and Power, 
London: Routledge.  
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eighteenth-century society underwent a structural transformation that gave rise to a 
“public sphere” - a public space 
 
where access to information affecting the public good is widely available, 
where discussion is free of domination and where all those participating in 
public debate do so on an equal basis (Curran, 2002: 233) 
 
Arising from this transformation members of society can “collectively determine 
through rational argument the way in which they wish to see society develop” and in 
turn in help shape government policy (ibid.). Used selectively, Habermas’ model 
offers a largely unproblematic conceptualisation of liberal media built on rational 
debate, scrutiny of government and concern for a greater public good (ibid.: 33).  
 
Critics, however, argue that the broader implications of Habermas’ model present 
significant challenges to an optimistic interpretation of mass media power. 
Pragmatic critiques levelled at the public sphere include the over-idealisation of 
rational debate as a product of a specific historical and cultural milieu based around 
coffee-houses and a fully independent press (ibid.). Moreover, they assert that the 
notion of the public sphere belies the historical reality of media power in mass 
democracy whereby the mass media - free from earlier monarchical and government 
constraints slowly became “refeudalised” (ibid.: 34) by the mass industrial 
corporations, bourgeois elites interest groups and ideologically aligned political 
parties emerging from mass industrial capitalism. 
 
Such a refeudalisation, critics argued, replaced a public sphere premised on 
individualism and a free media with the new imperative of manipulating mass 
opinion and shaping ideological beliefs to meet commercial or other elite interests 
(Thompson,1990). In response to these criticisms Habermas (1996) updated his 
conceptualisation of the public sphere to account for the modern mass media’s role 
within an extended civil society and its capitulation to corporate power.  
 
Rather than a single space, the public sphere becomes “a network for communicating 
information and points of view” (Habermas, 1996: 360) which are then connected to 
the central political core via a series of peripheral civil society actors and groups, 
such as voluntary associations, private associations, social movements, unions 
among others. Despite the revision of the public sphere into what Gitlin (1998) terms 
  38 
“public sphericules” a fundamental limitation remains in its preoccupation with 
homogenous groups or audiences located within clearly bordered regions or nation-
states. Such a perspective, Curran (2002) asserts, is rendered problematic by the 
effects of globalisation, social fragmentation and the emergence of a more complex 
social structure based upon dynamic networks (Castells, 1996; Curran, 2002: 234). 
 
From within the realms of such socio-economic and technological transformations 
further critiques have emerged challenging the idealised Habermasian notion of 
rational, pluralist political participation by citizens informed through free civic 
discourse (Bennett and Entman, 2001; Dahlgren and Gurevitch, 2005; Stanyer, 
2008). Such perspectives argue that in reality media power in modern democracies is 
increasingly influenced by political power (Cook, 1998; Esser et al., 2001). McLeod, 
Kosicki and Mcleod have gone as far as to assert that: “the center of the new political 
system appears to be the media” (McLeod, Kosicki and McLeod cited in Blumler 
and Gurevitch, 1995: 3).  
 
Crucially, within this modern political-media environment a broader network of 
informal, yet increasingly professionalised, participants extending beyond 
Habermas’ formal civil society actors become enrolled. These participants include 
politicians, their political advisers, public opinion researchers and professional 
communicators and have come to constitute a complex and dynamic political 
communications system (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995: 11-25; Stanyer, 2008: 3-4). 
 
This emergence of this system has been in part due to wider historical forces that 
have led to a decline in once strong mass collective political identities, shared 
societal values and cultural experiences generated by traditionally dominant party 
ideologies (Bennett, 2003a; Dalton, 1999; Dalton, 2000). Such forces have been 
identified as part of the turn towards a contemporary society where a reflexive 
modernity (Beck, 1997) or post-industrialism (Norris, 2000) has created a “sub-
political” (Beck, 1997) or “lifestyle” politics (Bennett, 1998). In turn, this new form 
of politics is characterised by political expression based on personal identity and 
political behaviour no longer confined to voting or collective action: 
 
The psychological energy … people once devoted to the grand political 
projects of economic integration and nation-building in industrial democracies 
is now increasingly directed toward personal projects of managing and 
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expressing complex identities in a fragmenting society. (Bennett, 1998: 755) 
 
This dynamic is amplified further by through globalisation and modernisation, 
leading to increasingly diverse and multi-cultural societies (Blumler and Gurevitch, 
1995; Swanson and Mancini, 1995). In response to these trends the media has 
adopted an increasingly market-focused position (Murdock and Golding, 2005: 10-
11; Stanyer, 2008) that places political or democratic discourse in direct competition 
with other consumer or lifestyle-focused communications (Bennett, 2003a; Blumler 
and Kavanagh, 1999). 
 
As a result, the public interest dominated discourses of the early, liberal mass media 
typified by Habermas’ public sphere becomes marginalised (Blumler and Gurevitch, 
2005: 106-107) and the traditional distinctions between political/democratic 
reporting and entertainment collapses. As “publics are more defined around 
consumer values,” Slater (2001) argues, “the discourses of public life become 
discourses of consumption far removed from the array of issues in the policy sphere” 
(Slater, 2001: 21).  
 
Such a “diverse, fragmented and complex” (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999: 209; 
Bennett, 1998) media environment has led to the increasing professionalisation of 
political communications and media production processes (Bennett and Entman, 
2001: 15-17; Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Scammell, 1995) and created a political 
environment in which 
 
power relations among key message providers and receivers are being 
rearranged; the culture of political journalism is being transformed; and 
conventional meanings of “democracy” and “citizenship” are being 
questioned and rethought. (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999: 209) 
 
Media power, then, is represented as an “increasing struggle to control and influence 
popular perceptions of key [democratic] events” using “news management” 
techniques (Blumler, 1990: 103). Although highly dependent on external variables, 
such as public support, proximity to elections or key democratic events, political 
communication can be strategically implemented to manage news owing to the way 
the media - and news production in particular – functions as a set of institutionalised 
practices (Louw, 2005: 72-84; Tuchman, 1978). 
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Features of such institutional news management include routinised information 
gathering, cyclical news-cycles, normative criteria for sourcing information as well 
as ingrained organisational cultures and values (Louw, 2005; Tuchman, 1978). As a 
consequence, political communicators are able to manage newsgathering inputs and 
production to influence public opinion. Drawing on early studies of dominant news 
management techniques identified in UK and US contexts, Denton and Woodward 
demonstrate how political communicators “define, justify, legitimate, persuade and 
inspire more effectively” (1998: 184) through agreeing and aligning media messages; 
crafting communications adapted specifically for mass media, e.g. sound-bites for 
use in time-sensitive news bulletins, and planning their targeted dissemination 
(McNair, 2003: 141; Scammell, 1995; Stanyer, 2008: 47-50). More recently studies 
have plotted two fundamental shifts in news management. Firstly, media 
management has shifted from key events in democratic life-cycles (Blumler, 1990: 
103), such as elections, wars and major policy decisions (Davis, 2007: 3) to a 
continual exertion of media power located in “metacoverage” (Esser et al., 2001) or 
“process coverage” (McNair, 2000: 50; Stanyer, 2008: 65; McNair, 2003: 144-145). 
 
Such a shift accounts for the ways in which the media “self-referentially and self-
consciously diverges from its customary role as a conduit of information to one of 
reporting on how it is one of the actors on the … stage” (Esser et al., 2001: 17) thus 
creating a situation where journalists "meta-communicate the awareness that they are 
being manipulated and attempt to publicly deconstruct its purpose” (D'Angelo, 1999: 
6). On one hand this may be seen as a useful practice revealing the hitherto hidden 
practices of strategic news management. Research, however, has indicated that 
metacoverage functions primarily as a “defense strategy” for the media, rather than 
as a tool with which to educate the public about the political and power-driven media 
processes taking place (Esser et al., 2001: 40-41).  
 
Secondly, the internet-enabled empowerment of individuals has yielded a more 
central role in mediating political events for ordinary citizens or new types of non-
professional or informal media actors, such as bloggers and ‘citizen journalists’ 
(Lasica,2003; Rosen, 2008). This increasingly informal media environment is 
challenging traditional approaches to political communication where predominantly 
one-way, mass media outlets and the strategic management of the news-cycle 
enabled political and professional media actors to control communication flows. 
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With the rise of the internet and social media political communication has become 
increasingly characterised by accessibility, porosity, informational openness and 
competitiveness (McNair, 2006: 199). 
 
This new media landscape, according to Chadwick and Stanyer, creates “a more 
open, fluid political opportunity structure […] that increasingly enables the British 
public to exert its influence and hold politicians and media to account” (Chadwick 
and Stanyer, 2010: 2). All of which transformations lead to a reality where it has 
become more important than ever before to go beyond just ‘selling’ a political party, 
leader or government policy during key periods of democratic governance. Instead 
news or media management requires a “perpetual” or “permanent” political 
communications strategy (Needham, 2005; Nimmo, 1999; Norris, 2000) that 
increasingly needs to become “all-encompassing” (Stanyer, 2008: 43) in order to 
engage with and respond to the increasingly grassroots and amateur-driven media 
power of the day-to-day political realm.  
 
Media Power: Critical Approaches  
 
While some scholars interpret the changes in political communication and news 
management as having a positive outcome on information accessibility and political 
accountability (McNair, 2000; Norris, 2000; Popkin, 2006), others view 
developments as further supporting evidence for the erosion of democracy and 
accretion of elite – predominantly corporate - power. Such advocates for a critical 
interpretation of media power attempt to demonstrate the ways in which dominant 
interests use the media to exert social control without recourse to the use of force 
(Davis, 2007: 2) and to prevent democratic “legitimation crises” (Bennett and 
Entman, 2001: 2; Habermas, 1976; Castells, 2009: 12) from occurring. 
 
At the core of these accounts is the assertion that dominant elites exploit the media’s 
structural functions by leveraging a range of economic, political and/or cultural 
connections (Davis, 2007: 4). Economic interpretations of media power, for example, 
draw their impetus from broadly classical Marxist analyses of the media’s political 
role in dominating public thought by perpetuating an ideology or false consciousness 
aligned with capitalist or ‘elite’ interests. The media’s output, then, both reproduces 
capitalist social structures and maximises economic value. Such deterministic 
thinking can be traced directly to Marx and Engels’ early work, in particular The 
German Ideology:  
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The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class 
which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling 
intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its 
disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, 
so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of 
mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the 
ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material 
relationships grasped as ideas (Marx and Engels, 1932) 
 
One of the most defining applications of this approach to media power can be found 
in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. Here the authors critique 
the mass media as a set of institutions that standardise and mass-produce cultural 
forms and content in order to satisfy a public demand, itself generated by the 
industries using mass-marketing techniques (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1989: 120-
168).  
 
In this “culture industry” media model (ibid.: 121), the mass public or citizens 
become consumers and considered as “not primary, but secondary, they are an object 
of calculation; an appendage of the machinery. The customer is not king, as the 
culture industry would like to have us believe, not its subject but its object” (Adorno, 
1973: 12). As a consequence of this commercial objectification the culture industry 
seeks to simplify and idealise reality through popular culture, which in turn 
standardises and homogenises public expectations and behaviour creating a 
consensual status quo that perpetuates domination by the ruling elites (Horkheimer 
and Adorno, 1989: 131-134). 
 
This domination is managed and maintained through the establishment of false 
choices, created by the culture industry to maintain a façade of autonomy and thus 
engender a false or unobtainable potential for social change:  
 
The ruthless unity in the culture industry is evidence of what will happen in 
politics. Marked differentiations … depend not so much on subject matter as 
on classifying, organising, and labeling consumers. Something is provided for 
all so that none may escape; the distinctions are emphasised and extended … 
Everybody must behave (as if spontaneously) in accordance with his 
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previously determined and indexed level, and choose the category of mass 
product turned out for his type. (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1989: 123) 
 
As a result, opportunities for the emergence of truly democratic debate or social 
change through media power are not only foreclosed but excluded and prevented 
from even occurring in the first instance (Adorno, 1973; Louw, 2005). 
 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s Marxist analyses of the culture industry mark an 
important theoretical development in critical approaches of media power – albeit one 
generated in response to a specific set of American political, economic and cultural 
phenomena (Curran and Seaton, 2003: 324-325). Building on this foundational work, 
contemporary studies into the political economy of the media have downplayed overt 
economically-determinist Marxist analyses in favour of a more pragmatic approach 
to political economy, taking into account the complex, globalised and informational 
economies in which the media currently operates (Murdock and Golding, 2005; 
Schudson, 2005). 
 
Reprising Horkheimer and Adorno’s earlier account in a contemporary context, it is 
argued that the economic priorities of mass media result in a failure for media power 
to be compatible with the normative ideals of the liberal media model. Studies show 
how capitulation to market-demands undermines democratic discourse as it aligns 
media output with dominant economic and political perspectives limiting debate and 
arguably reproducing a false consciousness which focuses media output on uncritical 
and ‘safe’ entertainment or lifestyle content that limits the potential for the public to 
critically appraise political or corporate interests (Curran, 2002; Curran and Seaton, 
2003; Davis, 2007; Herman and McChesney, 1998; McChesney, 1999; McChesney, 
2004). These micro-level accounts of media output are complemented by broader 
macro-level studies examining the way media ownership and control is becoming 
ever more concentrated into a smaller number of key corporations (Bagdikian, 2000; 
Castells, 2009) thus making it easier for dominant interests to mediate power in ways 
that limit democratic discourse. 
 
One of the most enduring contributions to the contemporary literature on the political 
economy of the mass media is Herman and Chomsky’s (1994) work on how the mass 
media exert power in ways that manufactures popular consent on behalf of state and 
private interests. Combining the micro and macro accounts the media outlined above 
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Herman and Chomsky challenge the popular assertion that the mass media derive 
news from unbiased and objective criteria and instead seek to account for the forces 
that cause mass media to produce “propaganda”, described as “the processes 
whereby [the media] mobilise bias, and the patterns of news choice that ensue” 
(Herman and Chomsky, 1994: lix-lx). 
 
This analysis is achieved through the construction of a propaganda model, “an 
analytical framework that … explain[s] the performance of the U.S. media in terms 
of the basic institutional structures and relationships within which they operate” 
(ibid.: xi). This framework identifies five factors that Herman and Chomsky use to 
account for the dominance of state and corporate propaganda in media power: size, 
ownership and profit orientation of media companies; advertising revenues as 
primary income source; control of news sources; “flak” (i.e. unofficial or covert 
regulation); and manipulation of broader social themes, e.g. anti-communism or the 
war on terror (ibid.: 2).  
 
Although Herman and Chomsky’s work identifies and applies a convincing 
theoretical framework to a comprehensive, critical analysis of mass media it 
nevertheless has been critiqued for its problematic adherence to the idealistic media 
“control paradigm” (McNair, 2006) as well as its over-emphasis of the media’s 
power to instil propagandist views among the mass public (Curran, 2002: 139-141). 
Despite these limitations, however, Herman and Chomsky crucially move critical 
analyses of media power beyond a preoccupation with media ownership and 
production by acknowledging the increasing significance of news sources and public 
relations as an important ‘mechanism of elite influence” in mediating power 
(Herman and Chomsky, 1994: xvii).  
 
This increased role of professional political and media actors in mediating power has 
led to a proliferation of studies critically analyzing the rise in modern public relations 
(PR) (Cottle, 2003; Davis, 2000; Davis, 2002; Davis, 2003; Franklin, 2004; 
Scammell, 1995). The study of PR, Cottle asserts, “takes us to the heart of key 
concerns and debates about the media’s relation to wider systems and structures of 
power” (Cottle, 2003: 3). In doing so, it provides a more complex perspective on 
media power that goes beyond economically and politically determinist accounts 
reliant on propagandist media effects for social control. 
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Such an account is supported by Davis (2002) whose extensive research into the use 
of political and corporate PR in the UK reveals an interpretation of media power 
more widely dispersed within society and less economically determined than 
previously thought (Davis 2002, 6). Davis (2000; Davis, 2002; Davis, 2003) 
examines the use of PR by official and non-official news sources, such as trade 
unions and NGOs, and concludes that the production of power is a highly contested 
process in which cultural capital plays an equal part as economic capital: 
 
Because PR does not necessarily rely on large capital expenditure, or the 
possession of a high degree of institutional legitimacy, more organisations, 
not fewer, are likely to achieve access that was hitherto denied them … set 
agendas and, on occasion, quite significantly disrupt their official and 
corporate counterparts (Davis, 2000: 54) 
 
As a result, neither political nor economic power is necessarily enough for media 
dominance (Davis, 2000: 40). Instead, media power is achieved through four inter-
related – yet independent – factors: economic capital; cultural capital; human 
resources and the strategic application of PR (ibid.: 54). While related, each factor 
ultimately functions independently; nor are factors exclusively available to official or 
non-official organisations or media actors. 
 
For example, while corporations have greater access to economic and human 
resources, they typically struggle to generate cultural capital; conversely while 
NGOs may not match corporate economic resources, they can outmanoeuvre 
corporations through their ability to generate cultural capital and mobilise human 
resources through their volunteer or supporter networks. As a result, the rise of 
public relations creates an interpretation of media power where the ability for a 
diverse range of institutional and non-institutional actors to possess the resources 
necessary to influence outcomes is much more open to contestation than previously 
thought. As Davies, concludes: “The rise of professional public relations means that 
institutions and corporations can further extend their media influence in the long-
term, but also that non-official sources have also gained a new means of access” 
(ibid.: 55). 
 
The notion that media power is an essentially contested process constituted by a 
range of factors going beyond the purely economic is further reinforced by cultural 
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analyses of media power. Such cultural critiques have predominantly adopted 
structural Marxist perspectives (Hall, 1986a) as a way to analyse the role ideology 
plays in enabling dominant groups to “grip the minds of masses” (Hall, 1986b: 2). 
Interpreted as such, ideology determines everyday cultural values, that is, the  
 
mental frameworks – the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of 
thought, and the systems of representation - which different classes and social 
groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render 
intelligible the way society works. (ibid.: 29) 
 
This interpretation presents ideology as “a ‘system of representations’ … through 
which we live” (Proctor, 2004: 45) rather than a classical Marxist false 
consciousness aligned with the problematic media “control paradigm” (McNair, 
2006). As a result, media power becomes “encoded” in a particular way by the mass 
media and subsequently “decoded” by the public – either in a related or potentially 
unrelated way to its encoding (Hall, 1973). 
 
Drawing on Althusserian notions of “relative autonomy” and “over-determination” 
Hall (1973: 129) articulates a “model of communication in which meaning does not 
reside at, nor can be guaranteed by, any particular moment” of the production of 
media power (Proctor, 2004: 61). This fundamentally transforms media’s power 
from a passive sender/receive relationship – inherent in both the political-economic 
control paradigm and the behaviouralism of liberal mass communication models - to 
one where meaning is actively produced, consumed and reproduced through the 
linguistic interplay of culturally conative and denotive signs present in the media 
(ibid.: 132-133). 
 
While this culturally created meaning is generated with a greater degree of autonomy 
than that acknowledged by earlier paradigms, it remains, however, structured by 
wider political discourses. Culturally active semiotic codes, Hall assets, are: 
 
not equal among themselves. Any society/culture tends, with varying degrees 
of closure, to impose its classifications of the social and cultural and political 
world. These constitute a dominant cultural order …mapped out into 
discursive domains, hierarchically organised into dominant or preferred 
meanings. (ibid.: 134) [emphasis in original] 
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Media power within a critical cultural framework, then, is a contested process 
existing along a preferred, negotiated and oppositional axis of meaning, albeit one 
prefigured by the wider everyday “meanings, practices and beliefs” (ibid.: 134-138) 
embedded in wider social, institutional and political power (Hall et al., 1978).  
 
While Hall’s highly influential work has informed a significant body of cultural 
research into active audiences resistant to Herman and Chomksy’s media propaganda 
model (Herman and Chomsky, 1994) it is also increasingly being challenged by 
critical cultural scholars who assert that the “close structural link between the 
economic, cultural and socio-political power … fails to account for the complex 
dynamics of the twenty-first-century media system” (McNair, 2006: viii-ix). 
 
McNair (2006) recognises the cultural and semiotic autonomy of Hall’s work but 
challenges the structural determinism inherent in his work on the grounds of 
weakened institutional structures in contemporary society. These institutional 
challenges are marked by a shift from the industrial “control paradigm” to a post-
industrial, “chaos paradigm” in which advanced capitalism - characterised by 
political volatility and media instability - transforms media power from “ideological 
control” to “anarchy and disruption; to the possibilities allowed for … dissent, 
openness and diversity” (McNair, 2006: vii).  
 
At the heart of this emerging paradigm is a non-linear conceptualisation of media 
power determined by globalised, internet-enabled, 24/7 news cycles. A key factor 
driving this transformation is what McNair terms the “end of ideology” (ibid.: 74-
87). This is understood as the reality that both the need and ability of dominant 
groups to generate and construct preferred meanings in a contemporary, globalised, 
multi-cultural society has declined: 
 
the ideological bi-polarity of the cold war had, by defining the limits to 
legitimate controversy or consensus, acted as a policing mechanism for 
journalists on both sides of the geo-strategic divide. When it ended, so did the 
need for cultural policing. Consensus was replaced by dissensus (ibid.: 83) 
 
The rise of a dissensual fragmentation of society arguably increases the 
independence of both media and its audiences. McNair argues the media has become 
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empowered to report with a greater flexibility and greater autonomy from dominant 
groups as evidenced by a “hyper-adversarialism” (ibid.: 71) and an increase in meta- 
or process coverage that reveals and analyses attempts by dominant groups to 
manage – or control – media content. At the same time, technological developments, 
such as phone-ins, public panel discussions and increasingly internet-enabled and 
empowered individuals authoring blogs and using tools such as Twitter to shape 
public discourse, have led to a rise in participatory media and given audiences 
“mediated access” to once isolated institutions and processes (ibid.: 66).  
 
As a result, a diverse and increasingly amateur or informal set of media actors are 
routinely given a role to play in influencing and shaping the structural domains of 
media power. It is important to note, however, that such a “pragmatic cultural 
optimism” (ibid.: viii) offered by McNair can be critiqued from orthodox critical 
perspectives as representing merely “calculated mutations” (Horkheimer and 
Adorno, 1989: 129) within capitalism’s totalising system, rather than a radical break 
with systemic dominance. 
 
Despite this, McNair’s perspective on media power remains significant in as much as 
it highlights the contemporary reality that 
   
the link between economic base and cultural superstructure is weakened. 
New information and communication technologies have not ended the 
concentration of media ownership ... But they have enabled an environment 
in which the latter are obliges in the own self-interest to share the public 
sphere with an increasingly diverse range of editorial viewpoints and voices 
(McNair, 2006: 93) 
 
Media power within a post-industrial chaos paradigm, then, is much more fluid than 
conceived by politically or economically deterministic accounts of the media. 
Contemporary media power “ebbs and flows between locations and centres” 
undermining the perceived dominance and “security” of traditional accounts 
(McNair, 2006: 203). 
 
Networked Media Power 
 
One of the defining characteristics of the contemporary media landscape’s 
metamorphosis from an industrial, control paradigm to a post-industrial chaos 
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paradigm has been the emergence and exponential growth globalised 
telecommunications networks and the internet. This shift has radically altered the 
scope and role of media power by transforming networked communication from a 
very old form of human practice and interaction traditionally restricted to private, 
localised environments or outperformed by centralised, industrial forms of 
organisation (Castells, 2001: 1-2) into “the archetypal form of contemporary social 
and technical organisation” (Livingstone, 2005: 12).  
 
Such a phenomenon has been conceived at a societal, economic, political and 
cultural level by early theorists as either the “network society” (Castells, 1996) or 
“networked information economy” (Benkler, 2006). Without doubt these continually 
evolving transformations have had a significant impact on public communications, 
the media and subsequently media’s power. At the same time, however, the 
emergence of such a complex networked communications environment has equally 
challenged the capability of research to adjust to the “pace of change” (Castells, 
2001: 3). As Livingstone (Livingstone, 2005: 11) has observed, the study of 
networked media and communications is “less institutionalised than, say, media 
studies or cultural studies,” political science or political communication. 
 
In response, scholars have developed a number of typologies for interpreting 
literature on networked media, communications and politics (Chadwick, 2009; 
Chadwick and Howard, 2009; Livingstone, 2005; Wellman, 2004). Chadwick (2009) 
and Chadwick and Howard (2009) in particular draw a distinction between 
optimistic/positive and pessimistic/negative schools of thought. In their typology 
optimistic approaches view networked media as redressing the balance of power 
away from dominant elites and returning it to individuals, while pessimistic 
perspectives interpret networked media as reinforcing existing power structures, 
albeit in new forms. 
 
Significantly, Chadwick and Howard introduce a third position they term 
“surprising” (Chadwick and Howard, 2009: 424-426) to account for research that 
seems to introduce an unforeseen or unrecognised complexity into the interpretation 
of networked politics and communication. This typology will be adopted throughout 
the remainder of this chapter to review existing literature on networked media power. 
However, I propose adopting the third “surprising” perspective and reinterpreting it 
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as representative of emergent studies that introduce novel or unique analyses or 
insights into the literature.  
 
Optimistic analyses of the networked communications environment have emerged 
primarily articulating a continued preoccupation with the Habermasian public sphere 
due in large part to the internet’s perceived ability to empower and connect 
individuals in a global public discourse that facilitates “communicative links between 
citizens and the power holders of society” (Dahlgren, 2005: 148). Broadly speaking, 
studies into the “networked public sphere” (Benkler, 2006: 176-177) have largely 
arisen from extant debates within literature on mass media (Dahlgren, 2001; 2005; 
McNair, 2009; Papacharissi, 2009) that aim to understand how the structure and 
content of a mass mediated public space can be revitalised by the internet’s expanded 
and accelerated information flow and increased interactivity between participants 
(McNair, 2009: 221-223).  
 
Marking a conceptual break with mass media and political science scholarship, 
however, Yochai Benkler (2006) addresses the public sphere debate from the 
perspective of the “networked information economy” (Benkler, 2006: 6-7) that 
conceptualises the networked communication environment as having “fundamentally 
altered the capacity of individuals … to be active participants … as opposed to 
passive readers, listeners or viewers” in the production of power (ibid.: 212). Benkler 
argues that such an account of the networked media environment is closely aligned 
with Habermas’ model of the public sphere although is more capable of accounting 
for the social and cultural complexity of modern democracies. This is achieved by 
empowering networked individuals to act collectively as a liberal “watchdog, a 
source of salient observations regarding matters of public concern, and a platform for 
discussing the alternatives open to a polity” (ibid.: 271). 
 
A further reason for optimism in analyses of networked media is the distributed 
communications architecture of the internet and the low capital requirements for 
producing and distributing information. Both Benkler (Benkler, 2006) and Castells 
(2009) believe this enables anyone with internet access to mediate power. This “mass 
self-communication” (Castells, 2009: 65-72) transforms traditional mass media 
power – typified as “more centralised, homogeneous and less pluralistic” (Beckett 
and Mansell, 2008: 4) into a decentralised, heterogeneous “social communication 
process” (Benkler, 2006: 181) characterised by a diverse and pluralistic range of 
  51 
participants (Bimber, 1998) and offering “avenues for citizen independence from 
mainstream news media and larger social forces” (Tewksbury and Rittenberg, 2009: 
197). In addition to the representative diversity offered by the radical pluralism 
offered by the networked media environment, its structural features further 
strengthen its resilience to state or corporate control.  
 
As decentralised and distributed networks, media production processes emerging 
from digitally-enabled actors often lack a single central point of control thus making 
it difficult to contain or censor contentious or politically sensitive information. This 
inevitably leads to “the emergence of multiple axes of information [that] provide new 
opportunities for citizens to challenge elite control of political issues” (Williams and 
Delli Carpini, 2004: 1209) and enhances “the potential for the media to exercise 
accountability over power” (McNair, 2006: 229).  
 
Tewksbury and Rittenberg see this as a “democratisation of the creation, 
dissemination, and consumption of news and information” (Tewksbury and 
Rittenberg, 2009: 197) while Castells (2007; 2009) goes further by asserting that 
mass self-communication” empowers individuals to “challenge and eventually 
change the power relations institutionalised in society” (Castells, 2007: 248). 
 
Such individual and collective efforts to challenge and transform societal power 
relations have been identified within extra-democratic forms, such as networked 
social movements, which use the internet to share information, coordinate and 
instantiate action (Bennett, 2003b; Castells, 2007; Castells, 2009; Chadwick, 2007) 
as well as in the traditional political realm where networked communications 
facilitate an increased engagement with and participation in democratic institutions 
(Bimber, 2000; Tewksbury and Rittenberg, 2009; Bimber, 2003; Hardy and 
Scheufele, 2005; Tolbert and McNeal, 2003).  
 
Although most scholars agree that the emergent networked communications 
environment is “bringing together individual citizens and informal networks through 
interconnected global webs of public communication” (Curran and Witschge, 2010: 
102), analyses of the internet as a force rejuvenating a global public sphere are not 
without extensive critique. Pessimistic analyses of the newly networked public 
sphere draw attention to the issue of internet access. Significant portions of global 
societies are on the wrong side of the “digital divide” (Dijk, 2005) thus universal 
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participation is likely to be significantly limited (Curran and Witschge, 2010; 
Dahlgren, 2001; Sparks, 2001) or biased towards affluent elites (Sparks, 2001: 83).  
 
Pessimist scholars have also questioned whether participation in the contemporary 
networked media environment is typified by the type of civic discourse idealised in 
the Habermasian model. Alternatively, they argue that the broader trends of media 
production and power are characterised by political and civic disengagement and an 
increased focus on lifestyle or entertainment content (Curran and Witschge, 2010; 
Papacharissi, 2010: 112-125; Sparks, 2001). Bimber (2000) observes that even where 
networked communications are adopted for political purposes, they 
“deinstitutionalise politics, fragment communication, and accelerate the pace of the 
public agenda and decision making” (Bimber, 2000: 333) rendering any notion of a 
viable public sphere incoherent.  
 
Similarly, Papacharissi (2009) reminds us that, above all, notions of an internet-
enabled Habermasian public sphere can be only idealistic:  
 
Romanticised retrospectives of past and future civic engagement often 
impose language and expectations that curtail the true potential of 
technologies of the present. The public sphere can be helpful in critiquing and 
contextualising the political role of online media, but not in prescribing that 
role (Papacharissi, 2009: 243) 
 
Further critique of networked media’s liberal effects include the replication of offline 
media consumption habits (Schoenbach et al., 2005; Hargittai, 2006; Tewksbury, 
2003). That is, while networked media enables people to democratically select 
information to consume, this is usually at the exclusion of political information 
(Tewksbury and Rittenberg, 2009: 194) or limited to content sharing their similar 
personal or political beliefs (Lawrence et al., 2010; Sunstein, 2007). 
 
Critical or pessimetic perspectives of networked media also draw impetus from the 
continued dominance of the political economic critiques carried over from mass 
media research. For example, Hargittai, (2004) Mansell (2004) and Dahlberg (2005) 
assert that the offline dominance of media power by commercial elites is now being 
replicated online through the “corporate colonisation of cyberspace” (Dahlberg, 
2005: 160) and as a result is weakening the internet’s potential for strengthening 
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public discourse. This leads to an “elite hold” where despite a perceived 
“communicative abundance” generated by networked media’s low barriers to entry 
(Karppinen, 2009) the elite mass media are structurally and economically 
outmanoeuvring networked civic communication (Castells, 2007; Castells, 2009; 
Karppinen, 2009; Stanyer, 2009) by “hijacking” social communication tools, such as 
blogs, to continue their dominance in mediating power (Meraz, 2009).  
 
While this perspective argues that dominant nodes in media networks are created 
through political or economic power, research indicates that even among grassroots 
and non-elite networked media the apparent natural tendency is for a small number 
of ‘elite’ sites to emerge and dominate media power (Hindman et al., 2003; 
Hindman, 2008). Pessimistic accounts of networked communications also draw 
attention to the limitations of individual agency in challenging the dominance of elite 
media power when such interpersonal networks are embedded in and largely 
constituted by predominantly “bourgeois” structures and the normative consumer 
capitalist values of contemporary society (Sparks, 2001: 89-92). 
 
As a result, despite the increased democratisation of media production, Williams and 
Delli Carpini remain 
 
skeptical of the ordinary citizens to make use of these opportunities and 
suspicious of the degree to which even multiple axes of power are still shaped 
by more fundamental forces of economic and political power (Williams and 
Delli Carpini, 2004: 1209) 
 
Articulating Williams and Delli Carpini’s pessimistic suggestion in more detail, 
Dean (2010) and Terranova (2004a) argue that economic and political forces go 
further than influence the networked public’s ability to mediate power. Rather, they 
assert that dominant forces co-opt and use the illusion of increased individual agency 
and empowerment offered by networked media to conceal a total atrophying of 
political power.  
 
For Dean, the convergence of democratic ideals, such as participation and open 
access, and capitalism’s colonisation of the networked media environment gives rise 
to a “communicative capitalism” (Dean, 2010: 4-5) which captures political power in 
an ever-increasing “displacement of political conflict to the terrain of networked 
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media” (ibid.: 124). Moreover, every “click and interaction made in the networked 
media environment can be traced, capitalised and sold” (ibid.) as “free labour” 
creating a “blurred territory between production and consumption, work and cultural 
expression” (Terranova, 2004a: 73-94) where individuals are potentially assimilated 
into and dominated by a capitalist “social factory” (ibid.: 74).  
 
It should be evident, then, that the adoption of optimistic/liberal and 
pessimistic/critical approaches for analysing networked media power draw heavily 
on dominant paradigms from within the mass media and communication literature. 
As a result, while recognising the representational and structural transformations the 
internet brings to mass media, any attempt at an adequate analysis risks being locked 
into an “alternatively revolutionary or evolutionary” dichotomy (Mansell, 2004: 7) 
that “tends to treat media choice, source choice, and interactivity habits as distinct 
areas of inquiry” (Howard and Chadwick, 2009: 431).  
 
A number of scholars, however, have questioned the usefulness of adopting mass 
media approaches to interpret the new, networked media space (Chaffee and 
Metzger, 2001; Meraz, 2007: 78), instead arguing that we have reached the limit of 
the mass media paradigm: 
 
researchers need to resist the temptation to simply apply old models of mass 
communication to the new media. Because of fundamental differences 
between the old and new technologies … new theories of media uses and 
impacts must be developed and tested (Chaffee and Metzger, 2001: 378. 
 
Initial efforts to empirically analyse this emergent space between old and new media 
have predominantly been located in studies examining the “intermedia agenda setting 
dynamics” (Meraz, 2009: 684) of social and traditional media platforms.  
 
These studies broadly indicate that as more and more journalists tap into virally 
distributed information via their online “interpersonal networks” (Chadwick, 2011a: 
5) social media – and in particular, blogs – can shape the mainstream news agenda 
(Collister, 2008; Cornfield et al., 2005; Davis, 2009; Farrell and Drezner, 2008; 
Meraz, 2009; Messner and DiStaso, 2008) or erode the traditional gate-keeping role 
of traditional media (Bennett, 2004; Bruns, 2005; Meraz, 2007; Williams and Delli 
Carpini, 2000; Williams and Delli Carpini, 2004).  
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These individual studies provide us with a glimpse of a theoretical approach to this 
newly emerging media landscape that Chadwick has termed the “hybrid media 
system” (Chadwick, 2017) characterised by “complex assemblages in which the 
personnel, practices, genres, technologies, and temporalities of supposedly “new” 
online media are hybridised with those of supposedly “old” broadcast and press 
media” (Chadwick, 2011a). Applying this system-level approach to an analysis of 
UK case studies Chadwick (2011a; 2011b) identifies a range of emergent phenomena 
that transforms media power from its earlier evolutionary or revolutionary dichotomy 
to a set of “evolving power relations based upon adaptation and interdependence” 
(Chadwick, 2011c: 3). Crucially, the hybrid media system enables us to 
conceptualise the media power as an endlessly contested flow of information arcing 
between official and unofficial, elite and non-elite, offline and online networks 
(Chadwick, 2017). Always in flux and characterised by complexity and contestable 
veracity, the nature of media power in the hybrid media system must “by its very 
nature remain “unfinished” (Bruns, 2005: 57). 
 
If Chadwick provides a system-level perspective of an emergent and hybrid 
networked communication space, Terranova (Terranova, 2004a; Terranova, 2004b) 
further problematises networked media power by exposing a deeper complexity at 
work, understood as the emergence of a “network culture” (Terranova, 2004a: 38). 
Providing a context for network culture, Terranova introduces the concept of an 
“informational milieu”, that is: an open, networked communicative space that 
operates both at a material and representational level (Terranova, 2004b: 52).  
 
Crucially, the material aspect of the milieu goes beyond the fundamental liberal, 
cultural and political economic interpretations of media by challenging the notion 
that information claims to have a link with what it represents. In a culturally 
networked space, media production is best addressed “less as a question of meanings 
that are encoded and decoded but as … new forms of knowledge and power” (ibid.) 
that are constituted by an unstable, complex set of physical states continually in flux 
that “can only describe a distribution of probabilities rather than an essential property 
that defines a being” (ibid.: 64). 
 
Understood as such, media power occurs through and informational dynamics”, a 
nonlinear and nondeterministic material process that behaves as a “transductive 
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arrow” (ibid.: 69) actualising the virtual probabilities flowing through the networked 
communicative space. Thus, media power is enacted as “a form of control over the 
fluctuations of an unstable physical milieu” (ibid.). This radically alters conventional 
perspectives of media power that have traditionally been interpreted as the 
distribution of representational messages from sender to receiver(s). Instead, 
communication operating in this way is revealed as only accounting for one-half of 
the media production process:  
 
On the one hand, it involves a physical operation on metastable material 
processes that it captures as probabilistic and dynamic states; on the other 
hand, it mobilises a signifying articulation that inserts such description into 
the networks of signification that make it meaningful. (ibid.: 70)  
 
Further reinforcing and clarifying the significance of symmetry between the 
symbolic and material dimensions of media power, contemporary scholars 
increasingly draw on the work of German media theorist Friedrich Kittler whose 
technologically-determinist approach identifies important questions in relation to the 
explicit physicality of media and locates media power entirely within its material 
form and processes (1992; 1999).  
 
Following such a perspective, any dichotomies hitherto identified between liberal-
critical and individual-structural divides are challenged by the view that human 
agency in media power is “not a self-determined actor” but rather “embedded in and 
emerg[ing] from a field of material relations” (Bollmer, 2015: 96). Packer (2013) 
further asserts that by “determin[ing] the brute facticity of what data are selected, 
stored, and processed”, media “make[s] possible new forms of knowledge” (ibid.: 
296). Interpreted as such, media power becomes an “effect of technological storage 
and information transmission … in which technologies structure possibilities for 
perception, knowledge, and politics” (ibid.).  
 
Tempering these technological deterministic, even “anti-humanist” (Bollmer, 2015: 
96), perspectives, however, is the fact that there remains a healthy debate as to just 
how reductive analyses of media’s materiality need to be. Sterne (2014) argues that 
no solid agreement has yet been achieved as to the ways in which scholars talk about 
and operationalise “the various relationships among the things that constitute our 
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thoroughly technical and human realm: physical and social processes, consciousness 
and subjectivity, power and justice” [emphasis in the original]. 
 
Thus, any account of contemporary media power must approach the materiality of 
media from a nuanced perspective which can adequately incorporate not only a 
hybridity of media actor, but also a hybridity of cultural/symbolic and material 
components and dynamics. Recognising these theoretical inter-relationships should 
enable the development and adoption of a robust conceptual approach to 
contemporary media power allowing for the development of an analytical model and 
empirical analysis able to adequately identify and account for the deeper socio-
cultural, socio-technical and material considerations within networked media 
environments.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Drawing on a diverse range of literature covering the development of contemporary 
conceptualisations of media power, this chapter reveals that the trajectory of power 
over the past half-century has moved away from observable, agent-centric behaviour 
linked causally to formal political outcomes, through a phase of dispersal into 
society’s wider political, economic and cultural structures and institutions of society 
before finally becoming dissolved into the social fabric where it is constituted as a 
network of material processes and immaterial forces operating both to produce and 
restrict agency at macro- and micro-levels. 
 
This evolution, originating with Dahl’s account of power as a rational, positivist 
force applied through democratic decision-making (Dahl, 1957, 1958 & 1961), is 
quickly augmented by the more problematic notion of power hidden in unseen non-
decisions (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962 & 1963) or a Marxist false consciousness and 
located in culturally produced forms of social meaning (Adorno, 1973; Gramsci, 
1971; Hall, 1973; Lukes, 1974). Such socially constructed forms of power, initially 
typified by discourse or dispositif (Foucault, 1977; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) in turn 
give way to theories whereby power becomes diffused within every-day society. In 
such approaches both individual agency as well as socially structuring forces are 
called into play – either in a dialectically bound relationship (Bourdieu, 1984; 
Giddens, 1984) or as more symmetrical and complex emergent actor-networks 
constituted by both representational and material elements (Callon, 1986; Deleuze, 
1992; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Latour, 2005).  
  58 
 
Building on this review of the evolution of power in society the chapter aimed to 
address the thesis’ first research question by assessing how media power concords 
with such political, sociological and philosophical developments in order to map out 
the potential ‘shape’ of what a contemporary theory of media power might 
encompass.  
 
In broad terms, the development of media power evolves along a liberal pluralist-
critical axis as per the other forms of social power. Media power in part provides 
access to a plurality of information enabling accurate and rational decision-making in 
democratic contexts and acts as a public watchdog against abuses of political power 
(Curran, 2002; Dahlgren & Gurevitch, 2005). This democratic potential, however, is 
similarly critiqued through concerns that the media is also influenced by a political 
economic drive to limit media production to entertainment and frivolous ‘soft news’ 
which severely curtails its democratic potential and limits opportunities for social 
change (Herman & Chomsky, 1994; McNair, 2000; Murdock & Golding, 2005). 
Moreover, such approaches situate media production within a much larger 
constellation of professional media actors (Blumler, 1990; Blumler & Gurevitch, 
1995; Davis, 2002; Esser, Reinemann, & Fan, 2001) and “cultural intermediaries” 
(Maguire & Matthews, 2010; Mwaura, 2013). 
 
Such approaches to media power persist into the contemporary digitally-networked 
age with optimistic, liberal scholarship arguing that the internet empowers 
individuals and collectives to “challenge and eventually change the power relations 
institutionalised in society” (Castells, 2007: 248). Conversely, critical scholars argue 
that newer forms of networked media merely extend opportunities for entertainment 
content driven by commercial, not socially transformational, interests (Hargittai, 
2006; Hindman, 2008; Papacharissi, 2010).  
 
From this synthesis and analysis of literature covering theories of media and power it 
has become clear that while studies of media power have adapted effectively to 
liberal democratic; political economic and critical cultural traditions of power it 
would seem that unpacking, aligning and applying the range of increasingly 
networked and materialist theories of power to media has proved more elusive. As 
the literature demonstrates, one explanation for this may be due to the theoretical 
heritage of the “elite-mass media-audience” paradigm (Davis, 2007) which has 
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ensured that research into media power has remained focused on macro-level, 
institutional sites of power and their associated actors, interchanged depending on 
scholars’ theoretical approach, e.g. liberal, Marxist, cultural. Similarly, 
Gillespie, Boczkowski & Foot (2014) have noted that “[m]ore often than not” media 
power scholarship has “borrowed conceptual and theoretical lenses developed in 
earlier studies of traditional print and broadcast media” (Gillespie, Boczkowski & 
Foot, 2014: 2). This scenario, however, suggests a urgent need to revise and update 
approaches to media power in order to bring it in line with the effects being 
generated by the emergence of the internet and the increasingly networked media and 
communications it instantiates.  
 
In concluding this chapter, and addressing the thesis’ first research question, the 
operational contexts, constituent parts and motivating forces of contemporary media 
power can be mapped as follows: Firstly, the context of contemporary media power 
has shifted from a formal, institutionally dominated media landscape to a hybridised, 
polycentric one where the ability to produce, distribute and consume media – and 
thus the potential to exert media power – has become diffused across the social 
realm.  
 
Secondly, the hybridity of contemporary media power requires a recognition that any 
theory of media power in the above context must take into account the shift from a 
“mass media” to “networked media” logic. This is typified as a coming together of 
two constituent parts. These are the institutionally-coordinated formal media actors, 
typically producing informational content according to rigid news values and 
designed to appeal to mass audiences, becoming blended with more fluid, networks 
of informal media actors producing media content largely selected according to 
personal (or wider group) interests (Curran, 2003; Benkler, 2006: 176-180; Castells, 
2009).  
 
Thirdly, with this diffusion of media production among informal media actors across 
the social domain, contemporary media power has a greater potential to be 
increasingly motivated by social or cultural drivers than the commercially-oriented 
or liberal-democratic public interest discourses of institutional media (Benkler, 
2006). Moreover, given the change in inter-connectedness and personal commitment 
of networked media production, contemporary media power is more likely to 
produce, distribute and consume information at greater speed, efficiency and scale 
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than the bureaucratic or corporate models and logics of institutional media (Klinger 
and Svensson, 2014). 
 
Finally, as identified in this chapter, one of the main conceptual divergences between 
political, sociological and philosophical theories of power and media power is the 
increased importance of materialism in the ways power is formed and exerted 
(Callon, 1986; Deleuze, 1992; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Latour, 2005). Thus, it is 
clear that a contemporary model of media power must take into account the material 
qualities at work within the current media landscape, particularly the materiality of 
media technology underpinning the digitally-networked media platforms being 
adopted by formal and informal actors alike (Beer, 2009; Packer,2013; Bollmer, 
2015). 
 
Taking this account of contemporary media power as its starting point, the thesis will 
now move on to address the second research question in the thesis: can an analytical 
model be developed that will allow researchers to effectively identify and analyse 
this form of contemporary media power? 
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Chapter 3 
 
Research Context: Ontology and Analytical Model 
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Having articulated a revised account of contemporary media power in Chapter 2, this 
chapter will now address the second research question posed by this thesis: can an 
analytical model be developed allowing researchers to effectively identify and 
analyse contemporary media power. In order to achieve this, this chapter will firstly 
outline the underlying ontological perspective on which the analytical model will be 
developed. This is significant as, due to the interpolation of neo-materialist 
approaches into the revised theoretical account of media power, a philosophical 
approach is required that will underpin the empirical analysis in a way that facilitates 
the research to recognise and analyse the materiality of media power as well as its 
phenomenological, symbolic aspects (Coole and Frost, 2010).  
 
Secondly, the chapter will establish an analytical model for the subsequent empirical 
analysis. This will be achieved by outlining and defining the who, what, how and 
why of contemporary media power according to the theoretical perspective 
developed in Chapter 2. Having provided clarity around these analytical variables, 
the chapter will conclude with the creation of four central analytical pillars: 
hybridity, materiality, choreography and coding, around which the core empirical 
analysis will be built in subsequent chapters.   
 
Ontologies of difference and multiplicity: limits of classical ontology 
As identified in the previous chapter, the theoretical horizon of contemporary media 
power arguably requires extending from a hitherto dichotomous conceptual 
landscape based on individual or structural agency and operating in – and studied 
from – a purely phenomenological perspective to a neo-materialist one in which 
agency becomes located within complex networks of formal and informal actors 
constituted and shaped by networks of symbolic and material components and 
dynamics. In order to build an analytical model appropriate for this revised 
theoretical context it is important to first discuss the ontological status on which 
research in this neo-materialist environment in planned and conducted.  
 
Such a task begins with Chadwick’s (2007; 2011a; 2011b; 2017) account of the 
hybrid media space discussed in Chapter 2. Drawing on the etymological origins of 
hybridity Chadwick argues that such a concept plays a pivotal role in understanding 
the contemporary networked media environment as it challenges and “unsettles” 
conventional interpretations of society by providing 
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a powerful way of […] seeing the world that highlights complexity, 
interdependence, and transition … [and] that captures heterogeneity and 
things that are irreducible to simple, unified essences (Chadwick, 2011: 3) 
 
Thus, at an ontological level, hybridity potentially provides a useful way to reject 
and undermine the dichotomous accounts of reality rooted in institutional-structural 
and agent-centric approaches prevalent in the extant media power literature. It can be 
argued, too, that hybridity not only rejects such approaches but also sets out and 
seeks to move towards an account of society premised on a relational inter-
dependence between heterogenous components. 
 
While such an ontological perspective facilitates a move beyond the largely stable 
and well delineated conceptual identities on which earlier studies of media power are 
based, Chadwick’s version of hybridity is potentially problematised owing to its 
overt reliance on a traditional ontological framework. For example, on the one hand 
it can be argued that hybridity’s ‘betweenness’ can be understood as a term 
accounting for a world beyond essentialism, yet hybridity’s betweenness is actually a 
process that blurs boundaries between existent, stable identities and essences. That 
is, the hybridisation of fixed concepts is only made possible by an ontological 
position that accedes - a priori – the identification, presence and existence of the 
original, pre-hybridised essences.  
A further challenge to hybridity is its situation within a classical ontological 
framework. From this position ontologies make “assertions or assumptions about the 
nature of being and reality” and which are often constituted through “hierarchical 
relations … assigned [through] prior existence, higher modality, or some other 
privileged status” (Chandler & Munday, 2011 cited in Chadwick, 2011: note 1).  
Thus, while hybridity draws attention to the role of complexity it may not go far 
enough in enabling a rigorous conceptualisation and operationalisation of that 
complexity.  
A more radical view of ontological hybridity is found in the philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze (Deleuze, 1994) and his collaboration with Felix Guattari (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987). Emerging out of a post-structuralist philosophical milieu 
characterised by the rejection of traditional ontologies, Deleuze (1994) reconstructs 
this rejection of conceptual stability by proposing an ontology created from the fluid 
and perpetually-open possibilities of reality, rather than its discovery within a 
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defined, singular ontology (May, 2005: 1-26). In place of an ontological project 
seeking to discover reality through the mapping and investigation of fixed identities, 
Deleuze proposes an ontology that emerges, and is created out of, a world “the very 
ground of which is difference, in which everything rests upon disparities, upon 
differences of differences which reverberate to infinity” (Deleuze, 1994: 241).  
 
Conceived as such, an ontology of difference becomes differentiated from 
hybridity’s classical ontology. We can demonstrate this distinction by returning to 
hybridity’s betweenness and applying a comparative evaluation. Whereas in an 
ontology of hybridity betweeness can be understood as a transitional – or interstitial - 
position between stable concepts, in an ontology of difference betweeness: 
 
does not designate a localisable relation going from one thing to the other and 
back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps 
one and the other way, a stream without beginning or end (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987: 13) 
 
Thus, where an ontology of hybridity seeks to account for an instability in the 
established order by blurring fixed boundaries, an ontology of difference exists 
solely as a permanently unsettled, unstable and emergent difference within which 
identities are produced through dynamic processes that are continually stabilised and 
destabilised.  
 
Such an ontology presents a challenge in that if such an ontological approach 
arguably resists the creation of a stable, “coherent framework” (May, 2005: 19) how 
can it be adopted into an analytical model for the investigation of media power? The 
following section will attempt to demonstrate how an ontology of differences can be 
translated into a working analytical model. 
 
Helpfully, in their work on difference and multiplicity Deleuze and Guattari 
developed conceptual structures to illustrate instantiations of their ontology. One of 
these Deleuzian structures is the concept of the Rhizome. Rhizomes, Deleuze and 
Guattari assert, are networks of root systems (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 3-25) 
constituting “a series of productive connections with no centre or foundation” 
(Colebrook, 2002: 156). Thus, it can be argued that a Rhizome provides the 
conceptual ‘scaffolding’ of a networked structure crucially acting as the basis for the 
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creation of an analytical model consistent with the underlying ontology of difference 
in which contemporary media power plays out.  
 
The challenge remains, however, as to how this ontological concept of the Rhizome 
can be operationalised as an analytical model to investigate media power in the 
empirical analysis section of this thesis. This will be achieved by adopting and 
adapting a further Deleuzian concept, the assemblage (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; 
Deleuze & Parnet, 2002) and, more pertinently, assemblage theory (DeLanda, 
2006a). 
 
Assemblages: From Deleuze to DeLanda  
The concept of the assemblage emerges inconsistently throughout Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986; 1987; 1994; Deleuze & Parnet, 
2002) owing to the fact that the authors employed a “terminological exuberance” of 
metaphors in their work to account for diverse, yet related, processes or concepts 
(DeLanda, 2002: 157). It is generally accepted, however, that there is a conceptual 
inter-operability between the rhizome and assemblage and in at least one instance the 
rhizome is adopted synonymously with the assemblage (Grossberg, 1992: 57). Thus 
rhizomes are one way of articulating the concept of the assemblage (Wiley, 2005: 92 
note 26).  
 
At a fundamental level, assemblages are dynamic processes of organisation and 
crucially also disorganisation that give shape to the singularities, that is, components 
of reality, that emerge from the ontology of difference (Wiley, 2005: 71). 
Assemblages are not static units but rather processes of selection and 
organisation/disorganisation that give consistency to the components constituting an 
assemblage (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 406; Wise, 2005: 77).  
 
Deleuze and Guattari distinguish two types of assemblages operating symbiotically 
with each other. These assemblages are constituted by material and semiotic forces 
(content and expression in Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology) and conceptualised 
as machinic assemblages and collective assemblages of enunciation respectively. 
These two types of assemblage account for one of the two axes along which 
assemblages operate, the other axis enabling the forces of stratification or flight (or 
territorialisation and deterritorialisation) - which drive the processes of organisation 
and disorganisation respectively (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 88). Taken as a 
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combinatory concept, then, the machinic assemblages of material content and 
collective assemblages of enunciation of semiotic and incorporeal elements and the 
territorialising and deterritorialising forces operate through a “double articulation” 
(Wiley, 2005: 71) to create “concrete assemblages” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 67).  
 
While it is possible to locate and articulate key criteria of assemblages within 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work, it can be argued that their fleeting and diffuse presence 
limits the potential of such a concept to offer an operational analytical model. 
DeLanda (2006) has “reformulated” (Shaviro, 2007) Deleuze and Guattari’s work on 
assemblages into a distinct approach using his own technical and theoretical 
resources and vocabulary. As a result, DeLanda has “eliminate[d] the need to engage 
in Deleuzian hermeneutics” and arguably succeeded in outlining a comprehensible 
framework to account for the fluid and dynamic “processes of assembly” that 
constitute reality (DeLanda, 2006: 3-4). DeLanda’s assemblage theory takes criteria 
characterising the form and function of Deleuzian assemblages and codifies them 
into a cohesive framework.  
 
Although a relatively recent addition to sociology, assemblage theory has already 
been adopted as powerful and productive ways to account for and analyse 
phenomena across a range of academic fields (Marcus & Saka, 2006: 102). Evidence 
of such adoption can be found in research spanning critical and cultural theory 
(Phillips, 2006; Venn, 2006; Wiley, 2005); political geography (Dewsbury, 2011; 
Legg, 2011), political communications (Chadwick, 2011; Kreiss, 2009; Nielsen, 
2009; Wiley, Becerra, & Sutko, 2012) as well as social movement studies (Chesters 
& Welsh, 2006; McFarlane, 2009). While there is evidence of emerging adoption 
within communication studies, the application of assemblages rests primarily at the 
level of generic appropriation. As such, there remains significant potential for a more 
rigorous derivation from Deleuze and Guattari’s work and an operationalisation of 
assemblages to derive a robust analytical model for investigating media power in a 
digitally-networked environment.  
 
Assemblage theory adapts and simplifies Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic 
assemblages and assemblages of enunciation by refining them into a single 
conceptual model, expressed along two axes of material-expression and 
territorialisation-deterritorialisation (DeLanda, 2006: 12-15). This means that an 
assemblage is constituted through component parts that are both material as well as 
symbolic. These components are organised through processes of territorialisation and 
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deterritorialisation, described by DeLanda as processes “that either stabilise the 
identity of an assemblage, by increasing its degree of internal homogeneity or […] or 
destabilise it” (ibid.).    
These processes stabilise the identity of an assemblage by increasing its internal 
homogeneity or increasing the clarity of its boundaries or destabilise it by 
undermining territorialising processes respectively. It’s important to note that 
because assemblage theory functions according to the exercise of components’ 
capacities, as opposed to the aggregation of their properties, then component parts 
may exist as a mixture of material and expressive roles and operate as territorialising 
and deterritorialising forces at any one time (ibid.: 12-14).   
  
While assemblages are constituted along two axes through a complex “organisational 
dynamics” (Wiley, 2005: 71) there is a further operational element within the 
assembly process that ultimately gives assemblages a nominal structure: universal 
singularities. Although assemblage theory posits that while the interaction and 
exercise of components’ capacities means their construction is always non-linear and 
emergent, “the set of possible capacities of an assemblage is not amorphous however 
open-ended it may be, since different assemblages exhibit different sets of 
capacities”. That is, while assemblages emerge from the capacity of their component 
parts to evolve through processes of territorialisation and deterritorialisation, they are 
ultimately bounded by a topological structure or, in DeLanda’s terms, a “space of 
possibilities” (DeLanda, 2006: 29).  
 
This structure is, in turn, conceived as an ontological space11 constituted by 
‘singularities’ - irreducible elements representing the full range of possible 
permutations or variations an assemblage may take. Put another way, such spaces 
can be understood as providing the “degrees of freedom” (ibid.) within which 
singularities may be brought to life to create a given assemblage.  
 
DeLanda then introduces the concept of ‘universal singularities’- alternatively 
attractors12 - that are recurring features accounting for, in part, the patterns of 
                                               
11 In Deleuzian terms, the ‘space of possibilities’ is a ‘virtual’ space synonymous with what I have termed an 
‘ontology of differences or multiplicities’ and described variously as a ‘world of intensity’; a ‘plane of 
consistency”; a ‘machinic phylum’; an ‘intensive spatium’ (DeLanda 2002, 158) 
12 Although DeLanda adopts the term ‘attractors’ in Assemblage Theory, a more detailed account is outlined in 
his earlier work, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (2002) owing to the scientific origins of the term. Here 
DeLanda addresses two primary forms of attractors that define distribution of singularities in assemblages, 
‘steady-state’ and ‘limit-cycle’, that tend towards a final state and a state of oscillation respectively (2002, 15).  
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distribution of individual singularities across spaces of possibility. Citing examples 
from physics,13 DeLanda suggests that, despite their existence within a space of 
possibilities, many mechanical systems are ultimately constrained by outcomes that 
seek to minimise the difference between potential and kinetic energy. Thus, universal 
singularities can be understood as generating “inherent or intrinsic long-term 
tendencies of a system, the states which the system will spontaneously tend to adopt 
in the long run.” (DeLanda, 2002: 15) [emphasis in original]. This means that while 
an assemblage is theoretically open to indeterminate transformation, universal 
singularities act to constrain and determine the formation of an assemblage in a 
particular and enduring pattern over time. DeLanda refers to this as a “coded 
assemblage”; defined as an assemblage which becomes so consistent that it gains a 
“superficial identity” beyond its constituent parts (DeLanda 2006: 14-16) [my 
emphasis].  
Recognising this phenomenon enables universal singularities to be understood as 
playing a vital role in the empirical analysis of media power intended in this thesis 
by providing a way to identify and analyse its effects. Specifically, universal 
singularities offer a way for an empirical analysis to account for the ways in which 
the complex and hybrid processes of (de)territorialisation likely to be exhibited by 
the informal and formal media actors coalesce into a symbolic-material assemblage 
which presents a stable, consistent and “superficial identity” (ibid.) beyond the sum 
of its parts. In turn this identity becomes the defining interpretation of events within 
the assemblage visible to a wider public. Such a notion is fully aligned with the 
definition of media power adopted in this thesis (Couldry, 2001; Couldry and Curran, 
2003; Freedman, 2014). 
In order to operationalise such a phenomenon in the empirical analysis, however, it is 
first necessary to discuss and interpolate a well-established - and increasingly 
important (Bryant & Miron, 2004)  – theoretical and analytical approach used in 
media and communications research: framing.  
Framing theory: origins and definitions  
 
Emerging from the fields of sociology and psychology, framing theory has, 
according to (Tewksbury and Scheufele, 2009; Reese, 2001), been broadly adopted 
and applied at either macro-social (Edelman, 1964; Gitlin, 1980; D. A. Scheufele & 
                                               
13 The identification and interpretation of universal singularities is at present most fully developed in the natural 
sciences where methods exist for more in-depth analysis of such phenomena. See DeLanda, 2002.  
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Tewksbury, 2007; Shoemaker & Reese, 2012; Tuchman, 1978) or micro-cognitive 
scales (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984; Sherif, 1967). This macro-micro 
paradigm has given rise to a research agenda largely dominated by studies of media 
effects examining elite-mass media-audience interactions (Davis, 2007: 2-3) and 
thematic approaches looking at frames through critical; cultural; and cognitive lenses 
(see Goffman 1974; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Neuman, Just et al. 1992; Wicks 
2005; Gorp 2007; Gorp 2010 for a selection of such perspectives). Additionally, 
framing has been integrated into related fields such as social movement studies 
(Benford, 1993; Benford & Snow, 2000; Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Snow, 
Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986) and agenda-setting and priming (Chong & 
Druckman, 2010; Maher, 2001; McCombs & Ghanem, 2001; D. A. Scheufele, 2000; 
D. A. Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Weaver, 2007).14  
 
Most significantly, for this thesis’ purposes, framing provides a conceptual and 
empirical approach to analyse the function of contemporary media power. Framing 
represents a rich research space to examine the relationships between media and 
political or social power (Carragee & Roefs, 2004: 227) by providing an insight into 
the ways "relationships and institutional arrangements support routine and persistent 
ways of making sense of the social world” (Reese, 2001: 19). According to Gamson 
and Wolfsfield (1993) media power, ultimately, is a “struggle over framing” 
(Gamson & Wolfsfeld, 1993: 117).  
 
Importantly for the empirical approach being developed here, Carragee and Roefs 
(2004) assert that framing analysis must be conducted in a way that takes into 
account the wider context in which frames are produced rejecting approaches that 
place too much emphasis on media effects or the mechanistic function of media 
actors in shaping frames. This enables the researcher to capture and understand the 
media’s potential to exert definitional power in society by naturalising certain 
elements of reality. By broadening the focus of framing to include the full range of 
symbolic and material resources and processes this approach to framing is entirely 
consistent with the analytical opportunities presented by assemblage theory outlined 
above.  
 
                                               
14 An entire thesis could be written about the diverse origins, emergence and future trajectory of framing theories 
and research. For a comprehensive history of framing see Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009) and for a wide-
ranging engagement with the conceptual and theoretical field of framing research see Scheufele (2004).  
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Despite this useful direction in media framing, the diversity of the field has led to an 
increasingly “casual” adoption of the theory (Entman 1993: 2) applied primarily as a 
“practical heuristic used to understand a range of topics” (Druckman, 2010: xiv) and 
as little more than a “hook” for any number of diverse research approaches (Reese, 
2007: 151). As a response, framing scholars tried to resolve framing’s lack of 
theoretical clarity by undertaking a series of self-reflexive exercises to pin-down and 
(re)define the concept (Tewksbury, 2011). Somewhat problematically, the 
development of these meta-theories, notably Entman’s Framing Paradigm (1993), 
Scheufele’s Theory of Media Effects (1999) and D’Angelo’s multi-paradigmatic 
approach (2002), have not only perpetuated macro-micro interpretations of framing 
but, moreover, have helped cement this reductionism as a central pillar of framing’s 
over-arching research agenda.  
 
These increasingly diverse and reductionist approaches, arguably, demonstrate 
framing’s past legacy of re-evaluation and thus opens the way for its further 
reconfiguration with assemblage theory. In order to achieve this, Reese’s 
interpretation of framing theory as a “bridging project” (2007) will be adopted as a 
key conceptual approach. In contrast to Entman’s drive to build a cohesive 
theoretical paradigm for framing, Reese argues that 
 
[f]raming’s value […] does not hinge on its potential as a unified research 
domain but […] as a provocative model that bridges parts of the field [of 
study] that need to be in touch with each other (Reese, 2007: 148) 
 
Interpreted as such, framing theory becomes, as D’Angelo asserts (2002), a research 
program rather than a unified paradigm; imbued with a “theoretical diversity” that is 
“beneficial in developing a comprehensive understanding of the process" (Reese, 
2007: 148).  
 
Rejecting what he sees as the “tendency for frame reductionism” (ibid.: 149) in most 
dominant accounts of framing, Reese draws on a range of earlier conceptual 
engagements with framing theory to refocus on more open-ended accounts of the 
field. This results in an understanding of frames as “a central organising idea” 
(Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, Bliss, & Ghanem, 
1991) and “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of 
selection, emphasis, and exclusion by which symbol-handlers routinely organise 
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discourse” (Gitlin, 1980: 7).  
 
Bringing together these and other definitions (Hall, 1982; Iyengar, 1991; Morley, 
1976), Reese sets out his own working definition of frames as “organising principles 
that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to 
meaningfully structure the social world” (Reese, 2001: 11). Adopting Reese’s 
definition enables us to approach frames and framing as dynamic processes that 
organise a set of abstract principles. This is opposed to news-text or media content 
approaches dominating earlier definitional theories (D'Angelo, 2002; Entman, 1993; 
D. Scheufele, 1999) and moves frames away from specific mediated locations or 
one-off interpretations of the media production process and towards “moment[s] in 
the chain of signification” that designate any number of moments that shape social 
reality (Reese, 2001: 15). Significantly, Reese’s definition also enables frame 
organisation to occur across macro- and micro-levels through “symbolic forms of 
expression” (ibid.: 16). 
 
This reappraisal of media and communication processes marks a significant 
departure from earlier unified theories as Reese overtly contrasts the symbolic 
interpretation of frames shared across multiple cognitive, constructionist and critical 
paradigms against Entman’s paradigmatic approach which interprets frames and 
meaning as located statically in news stories or media content and as transferred 
through a communicating text between sender and receiver (Entman, 1993: 51-52).  
 
Ultimately, framing on Reese’s terms creates routinised, and thus durable, patterns or 
structures that persist until contested and transformed by other organising principles 
(Reese, 2001: 16-18). In keeping with Reese’s multi-level approach these structuring 
patterns could exist at the content level of media discourse or at an organisational 
level, such as media production. Based on this reading, it can be argued that Reese’s 
interpretation opens up framing to be bridged with the broader framework of 
assemblage theory.  
 
Bridging Framing and Assemblage Theory  
 
While assemblages enable society to be conceptualised as a rhizomatically 
networked structure, framing’s dominant interpretation of the social realm has 
conventionally been as a linear process where the construction of meaning occurs 
through the interaction of discrete symbolic units transmitted along clearly delineated 
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lines of information flow (D'Angelo, 2002; Entman, 1993; D. Scheufele, 1999). 
Reese (2007) has attempted to revise this perspective by suggesting that framing is a 
network-oriented processes that “capture[s] more of the ‘network society’ (Castells, 
2000) paradigm than [framing theory’s] traditional sender–receiver, message-effects 
model." (Reese, 2007: 149).  
 
Although this approach brings framing closer to a conceptualisation based on the 
underlying networked structure of reality, as per DeLanda’s rhizomatic assemblages, 
Reese’s approach is still arguably limited by his adoption of Castells’ engagement 
with networks. In this interpretation – based on telecommunication networks - 
information is transferred through networks without transformation (Latour, 1999) 
whereas conversely rhizomatic networks are constituted through transformative 
“productive connections” (Colebrook, 2002: 156). Nevertheless, it is significant that 
Reese’s definition of framing seeks to distinguish it as a non-linear, network-oriented 
process over hitherto dominant interpretations of framing as a linear process. 
 
This centrality of relational, networked connections within framing processes has 
parallels in DeLanda’s assemblage theory, which instantiates relationships through a 
“relational exteriority” (DeLanda, 2006: 10-11) which connects component parts 
within assemblages. The result is that assemblage parts are not defined by their 
fundamental essence and role within a static concept linked by cohesive relations of 
interiority. Rather, parts are connected to - and function within - multiple 
assemblages at the same time and have relations based on each part’s capacity.  
 
Such a phenomenon is also visible in Reese’s interpretation of framing as “chains of 
signification” (Reese, 2001: 15) that create “structures of meaning made up of a 
number of concepts and the relations among those concepts” (Hertog & McLeod, 
2001: 140). Using assemblage theory to formalise our understanding of the nature of 
relationships in framing, we can propose that frames are constructed not as an 
aggregation of their parts with unique properties, but rather as the dynamic 
assembling of parts exercising emergent capacities. 
 
Having determined the shared centrality of relations within both framing and 
assemblage theory the next aspect of framing theory that requires reconfiguring is the 
notion of frames as constituted through purely communicative principles. In Reese’s 
definition framing is a symbolic process composed of signifying elements (Reese, 
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2001: 15). This definitional claim draws on broader framing literature which reveals 
similar characteristics whereby frames are constituted by “media texts … visual and 
verbal features” and “syntactical, script, thematic and rhetorical” structures (ibid.: 
16) - primarily as a result of framing’s antecedents in media effects research and the 
phenomenology of social constructivism (D'Angelo, 2002; Entman, 1993; Reese, 
2010; Scheufele, 1999).  
 
Given the recent turn to the materiality of media and communications, however, 
(Adams, 2009; Terranova, 2004; Packer & Wiley, 2012; Packer, 2013; Bollmer, 
2015) it can be argued that assemblage theory provides a powerful bridge between 
framing’s traditional social constructivism and the materiality of media. As already 
identified, DeLanda (2006) articulates assemblages as operating within two 
dimensions constituted as material-expressive and territorialising-deterritorialising 
forces. Applied to framing theory, the first axis enables us to account for the way in 
which frames can be constituted by both material as well as symbolic components.  
 
The second axis also plays a crucial role in bridging assemblage theory with framing. 
As per Reese’s definition framing is an organising process that constructs and 
structures shared meaning: “frames must always be considered in the process of 
gaining or losing organising value” (Reese, 2001: 15). For DeLanda, assemblages are 
determined by territorialising-deterritorialising forces that continually effect their 
material and expressive properties to stabilise the identity - and thus, meaning - of 
assemblages by increasing or decreasing internal homogeneity or increasing or 
decreasing the clarity of its boundaries respectively (DeLanda, 2006: 15).  
 
Finally, by combining these overlapping features of both theories with the 
phenomena of ‘universal singularities’ and ‘coding’ already discussed above it can 
be argued that when a symbolic-material media assemblage gains such a consistent 
pattern and superficial identity it effectively ‘frames’ a particular issue or event and 
thus can be understood as representing, from an empirical point of view, the tangible 
and observable effects of media power.   
 
Establishing an Analytical Model of Contemporary Media Power 
To move closer towards an empirical analysis of contemporary media power, it is 
necessary to develop and operationalise an analytical model. The following section 
will set out the analytical model by providing clarity on the key components or 
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variables present in the revised theoretical perspective on media power established in 
Chapter 2. It will conclude by defining four central analytical pillars for use in the 
empirical analysis.  
 
According to Hagen (1961) “[a]n analytical model is a mental construct consisting of 
a set of elements in interrelation, the elements and their interrelations being precisely 
defined.” (Hagen, 1961: 144). Building such a model, Miles, Huberman and Saldana 
(2014) argue, requires the researcher to consider:  
• the actors and objects present in the theoretical framework 
• their properties (and any significant variation between different them) 
• the relationships and interactions between them 
• conditions of interaction  
• the effects or outcomes of such interactions 
(Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 2014: 20) 
 
Based on these criteria the following section will develop an analytical model for use 
in the empirical analysis undertaken in this thesis by taking the theoretical 
perspective of contemporary media power established in Chapter 2 and creating a 
model which can be operationalised to conduct the thesis’ empirical analyses.  
 
Addressing these criteria one-at-a-time will enable the researcher to map out the 
empirical “the territory being investigated” (ibid.) in the thesis by defining and 
discussing the: who, what, how and why of contemporary media power. Doing so 
will also allow for reflection on any complexities or limitations likely to be 
encountered in the analysis.  
 
The ‘Who’ 
Based on the definition of media power adopted in this thesis the actors involved in 
the organisation and structuring of information to confer meaning on specific 
interpretations of events or facts represent an important element of analysis. In 
keeping with the socially-networked nature of contemporary media outlined above, 
both individual and collective actors included in the analytical model operate within 
either a formal or informal context. These terms are defined below. Firstly, formal 
media actors can be understood as the individuals and institutions that are engaged in 
producing and distributing information through “old” or “mainstream” media 
channels, such as television, newspapers and radio (Chadwick, 2011a). 
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At an individual level this includes the journalists, editors and media owners 
responsible for the selection and organisation of information used to shape meaning. 
However, given the professionalisation of the media over the past decades (Franklin, 
2004), the term also includes other individuals involved in influencing the 
availability of information and allocation of resources necessary to structure 
meaning, such as communications managers, media consultants and policy advisors 
(Bennett and Entman, 2001: 15-17; Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Scammell, 1995). 
 
Although these individuals and institutions have increasingly adapted to the 
opportunities and challenges presented by the digital media environment they 
continue to function according to a formalised set of agreed or expected professional 
standards, often established by informal standards, such as public interest or more 
formal frameworks, such as associational Codes of Practice or self-regulation (NUJ, 
2011; Ruth, n.d.). 
 
By contrast, informal media actors can be understood as the digitally-networked 
individuals and collective groups that are enabled to achieve “mass self-
communication” (Castells, 2009: 56) through digital media platforms. At an 
individual level, an informal media actor can refer to a citizen journalist (Breindl, 
2016) someone who devotes their personal time to gathering, interpreting and 
publishing information online, often with little professional experience or 
commercial support.  
 
The term can also refer to the digitally-networked collectives of individuals who co-
ordinate the sourcing, analysis, production and distribution of information – as well 
as organising social action as part of production of meaning (Allen, 2016). These 
digitally-enabled collectives can be constituted by social movements already in 
existence, such as NGOs, protest or activist groups or political parties. The ease and 
speed of using digital media to organise, however, has meant that such networked 
groups can emerge rapidly around a topical issue, co-ordinate information-sharing or 
action and then disband (ibid.).  
 
The ‘What’ 
Having defined the media actors operating as the subjects of analysis in this thesis, it 
is also necessary to define the objects of analysis. That is, in addition to investigating 
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the who of media power - which actors are responsible for sourcing and structuring 
information in order to shape and define meaning - it is also necessary to investigate 
the what of media power, i.e. what are the inputs used by media actors in order to 
shape and create meaning.  
 
It is important here to consider the implications of the theoretical perspective of 
contemporary media power set out in Chapter 2, as well as the ontological context 
provided by hybridity and assemblage theory above. Both of these accounts require 
the inclusion of material and symbolic elements in the definition of contemporary 
media power adopted in this thesis, therefore any empirical analysis of such a 
phenomenon must also take account of both domains.  
 
When thinking about the ‘what’ of the empirical analysis, however, addressing the 
material and symbolic qualities of media has not always been straightforward. 
Damásio, Henrique, Da Silva et al (2015) have identified a 
 
“[t]ension between content and materiality [which] has often prevented media 
scholars from fully acknowledging the role played by artifacts in the 
communication process, and has created a gap in research between the 
consumption/content side and the material side of communication technologies 
(ibid.: 387) 
 
Attempting to bridge this analytical gap between the foundational or technologically 
determinist approaches of the German and Canadian media studies traditions, 
typified by Kittler, McLuhan and Innis (Bollmer, 2015: 96) and the symbolically-led 
paradigms dominated by cultural theorists such as Stuart Hall and the British 
Cultural Studies movement, Damásio, Henrique, Da Silva et al (2015) propose 
refocusing analytical attention on the ‘artifacts’ or ‘objects’ found within the 
communication process. 
 
Building on this perspective, in this thesis the communicative artifacts being 
produced, shared and consumed by the actors in the case studies will be defined as 
‘media objects’ (Damásio, Henriques, Da Silva et al., 2015; van den Boomen and 
Lehmann, n.d.). Crucially, in keeping with the thesis’ definition of media power, 
media objects will be understood as incorporating both the material as well as 
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symbolic qualities of media, thus allowing researchers to “grasp the heterogeneous 
implications of digital culture” (van den Boomen and Lehmann, n.d.: 8). 
 
Drawing on van den Boomen and Lehmann’s account of media object analysis 
(ibid.) examples identified and analysed in the thesis include:  
• Computer software (e.g. Facebook’s newsfeed algorithm, Google’s PageRank 
algorithm, spam filtering algorithms) 
• Hyperlinks  
• Hashtags 
• Symbolic content (e.g. images, films, audio files, social media posts, news 
articles and broadcasts, corporate statements, interpersonal discussions)  
• Bodies 
• Placards and banners 
 
In addition to the technological materiality and symbolic qualities of media objects 
outlined above, the analytical model adopted in the thesis will also include physical 
space and place within the concept of media objects. This decision has been made 
due to the increasing significance of location within media production and 
consumption and the increasing importance the physical environment plays in 
shaping – and being shaped by – media outputs (Evans, 2015; Frith, 2015; Wilken & 
Goggin, 2014). 
 
As Endres and Senda-Cook (2011) have argued, “place”, defined as the physical 
environment of a particular location is constituted by “a combination of material and 
symbolic qualities” that are at any one time operating in “a fluid tension” (Endres 
and Cook, 2011: 259; 262). As a result, place can function as both a material media 
object in which a media actor is embedded, inter-relates with and which informs their 
actions, thus influencing meaning creation. Alternatively, it can function as a purely 
symbolic media object, in that the production and distribution of an image of place 
can influence and shape meaning through the ways it is received and interpretated by 
different actors. A further, final yet highly important consideration that needs to be 
made here is that it is entirely possible that a media object may be constituted by, and 
operate across, the material and symbolic distinction outlined above.  
 
The above example of how place can function as a media object displaying a fluid 
tension between the material and symbolic domains is a useful reminder of the 
potential complexity and challenges faced in delineating and tracing the blurred lines 
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between such concepts. Moreover, it’s not just place that exerts such fluid qualities: 
hashtags, for example, can function symbolically in that they convey a particular 
communicative message or express solidarity towards (or against) a particular topic.  
However, they can also function materially by automatically linking a person from a 
single social media post featuring the hashtag to an aggregated collection of related 
(i.e. similarly tagged) content. From an analytical point of view, however, there 
remains a need to provide clarity and consistency in the empirical analysis 
undertaken in the thesis. 
 
To ensure robust and rigorous empirical investigation is achieved, a clear distinction 
between material and symbolic media objects will be adopted in the analytical model 
and any such ‘fluid tensions’ encountered among media objects in the empirical 
analysis will be addressed and reflected on as pragmatically as possible in order to 
mitigate the potential complexity of disentangling such objects.  
 
One way in which this concern will be addressed is through the anticipated method 
of analysis applied to media objects. Van Den Boomen and Lehmann, (n.d.: 9) assert 
that while media objects can be studied in-depth as the primary object of analysis 
through probing the “history, business model, controversies, design, affordances, and 
appropriation” they can also be studied as a secondary object of analysis in order to 
“illustrate how particular phenomena materialise” (ibid.). Adopting this type of 
analysis, Van Den Boomen and Lehmann argue, requires a heuristic approach, which 
the authors define as using media objects as a practical method for learning that, 
while not optimal, is sufficient for exploring and investigating phenomena in order to 
help formulate and develop further hypotheses. Such an approach to media objects 
will ensure that any material-symbolic fluidity exhibited by a media object will be 
able to be identified and analysed (ibid.). 
 
A further way to address any potential fluidity between the material-symbolic 
qualities of media objects can also be addressed through the concept of affordances. 
Affordances are defined as the differing variety of opportunities for interpretation 
and action, that media objects present to media actors (Demásio, Henriques, da Silva, 
et al., 2015: 389). These allow for variation in the empirical analysis between the 
material and/or symbolic qualities of a media object – and, moreover, the different 
interactions, relationships and arrangements they can generate-depending on the 
context in which they are identified and studied. 
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Having defined the who (media actors) and what (media objects) of the empirical 
analysis undertaken in the thesis, the analytical model will further need to account 
for the how, i.e. what are the interactions, arrangements and affordances between 
media actors and media objects that enable the production of meaning and the 
creation of media power. Finally, the model will need to address the question of why 
the specific arrangements of media actors and objects emerge or are created in the 
first place.  
 
The ‘How’ 
Given the complexity and interdependence of media actors and media objects 
functioning within networked information systems (Chadwick, 2013: 10; Castells, 
2001; 2009; Benkler, 2006) and in keeping with Boczkowski and Siles’ call for 
media scholarship to adopt a research approach connecting the four cardinal points of 
media production, media consumption, symbolic content and materiality of media in 
order to overcome limitations of past scholarship in the current networked age 
(Boczkowski and Siles, 2014: 560-564). 
 
As such the empirical analysis must identify specifically how formal and informal 
media actors interact, how the symbolic and material media objects are produced, 
circulated and consumed, how the media technologies facilitating such processes 
function and how the outcomes of such interactions produce and exert media power. 
To achieve analytical model capable of tracing the interactions between formal and 
informal media actors; identifying the symbolic and material media objects (and their 
affordances) being produced, circulated and consumed; identifying and investigating 
the media technologies facilitating such processes; and, ultimately, seek to account 
for the outcomes such interactions and processes produce. By adopting such an 
analytical model the thesis will hopefully take steps towards an “alternative 
intellectual trajectory[y]” in media research as set out by Boczkowski and Siles 
(2014: 561). 
 
Siles and Boczkowski (2012) and Boczkowski and Siles (2014) define such 
networked arrangements of media actors and objects entangled in 
production/consumption and content/materiality relationships as “‘texto-material 
assemblages’” (2014: 563) in accordance with the textual nature of online content 
included in their original study. In the empirical analysis undertaken in this thesis the 
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term ‘assemblage’ will be adopted but, crucially, amended slightly to reflect the 
broader “realm of verbal/semiotic signifiers” (Hayles, 2002: 25) generated by the 
increasingly interpersonal and multi-media nature of contemporary, digitally-
networked media (Mirzoeff, 2015). As a result, the term used to define and describe 
such arrangements of media actors and objects in the thesis will be symbolic-material 
media assemblages - shortened to media assemblages where appropriate. 
 
Although Boczkowski and Siles (2014) adopt the notion of an assemblage more 
generically than DeLanda’s detailed theory (2006) it is important to note that the use 
of the term symbolic-material media assemblage in this thesis aligns more closely 
with DeLanda’s approach set out above. As such, the aim is for the thesis’ analytical 
modal to operationalise the specific processes of assemblage theory more directly. 
For example, in the analytical model being developed, symbolic-material media 
assemblages are constituted through the interaction of media actors with symbolic 
and material media objects whose actions either stabilise or destabilise the overall 
assemblage through the processes of territorialisation and deterritorialisation 
described above (DeLanda, 2006: 12-15).  
 
Adding further clarity to the how of the analytical model, it is also useful to define 
the specific ways in which the above actions and interactions between actors and 
objects and their contexts and affordances ‘organise’ (i.e. territorialise or 
deterritorialise) an assemblage. Key questions will need to be asked of the following:  
• who (and what) is connected within a particular network of actors and objects 
(and who/what is excluded);  
• what opportunities to produce, share and consume media objects arise through 
those connections (or exclusions);  
• what decisions are made when producing, sharing and consuming media 
objects among media actors;  
• who and what affordances influence those decisions;  
• what material actions arise as a result of such decisions;  
• what material conditions exist in order to influence or transform those actions; 
• what objects are shared, distributed (and which aren’t) and what are the wider 
implications or effects on this networked arrangement. 
 
Finally, according to assemblage theory (DeLanda, 2006) organisation within 
networks is an emergent process constituted by the interactions outlined above. As 
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Castells (citing Latour) argues: networked organisation is a function exerted by the 
“networks themselves” [emphasis in original] (Castells, 2009: 45). Clarifying this 
notion, Gerbaudo (2012), suggests that digital networks are organised to achieve 
specific outcomes through a “choreographic leadership” (Gerbaudo, 2012: 134-135). 
That is, while networks reject direct central coordination, a form of coordination is 
possible through indirect means, such as communal and collective behaviours, 
expressions of intent or shared meaning.  
 
This, argues Gerbaudo, is a reversal of traditional forms of organisational 
governance in that “it is communication that organises, rather than [the] organisation 
that communicates” (Gerbaudo, 2012: 139). Within symbolic-material media 
assemblages, then, the functions of communication and organisation are inseparable, 
which suggests that including the analysis of how symbolic-material media 
assemblages are ‘choreographed’ will be an important empirical concept to be 
operationalised and investigated through the analytical model. 
 
The ‘Why’  
One final task for the empirical analysis will be to define the outcomes of such 
networked interactions – addressing the question where possible of ‘why’ symbolic-
material assemblages are created (or, indeed, clarifying if there is an identifiable 
reason at all underpinning their creation). In order to do so, the analytical model will 
seek to understand how the specific effects of various arrangements of actors and 
objects choreograph symbolic-material media assemblages to territorialise and give 
greater stability and identity to particular interpretations of events and actions in 
order to define meaning and demonstrate media power. It is possible to understand 
how this process occurs, how it can be observed and thus analysed by 
operationalising the concepts of ‘singularities’ and ‘coding’ (DeLanda, 2006: 14-16) 
and ‘media frames’ (Reese, 2001; 2007; Hertog and McLeod, 2001) discussed above. 
 
Using these terms, media power in the analytical model will be observable through 
the ways in which the actions and interactions of media actors and media objects 
operating within symbolic-material media assemblages create a point of singularity 
and effectively code the assemblage giving it a consistent and stable identity 
(DeLanda, 2006: 15). When this happens the multiplicities of potential meaning that 
are enrolled and choreographed in the media assemblage are “translated” (Callon, 
1986) into a clear and singular interpretation of events identifiable in the analysis as 
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a ‘media frame’. Once this observable effect is discerned, media power can be 
recognised as having been exerted.  
 
Conclusions: Four Analytical Pillars of Contemporary Media Power 
 
This section of the chapter will build on the variables outlined above to develop an 
analytical model capable of a robust and consistent empirical investigation of the 
formal and informal media actors; symbolic and material media objects and the 
relational constellations exerting media power through the creation of symbolic-
material media assemblages. It will set out four analytical pillars - based on a 
synthesis of the main components or variables discussed above – which will be 
adopted and operationalised in the subsequent empirical analyses.  
 
i) Hybridity 
The first analytical pillar identified for use in the empirical analysis is hybridity. 
Recognising the ongoing and fluid interactions between informal, digitally-
networked media actors, such as empowered citizens or activist communities, and 
formal news-makers, such as journalists and media institutions, the emergence of 
such hybridised media practices and logics already identified in journalism and 
political science research (Beckett & Mansell, 2008; Hermida, 2012; Chadwick, 
2013) as well as studies of other emerging media practices, such as collaborative 
news production or ‘data-mining’ information from digitally-networked flows 
(Malika & Pfeffera, 2016; Martin, Corney, & Goker, 2015; Vis, 2013; Wall & 
Zahed, 2015) will help illuminate and provide clarity on the specific, new 
motivations, priorities and practices of contemporary media production and 
consumption – and thus the establishment of media power. 
 
ii) Materiality  
The second significant pillar for use in the empirical analysis is materiality – 
specifically the role played by a range of material objects and infrastructures in 
shaping the hybridised media repertoires identified above. The materiality of media 
is perhaps better interpreted through the notion of media materialities; that is the 
diverse array of objects, processes and infrastructures outlined above. Drawing on 
the ‘media objects’ section in this chapter, the material elements of media 
assemblages likely to be encountered in the empirical analysis include digital objects 
and processes, such as computer software, (meta) data, algorithms and hyperlinks, 
physical spaces and places (Boczkowski, 2010; Newman, 2011; Revers, 2015), 
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physical artifacts, such as protest placards or leaflets (Evans, 2015; Frith, 2015; 
Wilken & Goggin, 2014) and the economic materiality of media production, typified 
by the bias towards commercially-oriented ‘soft news’ (Marsh, Hart, & Tindall, 
2010; Reinemann, Stanyer, Scherr, & Legnante, 2011; West & Orman, 2002).  
 
iii) Choreography 
The next analytical pillar accounts for the hybridised processes and repertoires of the 
formal and informal media actors (Chadwick, 2007; 2013) and their embeddedness 
and inter-relation with the material contexts identified above. In its simplest form, 
this analytical feature can be understood as a form of network organisation, akin to 
what Gerbaudo describes as “choreographic leadership” (Gerbaudo, 2012: 134-135) 
or, alternatively, as protocols or standards governing or directing the emergence and 
performance of networked media production (Castells, 2009: 56; Chadwick, 2007). 
 
Somewhat paradoxically choreography is not identifiable as a singular phenomenon 
located specifically within media production and consumption. Rather, this feature is 
found within the interactions between individual or collective human actors as well 
as through material components operating within a media assemblage. Castells 
argues that achieving a coordinating function within such symbolic-material “actor-
networks” is exerted by the “networks themselves” [emphasis in original] (Castells, 
2009: 45). 
 
Gerbaudo (2012) alludes to this when he suggests that choreographic leadership 
exists when the function of communication and organisation become inseparable. 
Although networks reject formal and direct centralised coordination, a form of 
coordination is possible through indirect means, such as communal and collective 
behaviours, expressions of intent or shared meaning. In short: the act of 
communicating something can, in turn, organise networked actors. Thus, being able 
to identify, trace and understand who and how media assemblages are choreographed 
is a crucial step in empirically analysing the exertion of media power.  
 
iv) Coding 
The final analytical pillar of the model builds on the above pillars in helping to 
determine when media power has been achieved through the creation of media 
assemblages. As discussed earlier in this chapter, when an assemblage develops a 
point of universal singularity and establishes a consistent or enduring pattern of 
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behaviour, it becomes heavily territorialised and gains what DeLanda terms a 
“superficial identity” (DeLanda 2006: 14-16). This identity enables a media frame to 
be established around the issues and actions constituting the media assemblage. This 
coded media frame thus determines the way in which the event is interpreted by the 
public. According to the definition of media power adopted in Chapter 1, such an 
outcome is entirely consistent with the exertion of media power. Thus, when a 
symbolic-material media assemblage becomes coded and frames an event or issue, 
the presence of media power becomes tangible and empirically observable. 
 
Taking these core pillars of the analytical model – and the specific variables 
underpinning the pillars outlined above – into account, and following the theory-
model-method process, it is next necessary to set out the appropriate research 
methods to undertake the empirical analysis. 
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Research Methods 
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Chapter 2 of this thesis concluded with a revised theory of contemporary media 
power based on a review and assessment of social and media power. In Chapter 3 a 
model for the analysis of media power was developed in order to address the thesis’ 
third research question: can the theory of contemporary media power be empirical 
analysed and validated? In order to move the thesis closer to an empirical analysis 
this chapter will establish more specific empirical research questions based on the 
analytical model developed in Chapter 3 and set out the research methods required to 
answer the questions and, ultimately, address the overarching aims of the thesis.  
  
It is first important to recap on the specific empirical research problem or aim that 
the thesis is seeking to address. According to the research aims in Chapter 1, the 
thesis firstly seeks to answer the question: what could a revised theory of media 
power look like given the transformations that have occurred within the media 
landscape over recent years? Based on a review of the extant literature on social and 
media power this question is answered in Chapter 2 where a revised theory of 
contemporary media power is outlined. Next the thesis aims to explore and validate 
the quality and suitability of this theory for future scholarly use. It does this by 
developing an analytical model (see Chapter 3) which allows the theory to be 
empirically tested.  
 
Taking these statements of the thesis’ overall research aims as a starting point, it is 
important to determine specific empirical research questions to help refine and 
narrow the research objectives that the thesis will address and therefore improve the 
likely quality of the research outcomes (Creswell, 2005; Johnson & Christensen, 
2004). By formulating such questions, the researcher should build “interrogative 
statements” from their original research aims or goals that will enable them to 
address the specific detail of analysis (Johnson & Christensen, 2004: 77). Moreover, 
such questions will also provide important “signposts” for readers of the thesis 
readers by setting up and “foreshadowing the specific details of the study” 
(Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2006: 478). 
 
What follows are specific research questions for the empirical analysis to answer 
based on the analytical model developed in Chapter 3:  
1. are the principle analytical pillars of hybridity, materiality, choreography and 
coding present in examples of contemporary media use? 
2. to what degree are they present in the examples? 
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3. do the analytical pillars in the examples evolve – i.e. does their presence shift 
over-time? 
4. do these analytical pillars influence the creation of media power?    
 
These questions provide the starting point for the research design and methods 
required for the thesis’ empirical analysis. According to Cresswell (2009) there are 
three dominant research approaches available to the researcher: quantitative, 
qualitative and mixed-methods (Cresswell, 2009: 3). Importantly, however, these 
approaches should be viewed by the researcher as less distinct than they first appear. 
Rather, qualitative and quantitative approaches should be considered as opposite 
ends of a research spectrum with mixed-methods sitting in the middle (ibid; Newman 
& Benz, 1998). In selecting the right approach, it is important to consider the role 
and opportunities that qualitative and quantitative research offer empirical analsyis.  
 
In general terms, qualitative research is suited to studies that explore situations, 
systems or events to gain a better understanding of the meaning that can be applied 
to them (Cresswell, 2009: 3). This type of research is often conducted to build new 
theories or augment and adapt existing ones. Typically, it involves the researcher 
inductively gathering data from within the participants setting, conducting analysis 
of emerging themes according to their interpretation and recursively testing and 
developing hypotheses (ibid.). 
 
Conversely, quantitative research allows variables specified before the empirical 
analysis to be measured and analysed using statistical procedures. Quantitative 
studies test theories deductively and aim to allow their findings to be generalised 
more widely (ibid.). Finally, researchers adopting mixed methods tend to seek an 
approach that provides a better overall understanding of the research problem in the 
study. If applied correctly, mixed methods can optimise the mutual strengths of each 
approach while minimising the mutual weaknesses (Cresswell, 2014: 220).  
 
In this study mixed methods approach will be adopted, although the over-arching 
research approach to the study will be qualitative. As Cresswell observes, given the 
spectrum of available approaches a study “tends to be more qualitative than 
quantitative or vice versa” (Cresswell, 2009: 3) [emphasis in original]. Such an 
approach has been selected in this study because, in order to effectively address the 
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specific empirical research questions set out above, the research must apply elements 
of both inductive and deductive research. 
 
Specifically, in order to develop and build the revised theoretical proposition of 
contemporary media power (see Chapter 2) the empirical analysis will need to 
explore and understand the analytical pillars in the model developed in Chapter 3 to 
confirm if such themes are present in the data. In addition to this inductive, 
exploratory research work, however, a further level of empirical analysis is required 
to confirm that such themes have played a role in exerting media power, understood 
in the analytical model as establishing a media frame around a particular event or 
issue. This requires a deductive approach which can test and validate the outcome or 
effect of the model (LeCompte and Schensul, 2010: 16).       
 
A qualitative research approach is suited to addressing the thesis’ research questions 
as it lends itself to using empirical analysis to explore, describe, understand and 
explain complex phenomena or concepts and test new ideas (Johnson & Christensen, 
2004; Cresswell, 2014: 20; Newman et al., 2003). Similarly, Onwuegbuzie and 
Leech (2006) assert that qualitative research lends itself to questions that “discover 
… or describe experiences” and “typically attempt to obtain insights into … 
processes and experiences that exist within a specific location and context 
(Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2006: 482). 
 
Moreover, Morse (1991) reinforces the relevance of qualitative research to this 
thesis’ aims by asserting that adopting a qualitative research approach is desirable 
when “a notion that the available theory may be inaccurate, inappropriate, incorrect, 
or biased” or “a need exists to explore and describe the phenomena and to develop 
theory” (Morse, 1991: 120) - again, characteristics identified in the review of extant 
literature on media power in Chapter 2. 
 
In considering adopting a mixed-methods research design it is useful to consider the 
benefits and limitations of such an approach. While both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches have strengths and limitations some scholars argue that by mixing and 
blending the two approaches the strengths of one can be combined with the other 
while enabling the researcher to overcome inherent limitations present in each. This 
can result in “a stronger understanding of the problem or question than either by 
itself” (Cresswell, 2014: 220).  
 
  89 
In order to get to these benefits, however, researchers will likely face challenges. 
Given the methodological flexibility they are likely be faced by the need for 
extensive, multi-source data collection combined with a period of time-intensive 
analysis of both sets of data. This dual analysis further adds to the complexity of a 
mixed methods approach by requiring the researcher to be familiar with both 
quantitative and qualitative forms of research (ibid.: 217). In order to operationalise 
such a research approach, it is important to reflect on how the empirical study will be 
designed.  
 
Research Design 
 
In order to select and plan the research and data collection methods for, the following 
dominant characteristics of qualitative research have been used: researcher as key 
instrument; natural setting; multiple data sources; inductive and deductive analysis; 
reflexivity (Creswell, 2014: 185). Cresswell asserts that in qualitative research, the 
researcher plays a central role in gathering empirical information for their analysis – 
they are the primary instrument of data collection (ibid.). This requires qualitive 
research to include a detailed discussion on how the researcher’s role could be 
shaped by their personal background, culture and life experiences. For example, how 
might these factors influence the interpretation of events or phenomena and therefore 
the meaning they assign results? As a consequence, robust qualitative analyses 
benefit from a dedicated section where the researcher writes about their role within 
the research and reflects on the nature of the likely results (Cresswell, 2014: 184). 
Such a reflection will be provided in greater detail in a dedicated ‘Reflexivity’ 
section below.  
 
When conducting qualitative research, data collection is primarily undertaken in a 
setting where research subjects and objects naturally encounter and act on issues 
relevant to the empirical analysis. Talking to participants, observing their behaviour 
and its effects in the natural context is an important characteristic of qualitative 
research. As a result, researchers adopting qualitative research methods need to 
recognise the potential variety of data sources and therefore, the wide range of 
methods available for collection and analysis (Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 2014).  
 
Cresswell notes that interviews, observations, documents/content analysis are key 
methods available to qualitive researchers (Creswell, 2014: 185). Importantly, 
supporting the materialist ontology underpinning this study, Yin (2003) further 
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suggests the analysis of physical artifacts into the methodological mix (Yin, 2003: 
85-96). This in turn allows researchers to inductively explore data to look for themes 
and then validate or build on those themes through a process of deductive cross-
checking (Creswell, 2014: 184-5; Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 2014).   
 
In defining the specific mixed-method research strategy that will be adopted in this 
thesis it is useful to refer to typologies previously developed for classifying types of 
mixed-method designs. Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) have identified and 
reviewed several classification systems available to researchers and refined these into 
a framework of four major mixed method designs: 
1. Triangulation Design 
2. Exploratory Design 
3. Explanatory Design 
4. Embedded Design 
 
The ‘Embedded’ design will be adopted in the thesis for the following reasons. In 
this design, both quantitative and qualitative data are collected and analysed 
separately with the results then combined to look for points of convergence and 
divergence in order to enhance the overall findings and outcomes of the analysis. 
Typically, this design has a stronger qualitative or quantitative emphasis, with one 
type of research used to support the other and enhance the overall results. This makes 
such a design appropriate to the predominantly qualitative approach adopted in the 
thesis, but opens up an opportunity to enhance the data collected and, consequently, 
the outcomes of the analysis (Plano Clark, Huddleston-Casas, Churchill, et al., 2008: 
1554-1555). 
 
As noted above, while mixed-methods approaches can strengthen empirical results 
they necessarily add a level of complexity to the data collection and analysis. With 
this in mind it is important to acknowledge and address several key concerns with 
this design. Firstly, both forms of data must be collected using the same variables or 
constructs in order to enable analytical consistency and reliability (Cresswell, 2014: 
219). Secondly, it is important that the researcher aims to ensure that participants in 
the qualitative sample should also be represented in the quantitative sample in order 
that the more closely aligned the two data sets are the better any comparison and 
cross-referencing (ibid.). Both of these issues are addressed in the section on data 
collection methods below.  
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Thirdly, timing becomes an important consideration in a mixed-methods design, 
specifically whether the datasets are collected at the same time or sequentially. 
Within an embedded design it is desirable that data is collected concurrently (ibid.: 
238). This is something that can be difficult to manage as a single researcher, as 
opposed to a research team (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2006). In this study, this issue 
was addressed through the use of new research technologies which allowed the 
research to either gather parallel data sources concurrently or to conduct 
retrospective analysis of data. Such a process presented a number of other issues 
relating to the use of third-party instrumentation which is discussed in greater detail 
in the sections on data collection methods below.   
 
A final, but not insignificant, consideration which needs to be addressed when 
adopting an Embedded design is the inequality between sample sizes of the 
quantitative and qualitative data. As Cresswell (2014) notes, “the data for the 
qualitative data collection will be smaller than that for the quantitative data 
collection” (Cresswell, 2014: 238). In resolving this issue, the empirical analysis 
adopted in this thesis will not consider unequal sample sizes problematic. Instead, it 
can be argued that the role of the different types of research are complimentary and 
used cumulatively, so as a result their analytical roles differ meaning that each 
requires an internally consistent sample count (ibid.). 
 
In approaching the specific design of the empirical research, Onwuegbuzie and 
Leech (2006) assert that the nature and direction of the research questions under 
investigation provide direction for the research design (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 
2006: 482). Based on the empirical research questions adopted in the thesis, the first 
step in order to empirically investigate the phenomena of contemporary media power 
according to the core pillars of the analytical model will be to locate a series of 
examples to which the empirical analysis can be applied.  
 
As such, a case study approach will be adopted in order to provide discrete, real-life 
units of analysis within which the complex phenomena set out in the analytical 
model (see Chapter 3) can be observed, described and explored (Cresswell, 2014; 
Yin, 2003). In selecting case studies as an appropriate research, the following 
opportunities and limitations of such as approach have been evaluated. Firstly, as a 
predominantly qualitative research approach case study analysis is particularly suited 
to research asking ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions. Indeed, Yin (2003) argues that the more 
empirical investigation seeks to answer such questions or “require extensive or in-
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depth description of some social phenomenon” the more relevant case study analysis 
becomes (Yin, 2003: 13). 
 
More specifically, the distinct opportunity for case study analysis arises from the 
desire to understand complex social phenomena. In particular, case studies have been 
used in prior research to support the investigation and understanding of individual 
and group behaviours as well as organisational, social and political phenomena 
(ibid.: 4). Not only that, but a further strength of case study research is its ability to 
analyse and understand real-life phenomena and interactions in greater detail, where 
such an understanding is embedded in important contextual conditions which are 
similarly important to the analysis but which may be overlooked or lost in other 
research approaches (Yin and Davis, 2007). 
 
Thus, it can be argued that analytical opportunities of case study research make it 
particularly suited to this thesis. In addition, case studies as an analytical form are 
also suited to this thesis’ empirical analysis as they are a preferred way to analyse 
and understand contemporary events (Yin, 2003: 11; 18). While case studies rely on 
many of the same techniques as histories in undertaking a descriptive and 
exploratory analysis of social phenomenon, case studies can add two further sources 
of evidence suited to the needs of this thesis: “direct observations of the events 
taking place and interviews with persons involved in the events” (ibid.).   
 
A further opportunity afforded by the analytical instrumentation of case studies is 
that while categorised primarily as a qualitative research approach (Cresswell, 2009; 
2014), case studies offer opportunities for both qualitative as well as quantitative 
data analysis (Yin, 2003: 19; Patton and Applebaum, 2003: 60). This methodological 
flexibility arises due to the richness and extensiveness of real-life contexts which 
case studies can present, in turn yielding a wealth of data and complexity requiring 
analysis of “multiple sources of evidence” (Yin, 2003: 4). Such an analytical 
affordance provides strong supports the inductive-deductive approach 
adopted/required by this thesis. 
 
This particular strength of case studies, however, has also been raised as an objection 
to their unsuitability in social science research. Specifically, case study analysis in 
the past has largely conflated analysis of the case study itself with the data-collection 
methods undertaken (Yin, 2003: 4). Alternatively, case study analysis has largely 
been based on description of the context or topics of investigation only (ibid.). Such 
  93 
criticisms, arguably, fail to recognise the strengthes case studies offer in terms of 
allowing researchers to grasp the complex interactions and processes at work across 
a particular set of phenomena. In order to achieve this, however, separation of data 
collection methods and analysis is required from a mere description of the case study 
itself (Yin, 2003: 4). 
 
Case Study Sampling 
 
In identifying and choosing case studies for analysis, it is important to follow a 
research approach which is based on a purposive selection strategy. As Miles, 
Huberman and Saldana (2014) assert, case studies should be chosen on conceptual 
grounds to help illustrate and add depth to the theoretical perspective being explored. 
This can be achieved by selecting cases that offer “unique contexts” for study (ibid.: 
34).  
 
It should be acknowledged, however, that in many instances an element of 
“convenience sampling” occurs whereby the final selection is influenced by 
additional, non-purposive factors, such as geographical proximity to the researcher 
and dates of events suited to the timeframe of the study (ibid.: 32). In selecting case 
studies for this thesis such a phenomenon was recognised and a balance between 
conceptually optimal and convenient case studies was sought at all times.  
 
In selecting case studies for analysis in this thesis, a conceptual map of the 
contemporary media environment was developed as a top-level framework to give 
consistency to case study selection (see Table 1). This framework was based on 
Wiley et al.’s (2012) approach to the contemporary media environment which is 
strongly aligned with the thesis’ ontological perspective set out in Chapter 3 
inasmuch as the authors recognise the a networked media space instantiated through 
multiple actors, symbolic-material properties and complex, emergent relationships 
(Wiley et al, 2012). Given the importance of digital technologies in the 
contemporary media environment (Schwab, 2016), the presence and use of digital 
media and/or digital technologies (as defined in the analytical model in Chapter 2) 
was also included as a requisite for case study selection.  
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Table 1 – Framework of the constitutive categories in a contemporary media 
environment 
 
Milieu Type Network 
Type 
Constitutive 
attributes  
Categories of 
articulation  
Practices 
Social  Social People; 
interpersonal 
communications 
Narratives; 
spatial frames 
Inter-personal 
interaction 
Geographical 
/ Physical 
Place Places; paths; 
means of 
transport 
Physical 
channeling; 
spatial 
expression 
Displacement; 
mobility; 
Emplacement 
Media Media Media; media 
contents 
Agendas; 
narratives; 
spatial frames 
Media use 
Digital Digital Software; 
hardware; 
algorithms; data;  
Data, 
narratives, 
digital objects, 
e.g. hashtags, 
etc 
Code, 
information 
flows, 
visualisation 
 
Using this framework, a number of cases were purposively selected that include a 
majority (at least three out of four) of the conceptual areas. This selection strategy 
aimed to ensure that each case study offers the empirical analysis as much 
conceptually relevant material as possible while being flexible enough to not limit 
the range of available cases for analysis.  
 
For the final empirical analysis three case studies fitting the above purposive criteria 
were selected. The decision to adopt multiple cases for analysis was made to support 
the aims of the thesis. Although. multi-case sampling doesn’t necessarily improve 
the overall generalisability of the results it does, however, support the development 
of any underlying theory being investigated as it generates a “confidence our 
emerging theory is generic” as it can be identified in multiple settings (Miles, 
Huberman and Saldana, 2014: 34). 
  
The three case studies selected for final analysis in this thesis are presented below 
(see Table 2): 
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Table 2 – Case studies selected for empirical analysis  
 
Case study title Description 
1. NUS’s #Demo2012 
Student demonstration organised by the NUS, students’ union, 
against UK government higher education policy 
2. Animal rights activists 
versus Adidas campaign 
Online campaign organised by European animal rights activists 
against the sportswear and lifestyle brand, Adidas 
3. The Guardian’s 
#AskSnowden reporting 
Investigative reporting from global media organisation of 
exclusive leaks against illegal espionage by the US and UK 
governments 
 
 
Having identified and selected the case studies for empirical analysis, the next stage 
of the research design is to outline and account for the data collection methods 
chosen in order to gather and analyse each case study. As such, the following section 
will identify each method (the ‘what’), provide a rationale for its selection (the 
‘why’) and explain the data collection process (the ‘how’). Moreover, each method 
will include a discussion of any limitations or ethical issues arising and attention paid 
to issues of validity and reliability. Finally, given the significance of the researcher’s 
role in the data collection and empirical analysis a section covering reflexivity and 
self-reflection in the research will also be included.  
 
Data Collection 
 
Based on the list of potential data collection methods identified as suited to 
qualitative analysis (Yin, 2003: 85-96; Creswell, 2014: 184-5; Miles, Huberman and 
Saldana, 2014), the following methods will be adopted: ethnography; media content 
analysis and follow-up interviews.  
 
i) Ethnography 
 
Ethnography is described by Angrosino (2007) as “the art and science of describing a 
human group – its institutions, interpersonal behaviors, material productions, and 
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beliefs” (Angrosino, 2007: 14). Specifically, it is a research method for “discovering 
and investigating social and cultural patterns and meaning in […] social settings” 
which, crucially, allows researchers to discover “what people do and why” prior to 
assigning meaning (LeCompte et al., 1999: 1). Ethnography has proven useful and 
important in exploring and defining factors associated with a research problem in 
order to identify, understand and address them - particularly when such factors are 
embedded in complex systems or settings and the exact participants and their 
relationships require further understanding (LeCompte and Schensul, 2010: 36). 
 
Ethnography has been used extensively in media and communications research, 
predominantly to examine production and consumption of media (Hansen and 
Machin, 2013). In these cases, data collection methods are usually associated with 
observing or participating in what media audiences or practitioners are doing or 
saying. Indeed, Hansin and Machin (2013) argue that ethnography offers researchers 
a unique opportunity to study and understand media use, its effects and production 
by viewing them as part of people’s lives and the culture which they inhabit (ibid.: 
60). 
 
This rationale is particularly pertinent in the interpretation of media adopted by this 
thesis approaches it “not as the transmission of meaning” but rather as the production 
of a “territory in which geography, mobility, and economic relations play as much a 
role as the circulation of information and the sharing of language and cultural 
practices” (Wiley et al., 2012: 183). In such a “territory” the use of ethnography will 
play an important role in de-tangling, exploring and understanding how 
contemporary media power might operate.  
  
Furthermore, ethnography is an ideal research method for this thesis as it addresses 
the specific needs of the research design outlined above. For example, it allows 
researchers to start with a research problem or analytical model which can be 
explored through initial observation and then “elaborated and retested through 
continued collection of data […] until new information confirms a stable pattern” 
(LeCompte and Schensul, 2010: 18). Thus, ethnography supports the mixed-method 
approach adopted in this thesis by enabling inductive and recursive analysis which 
can then be augmented with other data collection and analysis methods. In turn this 
allows the researcher to build and test a new theory of contemporary media power. 
Finally, ethnography plays an important role in identifying and defining new trends 
in specific research settings that haven’t been studied in detail or against a particular 
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theory before (LeCompte and Schensul, 2010: 45) making it well suited to address 
the research questions found in this thesis.  
 
From a process point of view, ethnography involves the researcher engaging in data 
collection in a natural setting and collecting primarily observational data (Cresswell, 
2014: 14). The data collected will feature “concern for mundane, day-today events” 
and “direct or indirect participation in local activities” (Miles, Huberman and 
Saldana, 2014: 8) and although it requires “relatively little pre-structured 
instrumentation” (ibid.) it does present, however, other significant pre-collection 
considerations than other methods, in particular research ethics and reflexivity.  
 
Ethics 
Given the researcher’s direct engagement with the objects of study, it is particularly 
important when conducting ethnographic research to consider the ethical impact 
and/or consequences of the research in order to protect participants from any kind of 
risk - whether physical, emotional, social or financial harm (LeCompte and Schensul, 
2010: 235). As a consequence, it is essential for the researcher to evaluate the risk 
and benefits of the study and ensure that the benefits of the collected data outweighs 
the risks of its collection. It also means that researchers must identify, understand 
and reflect on the potential risks participants may face and address such risks 
accordingly in the design, conduct and analysis of the study (ibid.).    
 
In order to identify and evaluate the potential risks likely to be encountered in the 
planned research, ethical guidelines produced by the Association of Social 
Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth were consulted (ASA, 1999) and 
used to guide the research design in each case study. Key elements of the design are 
discussed in detail below. 
  
Protecting Participants 
A vital tenet of protecting participants from risk in ethnographic research is the need 
to anticipate potential harm across the research design, data collection and data use. 
Given the hybrid nature of the selected case studies, consideration of preventing risk 
or harm were made both in terms of their online as well as offline settings. Studying 
online communities can be considered a relatively low risk activity due to the 
presumption of accessibility and availability of the public domain (Iphofen, 2013: 
63). However, it is also important when undertaking ethnographies of online spaces 
for the researcher be present themselves authentically in the setting to avoid 
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intentionally misleading participants. This is achieved by ensuring the researcher 
doesn’t seek to create anonymised or misleading online profiles or mis-represent 
themselves to participants (ASA, 1999; Iphofen, 2013). These considerations were 
adopted and built into the research both during data collection and in subsequent 
analysis.  
 
While the potential for physical risk in the Adidas case study was deemed to be 
minimal owing to the secure office location of the offline setting, the #Demo2012 
case study was identified as a case study with a higher risk for physical and 
emotional harm due to its inclusion of a physical protest and demonstration. This 
presented a number of important instances where concerns over the real risk of harm 
had to be addressed. For example, while undertaking ethnographic observation in 
public spaces is generally less problematic than highly personal settings (Murphy 
and Dingwall, 2007), studying a public demonstration presents the possibility of 
encountering highly charged, stressful situations, potentially featuring illegal actions. 
As such, extreme caution was taken during data collection to ensure actors were not 
explicitly identified or their individual rights infringed. 
 
In order to be sympathetic to the values and norms found in public protest or 
demonstration settings, the planned data collection adhered to the guidelines and 
advice produced by the activist community designed to protect the rights of 
protestors during research or reporting (Camp for Climate Action, 2010). 
Furthermore, the researcher’s previous experiences of public demonstrations enabled 
the research design to anticipate of scenarios likely to arise during the event and plan 
accordingly to minimise the risks to participants and the researcher. These scenarios 
included how to tell if illegal action was likely to occur and what to do to ensure 
anonymity of participants or when the events might turn violent and to ensure the 
research work is suspended to give personal safety precedence. 
    
Avoiding Undue Intrusion 
These issues link to a further tenet of conducting ethical ethnography: avoiding 
undue intrusion. Again, limiting intrusion in the Adidas and #AskSnwoden case 
studies was easier to ensure given that the settings were more formalised (i.e. a 
small-scale workplace in the Adidas case study) and online communities. Here 
observation without intrusion was feasible. In particular, the researchers previous 
professional experience of the settings in question meant a level of familiarity that 
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helped to minimise intrusion by limiting the need for questioning actions or seeking 
clarification on discussions. Where this was occurred, any pertinent issues were 
noted and saved for deeper exploration in follow-up interviews.   
  
Again, however, the #Demo2012 case study with the researcher physically 
embedded in the event being studied meant taking greater caution in the research 
design to avoid undue intrusion. Here, it was vital that as a participant observer the 
researcher didn’t encourage or enable (or even appear to encourage or enable) 
specific actions within the demonstration which could unduly affect the outcomes or 
consequences of situations in the research setting. This consideration is especially 
important where researcher intrusion could precipitate illegal actions as these would 
significantly increase the risk of physical, emotional, social and financial harm for 
participants.  
 
Right to Confidentiality  
A final ethical consideration when conducting ethnographic research is the need to 
ensure that participants “have the right to remain anonymous and to have their rights 
to privacy and confidentiality respected” (ASA, 1999). This tenet was used to plan 
data collection in that no individuals whose actions was recorded would be identified 
without their approval. While this logic was appropriate to the collection of 
ethnographic data, however, it presents further challenges when conducting follow-
up research in this thesis, such as content analysis and interviewing. Here, other 
methods of data collection may directly (i.e. through an interview request) or 
indirectly (i.e. through the inclusion of textual examples from the content analysis) 
identify the participant. Where this is likely to occur, the ethical issues arising are 
addressed in the relevant research method section below.  
 
Limitations 
While ethnographic research can provide opportunities to identify and explore 
research questions whose factors are embedded in complex systems or settings, one 
limitation arising is that such findings - while rich in detail and nuance - tell us about 
one particular setting at one particular time (Hansen and Machin, 2013: 61). 
However, countering such a limitation it can be asserted that ethnography provides 
researchers with the relevant observational data that, along with follow-up research 
can help to build a more complete and richer picture of the situation being studied 
(ibid.). Moreover, as noted above, this thesis’ use of multiple case studies can help 
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improve reliability within the study as it allows a generalising and comparison of 
data and results across the multiple cases in the thesis. 
 
important concern with ethnographic research is that the ability to achieve reliable 
and repeatable data collection is limited owing to there being little or no systematic 
approach (Carrithers, 1992). In response to this, it has been argued that providing the 
role of the researcher in the research setting and data collection process is understood 
adequately and that reflexivity is used to account for the research actions taken, then 
a level of systematic reliability can be achieved (Hansen and Machine, 2013: 81). 
Similarly, it can be argued that as ethnography produces knowledge of how people 
engage with everyday phenomena, then it represents the best way to investigate the 
details of everyday life. As Hansen and Machin observe: “[k]nowledge is always 
embedded in the social world. In this sense there seems no reason that ethnography 
should be criticised above other methods that strive to claim to produce a form of 
knowledge that is indeed free-floating and independent from the social world” 
(ibid.). 
 
Reflexivity  
Ethnography’s role in studying knowledge embedded in the social world foregrounds 
issues of subjectivity and bias when it comes to the validity of data (ibid.). Therefore, 
it is essential to ensure that the researcher is able to apply a reflexivity to their own 
work in order to identify, reflect on and challenge their own perceptions and biases. 
According to Lipp (1991), reflexivity requires a critical self-reflection that addresses 
the ways in which the personal attributes, experiences and social background of the 
researcher can all influence the collection and analysis of data. 
 
When gathering data, it is important to recognise that the background of the 
researcher is likely to inform their personality and behaviour and, as such, their 
perception of events. In response to this the phenomenologist Husserl argued that 
when gathering data, the researcher should ensure they practice ‘bracketing’- that is: 
“the process of setting aside, suspending, or holding in abeyance presuppositions 
surrounding a specific phenomenon.” (Gering, 2009: 1443). By identifying personal 
beliefs and suppositions prior to conducting research the researcher can minimise the 
influence their background has on data collection (Cutcliffe, 2003; Mulhall et al., 
1999; Padgett, 1998).  
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The act of bracketing has been critiqued by some scholars as unrealistic the potential 
difficulties for researchers to fully “bracket off” their research activitirs from their 
entire previous lived experience (van Manen, 1990). Rather, by acknowledging the 
potential influence of this experience the researcher is able to “make transparent, 
overt, and apparent” (Gearing, 2009: 1445) their personal values in their research and 
thus address any issue that these may create. For example, each of the case studies 
analysed in this thesis present circumstances with which I was familiar. Having 
worked within professional media settings and also participated in public 
demonstrations it is important for me to ensure that all data collected is recorded in 
ways that capture the full exposition of the situation, rather than my taken-for-
granted presumptions of events. Similarly, the data collection should strive to capture 
what actions or events mean to the groups being studied, not the researcher based on 
their past experiences.  
 
A further reflexive concern is the issue of inter-subjectivity – a notion that focuses 
critical attention on the “unconscious processes structure[ing] relations between the 
researcher and the participant” (Marshall, Fraser and Baker, 2010). This refers to the 
likelihood that in field settings research participants may assign certain identities or 
roles to the researcher based on certain characteristics or appearances. In turn, this 
may affect the type and depth of research data. This issue can be addressed through 
close monitoring during the research process and by the researcher adapting their 
appearance and behaviour to support data collection – as far as ethically permissible 
(ibid.).  
 
Again, while gathering case study data the researcher’s previous experience of the 
research settings meant that they could adapt their appearance accordingly. However, 
this also posed challenges in that while this knowledge helped to minimise the 
impact of the researcher in the setting, it was also necessary to ensure that the 
researcher’s past experience didn’t mean that they weren expected to participate in 
the activities or event they were observing. If this had happened, not only would it 
present challenges in recording data, in the case of #Demo2012 it may have placed 
the researcher at risk of participating in illegal actions.  
 
Lipp (2007) further identities the need for reflexivity to achieve a social critique of 
the socio-economic status of the researcher and the effect any power imbalances 
between researcher and participant may have on the data. Here the challenge is to 
balance any potential tension between allowing the research data enable “multiple 
  102 
voices to be heard” (Finley, 2003) and avoiding over-emphasising the “underdog” 
(Dingwall, 1980). This is something easier to address in the Adidas and 
#AskSnowden case studies, than #Demo2012 where the researcher’s status as a 
middle-class, professional male could negatively affect relationships with student 
and political activist participants and limit access to situations or information 
pertinent to the research owing to a perceived privileged or ‘outside status’. This was 
addressed in part by being able to ‘blend in’ with participants – both in terms of 
behaviour and visual appearance owing to previous experience of demonstrations, as 
discussed above.  
 
Data was collected primarily using note form, although it can also be argued that 
secondary ethnographic data was collected through what Caputo has termed 
“processual ethnography” (Caputo, 2000). While primary ethnographic data will 
provide invaluable of first-hand insights into the “spatialised” field setting 
(Angrosino, 2007) the opportunities for research can be extended by collecting and 
incorporating other media content published online by other participants from the 
setting. This can include camera phone footage or participant reflection of specific 
experiences. It will be gathered as part of the content analysis data collection and, as 
such, the ethical implications of this are discussed in greater detail below. 
 
While Carrithers (1992) has argued that ethnography has a limited systematic 
approach data collection was planned to ensure that the relevant data points required 
to address the thesis’ research questions were gathered. This was undertaken by 
creating a checklist based on LeCompte and Schensul’s (2010) ethnographic data 
collection framework (LeCompte and Schensul, 2010: 175). This included the 
purpose of each data point, its target source and data content type. This ensured the 
data collection was clear and structured and was aligned with the core analytical 
pillars of the model operationalised in the thesis: hybridity, materiality, choreography 
and coding. 
 
When collecting the data, events were recorded as they happened, and each set of 
notes aimed to gather as much detail as possible to record what may have appeared 
as “mundane” or “everyday’ situations”, but which may have had significant effects 
or consequences unrecognised by the researcher at the time (Hansen and Machine, 
2013: 81). In addition, data collection also paid attention to events that appeared to 
elicit an unusual or significant response from participants in order to capture what 
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could be pertinent findings through follow-up data collection – even if they were not 
fully understood by the researcher at the point of collection.  
 
ii) Content Analysis  
 
Content analysis offers an approach to analysing media and communications 
systematically and objectively in a way that is particularly suited to revealing 
patterns and trends (Hansen and Machin, 2013: 85). Whiile a number of early 
definitions of content analysis locate this method firmly on the quantitative end of 
the research spectrum (Berelson, 1952; Holsti, 1969), more recent applications of 
content analysis, however, have identified it as a qualitative research instrument. For 
example, Krippendorff (2004) has defined content analysis as “a research technique 
for making […] valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the 
contexts of their use” (Krippendorff, 2004: 18) while Downe-Wambolt (1992) 
asserts that content analysis can be adopted to achieve more than just measuring 
frequency of topics. Rather content analysis can be used to infer meaning from 
“verbal, visual, or written data in order to describe and quantify specific phenomena” 
(Downe-Wambolt, 1992: 314) [my emphasis].  
 
Two dominant approaches to content analysis are manifest or latent analyses 
(Bengtsson, 2016). In manifest analyses the researcher quantifies evidence in the 
content which is usually “presented in the form of frequency expressed as a 
percentage or actual numbers of key categories (Bengtsson, 2016: 10). Conversely, 
latent content analyses are applied at an “interpretative level” allowing the researcher 
to identify “the underlying meaning of the text [content]: what the text is talking 
about (ibid.) [emphasis in original]. 
 
This duality of approach is important for this thesis as it supports the 
operationalisation of the analytical model developed in Chapter 3. Specifically, it 
allows the inductive exploration and interpretation of the analytical categories: 
hybridity, materiality, choreography and coding identified in the model. This, in turn, 
can be used to augment and support the ethnographic and interview data in further 
qualifying, augmenting and revising the theory of contemporary media power 
outlined in Chapter 2. Moreover, by applying a quantitative analysis to the content 
data it is possible to determine when a media assemblage becomes coded and a 
media frame is established in the case studies, and thus media power exerted (Hansen 
and Machin, 2013: 87).  
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Ethical Considerations  
In terms of ethical considerations, content analysis is often adopted as a “low risk” 
collection method because if “data is freely available on the internet, books or other 
public forum, permission for further use and analysis is implied” (Tripathy, 2013: 
1478). The concept of digital, user-generated content15 problematises this perspective 
as while researchers may believe that users of social media post or publish content 
having made a fully-informed decision there remains a grey area in terms of whether 
social media data can be considered public or private (Potter, 2011). That is, despite 
the public accessibility of user-generated data published openly on social media and 
the terms and conditions of social networking platforms, such as Facebook, opting in 
their members to consent for research purposes when they sign up to the platform 
(Facebook, 2018; see section iii), many public users of social media report that 
they do not read terms and conditions of digital platforms presenting implied 
challenges for researchers (Wolfinger, 2016). 
 
In this grey area, context become an important consideration in making ethical 
judgements for data collection. Wolfinger (ibid.) argues that in such equivocal 
contexts, researchers must take into account the thoughts and feelings of participants 
in their research in order to account for their attitudes towards privacy and safety. 
Applying this approach to the research undertaken in this thesis it seems reasonable 
to presume that as each case study is a high-profile public event designed to be 
publicly visible and, ultimately, largely using this visibility to achieve an impact on 
an outcome in each case study (i.e. influence government policy (#Demo2012); 
affect corporate reputation (Adidas) and shape public debate (#AskSnowden)) 
participants generating media digital content must intend or be willing for their voice 
to be heard. As a consequence, it is accepted that this data is acceptable for inclusion 
in the empirical analysis. 
 
This ethical position is further supported by the British Psychological Society whose 
guidelines on internet-mediated research asserts that the question of whether social 
media data should be considered public or private is premised on whether users can 
reasonably expect their data to be public. For example, users posting information to 
Twitter (a public platform by default) should be aware that their information is open 
to observation by members of the public. Conversely, members of Facebook (by 
                                               
15 That is, any digital “content created and provided by users, through easy-to-use … [digital] tools” (Skalski, 
2017: 210; Potter, 2011). 
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default, a closed platform) may expect that the information they publish has a level 
of privacy (Hewson et al., 2017). 
 
Limitations 
Despite the opportunities content analysis affords the thesis’ empirical analysis the 
method is not without limitations. Firstly, while content analysis makes claims to 
objectivity which, for example, ethnographic data collection could not lay as strong a 
claim, it can be argued that collecting and analysing media content can’t be entirely 
value free as it “delineates certain dimensions” for data collection and analysis 
(Hansen and Machin, 2013: 88). Collecting media content data, then, clearly requires 
the researcher to make subjective choices. In response to this tension, the content 
analysis undertaken in the thesis will recognise the challenges of achieving 
objectivity and instead will adopt a systematic approach that recognises the 
subjective nature of any engagement with social data. This will be guided by the 
analytical model developed in Chapter 3 to ensure a level of reliability and 
replicability across each case study (ibid.: 89).  
 
There is also a need for researchers to be aware of inferring results or meaning too 
easily from simple frequency counts when conducting content analysis, as there is no 
straight-forward relationship between content and its wider implications (Hansen and 
Machin, 2013: 89). To resolve such a limitation, it is important to ensure results are 
“anchored in a theory that articulates the relationship between media and their social 
contexts” (ibid.). This is achieved in the thesis by using content analysis to 
deductively assess the presence of recurring themes which code the media 
assemblage and create an enduring media frame demonstrating media power.  
 
Selection and Sampling 
Bengtsson (2016) asserts there are a number of key steps to be considered when 
planning content analysis: the aim, the sample, the choice of data collection method 
and the practical implications for the researcher, such as ethics and reliability 
(Bengston, 2016:10). The process of media selection and sampling broadly follows 
the approach first defined by Berelson (1952): a) select media, b) identify sample 
date or issue, c) sample relevant content. Typically, media selection can be based on 
geography; audience or media type and either single or multiple source (Hansen and 
Machin, 2013: 88). Given the networked characteristics of media in the thesis, and 
the hybridity inhernet in its analytical model, media selection and sampling is drawn 
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from multiple sources to ensure analysis achieves a comprehensive overview of the 
relationships between, and across, different types of media.  
 
Based on Skalski et al. (2017) media selection collected content from formal media 
publishers, such as institutional broadcasters and print media, as well as informal, 
self-published content, including blogs, and social networking sites, such as 
Facebook and Twitter (Skalski et al., 2017: 217-218). One particular challenge of 
selecting informal and user-generated content is the ability to identify and collect the, 
often vast, quantities of material from a widely distributed network of publishers. 
 
To address this challenge, research technology was used to select media capable of 
capturing both formal, traditional media content as well as digital, user-generated 
content. Given the proliferation of digitised media content, the availability and 
adoption of technology in the collection, collation and analysis of vast quantities of 
research data available has grown over recent years (ibid.: 212-213).     
 
Content selection and sampling was primarily conducted using the content research 
platform, Sysomos.16 This instrument was chosen as it offered three clear benefits to 
the research approach. Firstly, the technology provided comprehensive access to the 
range of relevant data sources required by the analytical model, from institutional 
news content, popular social networking platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, 
Instagram and YouTube, as well as self-publishing platforms, such as blogs and 
online forums. Furthermore, the technology claims to hold over 200 billion content 
data points available up to 13 months prior to the point of research (Sysomos, 2013). 
While these are commercially-motivated claims (as Sysomos is a paid-for research 
tool built on a business model of selling access to media data) they nevertheless 
demonstrate a scale and depth of content that can be accessed and collected well 
beyond those afforded by manual methods.  
Moreover, Sysomos offers access to complete Twitter data via the “Twitter 
Firehose”17 which addresses a number of particular challenges encountered by 
researchers. Firstly, the sheer volume of data produced by Twitter renders manual 
collection problematic (Honeycutt and Herring, 2009). For example, researchers who 
                                               
16 See: https://sysomos.com/ 
17 The Twitter Firehouse refers to the ability to access the complete range of data produced by Twitter. That is: 
the Firehose provides access to 100% of data, compared to other sources which only offers researchers around 
1% of a randimised sample of data (Mejova, Weber, & Macy, 2015: 41-42).  
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build tools to gather data direct from Twitter’s API18 come up against the limitations 
applied to data collection via the open (i.e. non-commercial) API which is capped at 
1% of the available data (Mejova, Weber, & Macy, 2015: 41-42; Skalski et al., 2017: 
222). This is primarily due to Twitter’s business model, which is based on selling 
access to its data (Honeycutt and Herring, 2009; Thelwall, Buckley, and Paltoglou, 
2011).  
Secondly, the reliability and quality of data selection was improved through the 
researcher’s ability to identify and collect data based on its inclusion of key words 
pertinent to the case studies. Thus, rather than relying on the researcher to pre-define 
the media sources most likely to be relevant to the analysis, by searching all 
available media sources for relevant references to each case study a broader and 
more inclusive dataset was collated. Thus, any irrelevant or unwanted media 
identified can be discarded pre-analysis thus minimising the potential for resulting 
data to be comprised and its reliability undermined (Lacy, Watson, Riffe, & Lovejoy, 
2015: 801). Such irrelevant content is a unique challenge for researchers when 
collecting digital content, owing to the prevelence of spam content, abandoned sites 
or access-restricted sites potentially contaminating the data (Li and Walejko, 2008; 
Skalski et al., 2017: 220).  
To collect data using Sysomos it was first necessary to create a robust search 
taxonomy capable of identifying media content relevant to each case study. A 
taxonomy was created for each case study using a dual approach to ensure maximum 
accuracy and coverage of data. Firstly, a formal taxonomy was created that included 
the identification and use of popular and widely used terms and key words associated 
with the case study events (Anstead & O'Loughlin, 2011: 446). This was done by 
reviewing manually identified content related to each case study; then exploring and 
testing likely words or phrases. For example, in the Adidas case study relevant, 
formal terms, such as Adidas or “UEFA 2012” or “animal rights” were identified and 
adopted 
 
Complementing this, an informal taxonomy was also developed. This is intended to 
identify and collect data making use of more colloquial or interpersonal terms. This 
taxonomy must recognise the highly personal and subjective language used to 
                                               
18 API is a software development term which stands for ‘Application Programming Interface’. It is a way for 
software on one website or platform to be connected to other third-party software. In this case, Twitter is making 
some of its data freely available to researchers while providing access to the full Firehose API for commercial 
clients only. See: Kiss (2007). 
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discuss and report events by informal media actors. This was developed by initial 
observation of media content arising in the case studies and more colloquial or 
unforeseen terms identified. Again, in the case of the Adidas case study the Twitter 
hashtag, #shitstorm, emerged for example. These were then used to recursively 
inform updates to the taxonomy.  
 
Using these taxonomies, Boolean search queries were created for use to enable 
Sysomos to gather relevant data for each case study. Boolean searching enables 
researchers to apply a series of logic operators that apply clear sets of rules to the 
search software programmes used in the collection of information from large 
databases (Sobel & Riffe, 2015: 794). Boolean logic includes linguistic operators, 
such as AND, OR and NOT, and symbol-based operators, such as “…”, ~ and (…), 
which can be used to disambiguate between the use of the taxonomic terms in 
different contexts (Chakraborty, Pagolu and Garla, 2013: 144).  
 
Returning to the Adidas case study as an example, searching for Adidas alone 
returned a large quantity of data within the given date range, the majority of which 
was not relevant to the case study. By applying the Boolean operator ‘AND’ and 
“…” to create the search query Adidas AND “animal rights” it is possible to refine 
the search results occurring where Adidas and animal rights are discussed. By further 
refining this query to: (Adidas AND “animal rights”) AND (“Adidas shitstorm”~5) 
we can identify social media conversations and media content where Adidas and 
animal rights are mentioned but, crucially, also where the key case study qualifying 
term, ‘shitstorm’ is used within five words of Adidas. Creating and testing such 
logic-oriented search queries for each case study will ensure high accuracy and 
relevance of the data collected.  
 
Data collection conducted in this way using Boolean search can be considered 
purposive in that the research approach is designed to capture all relevant content 
from the “natural history” of an event (Lacy et al., 2015: 793). But in recognising the 
natural history of the case studies, it is important for researchers to consider the 
sampling timeframe when conducting content analysis. Owing to the specific time-
bound events of the case studies, sampling was conducted by date (Hansen and 
Machin, 2013: 94).  
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Hansen and Machin (2013) argue that collecting case study data can be more 
straight-forward than other issue- or theme-based events owing to there being 
relatively fixed identifiable start and end dates of the cases (Hansen and Machin, 
2013: 94-95).  In reality, however, case study data collection can be complicated by 
the fact that the media’s influence on the case study may not align exactly with its 
official start or end times. This was resolved in the thesis by taking a sample of data 
from each case study’s known timeframe and using Sysomos’ data visualisation 
functionality to create a graph showing content volume over time. This visualisation 
was then used to estimate when the most prolific period of media activity occurred 
for each case study. This was then adopted as the sampling period for data collection.  
 
Table 3 – Media content selection and sampling period by case study  
 
Case Study 
Media Sources 
Volume Sample Date-
range 
#Demo2012 
News articles 46 16th  to 26th 
November 2012 Blog posts 
97 
Tweets 3,198 
Adidas 
‘Shitstorm’ 
News articles 17 
1st November to 
31st December 2011 
Blog posts 8 
Tweets 34 
#AskSnowden 
News articles 6 
15th June to 17th 
June, 2013 
Online web chat 
comments 
380 
Tweets 17,176 
 
Having defined and piloted the Boolean queries for each case study, searches were 
performed for the relevant sampling period and content downloaded (See Table 3). It 
should be noted further that as the questions and comments submitted to The 
Guardian’s online community as part of the #AskSnowden case study were not 
included in Sysomos’ dataset the data extraction tool, Import.io19, was used to 
‘scrape’ and collect this information separately. 
One other challenge identified with Sysomos arose from the fact that the platform 
only allows a maximum sample of 5,000 data points, e.g. news articles, tweets, blog 
                                               
19 See: https://www.import.io/ 
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posts, etc, to be downloaded from its database.20 While two of the three events 
studied in the thesis generated data sets within this threshold, the #AskSnowden case 
study produced significantly more than the 5,000 maximum within the defined 
timeframe. From these 5,000 a further randomised sub-set of 500 tweets (10 per 
cent) of data was created for detailed coding and analysis.  
 
To address this, Sysomos’ built-in automated analysis was used to augment and 
extend the investigation. Due to the increase of ‘big data’ sets which “by definition 
[…] impl[y] that the data are too big and complicated to handle or even be fully 
conceived by humans” such automated approaches to data analysis offer new ways to 
“collate, massage and analyse” content (Skalsi et al., 2017: 204). This manual and 
computational method supports Lewis et al.’s (2013) call for a hybrid approach that 
blends computer text analyses and manual methods in order to “preserve the 
strengths of traditional content analysis, with its systematic rigor and contextual 
awareness, while maximising the largescale capacity of big data and the efficiencies 
of computational methods” (Lewis et al., 2013: 47; (Ha, 2013). By applying this 
hybrid analysis to the entire #AskSnowden data-set computational processes will be 
used to “generate patterns and inferences” (Tookey, 2010). These include 
understanding the connections between concepts and themes within textual content 
(Park and Thelwall, 2003) and identifying recurring or significant sources within 
media (Morgan, 2015 in Lacy et al., 2015: 799).  
 
iii) Interviews 
 
The third and final data collection method adopted for the empirical analysis is 
interviews. Interviews are a common way of collecting qualitative data which offer 
researchers the ability to investigate people's opinions in greater depth (Kvale, 1996) 
as well as explore and understand people’s actions and beliefs (Brown, 2005: 485). 
Interviews offer a particular benefit to the empirical analysis as they will enable the 
researcher to follow-up on notable or interesting observations identified in the 
ethnographic data or content analysis. Specifically, while the ethnographic 
observation applied in each case study will help provide insight into given situations, 
it is not always possible to directly observe such events in their entirety. Thus, 
interviewing participants is an effective way of gaining further detail about the wider 
                                               
20 While the 5,000 sample data set available to researchers is a randomised sample drawn from across the case 
study time period, it is not possible to understand exactly how Sysomos randomises the data.  
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context in a way which is arguably “more powerful in eliciting narrative data” than 
other methods, such as questionnaires and observations (Blaxter et al., 2006: 172).  
 
On a more practical level, interviews allow better quality, more accurate, in-depth 
qualitative data to be collected through the researcher being able to interact directly 
with the participant and rephrase or explain questions so interviewees understand 
better (ibid.). Moreover, interview data can be recorded and reviewed post-event thus 
enabling more opportunities for analysis and thus more accurate findings (Berg, 
2007). 
 
Despite these opportunities, interviewing does present limitations that need to be 
recognised and addressed. Firstly, the role of the researcher must be taken into 
account and reflexivity applied to ensure interviews yield accurate data. For 
example, as Hammersley and Gomm (2008) assert: “what people say in an interview 
will indeed be shaped, to some degree, by the questions they are asked [...] by whom 
and to whom, and so on; by what they think the interviewer wants; by what they 
believe he or she would approve or disapprove of” (Hammersley and Gomm, 2008: 
100). 
 
Bearing this in mind, it is important for the researcher to reflect on their actions 
during the set-up and conduct of each interview. To address this, interviewees were 
asked to suggest a format, time and location suitable to them to ensure they were able 
to speak openly and in confidence. A further limitation is that interview data will be 
restricted to what participants are prepared to able to discuss. For example, if a case 
study included sensitive or illegal events, then the interviewee may not be willing to 
disclose certain facts. Similarly, recollections of events among participants will be 
highly subjective and therefore be subject to change over time (Alshenqeeti, 2014). 
For example, interviewees may feel the need to justify or post-rationalise their 
actions in a particular case study. As this thesis’ empirical analysis doesn’t rely 
solely on interview data the issue of unreliability in participants’ knowledge can be 
addressed by triangulating interviewees’ personal perceptions of events with findings 
from the other data sources. 
 
Participants’ subjective recollections can also provide challenges for data reliability 
on the part of the researcher. For example, interviewers need to be careful to ensure 
that they don’t seek answers to meet preconceived ideas or fit hypotheses or mis-
interpret their interviewee’s responses. Cresswell argues that attaining reliability in 
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interviews is at best “elusive” (Cresswell, 2009: 153) owing to an interview’s 
“openness to so many types of bias” (Millward and Brewerton, 2001: 74). This will 
be addressed in this thesis by ensuring a constant reflexivity during the interview 
process and taking necessary steps to maintain validity and reliability in the data 
being gathered., Specifically, this will include: being alert to my own personal 
experiences and background and reflecting on how these may affect the 
interpretation of participants’ answers. I will also ensure questions asked are 
objective and don’t lead the interviewee into pre-conceived answers.  
 
Selection 
Respondent selection was undertaken purposively in order to gain deeper, more 
qualitative understanding of particular actions, participant motivations and contexts 
that appeared significant in the ethnographic or content analysis data. Participants 
were identified from the ethnography and content analysis data and were contacted 
either via email or other digital communications tool, e.g. Facebook Messenger. 
These methods were selected according to what was believed to be the most 
appropriate method for the respondent. For example, when contacting more formal 
media actors publicly available email addresses were identified and used to approach 
respondents. Conversely, for informal media actors, digital messaging tools, such as 
Facebook Messenger were used to approach respondents. To ensure an ethical 
approach to selection respondents were only contacted if they were publicly visible 
and accessible on such platforms. This was taken to imply a level of receptivity to 
approach.  
 
The majority of interviews were conducted face-to-face or using telephone or Skype 
and featured a semi-structured interview, which is a more flexible version of the 
structured interview as “it allows depth to be achieved by providing the opportunity 
on the part of the interviewer to probe and expand the interviewee's responses” 
(Rubin & Rubin, 2005: 88). Alshenqeeti (2014) recommends establishing and 
referring to a checklist in semi-structured interviews to ensure all topics pertinent to 
the research aims as well as follow-up points from other empirical data are addressed 
(Alshenqeeti, 2014: 44).  
 
Ethics 
As with the ethnographic research, data collection dealing with human participants 
requires researchers to identify and address a number of ethical concerns. For 
example, Cohen et al. (2007) argues that collecting interview data is a highly 
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personal interaction both taking up personal time and risking intruding into 
respondents' private lives with potentially sensitive questions being asked. Similarly, 
Brinkmann and Kvale argue that when researchers conduct interviews they face an 
ethical “dilemma between wanting as much knowledge as possible while at the same 
time respecting the integrity of the interviewee. (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2005: 169).  
 
Resolving such a tension is challenging to researchers who don’t wish to probe the 
respondent too much, while at the same time requiring interview data which will 
provide good quality insights. This ethical concern is particularly sensitive in the 
#Demo2012 case study where interview respondents may have taken part in – or 
witnessed – illegal actions. Addressing these issues, it is important that research 
participants will provide their informed consent before participating in the interview 
and will be provided with an overview of the nature and aim of the research as well 
as reassurance that their data will be kept confidential if required and that their 
participation is entirely voluntary (Alshenqeeti, 2014: 45).  
 
Data Analysis 
 
Patton and Appelbaum’s assertion that the aim of case study analyses is “to uncover 
patterns, determine meanings, construct conclusions and build theory" (Patton and 
Appelbaum, 2003: 67). Following Cresswell (2007) preliminary exploration of the 
ethnographic data was conducted by reading through the case study materials and 
making notes of interesting or notable areas. The raw data was then coded by 
identifying and segmenting events or observations in the text, developing themes by 
aggregating coded segments and building connections and relationships between the 
themes (Cresswell, 2007: 308-309). Notable points in the data were identified for 
further follow-up in interviews and content analysis. The interview analysis followed 
a similar approach as the ethnographic analysis in that notes and transcripts from the 
interviews were manually coded and then grouped into inter-relating themes. 
Reliability was ensured by recursive exploration and triangulating the different data 
sources.  
 
Following Bengtsson’s dual approach to media content analysis (Bengtsson, 2016) 
content was initially reviewed and a qualitative, theme-based analysis conducted to 
explore the data, identify themes and theory-build. To perform the manifest analysis, 
more quantitative analysis a loosely-structured and open-ended coding framework 
was used to analyse media content. A coding framework was created for each case 
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study by taking themes identified in the initial data review and combining these with 
a set of core analytical categories to ensure that the analysis avoided being a “fishing 
expedition” (Hansen and Machin, 2013: 99). These categories were based on the 
variables identified in the analytical model outlined in Chapter 3 and included: 
media actors and sources; subjects, themes and issues present in the content; 
symbolic content choice (textual and visual); value dimensions and sentiment 
(Hansen and Machin, 2013: 98-99). It is important to note that as well as capturing 
symbolic components of the media content, material components were also included 
in order to understand their role in shaping the media assemblage. These included: 
evidence of software code which was identified through the ways in which was 
“materialised into particular code-based devices.” (Berry, 2011: 10) via elements 
such as HTML or hyperlinks.  
 
The framework was piloted using a 10 per cent sample of content from each case 
study and then refined to improve its accuracy and relevance accordingly.21 The 
framework was then used to analyse media content with new themes being added as 
the analysis proceeded to ensure an iterative and open-ended approach to coding. 
This “manifest” analysis (Bengtsson, 2016) will allow the content data to be viewed 
through a quantitative lens. This will be important to identify recurring and enduring 
themes or elements within the data and confirm when the media assemblages in each 
case study become coded and what the media frame emerging from the heavily 
territorialised assemblage will look like. This was achieved by evaluating when the 
themes or issues present in the media content and their value dimensions become 
consistently evident.  
 
While quantifying media content data will support the confirmation of a coded media 
assemblage and its media frame, it is also important to note that the multiperspectival 
approach to framing addressed in Chapter 3 will also be factored into the content 
analysis (Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Kuypers, 2010; Reese, 2007, 2010). Specifically, 
this will enable the full range of elements and contexts within a media assemblage to 
be included in the analysis. Sounders and Dillard (2014), for example, argue that 
analysis of media frames needs to go beyond statistical analyses and adopt more 
                                               
21 It should be noted that although a coding frame will be used, the coding reliability was not tested as, according 
to Kuypers (2010), qualitative content analysis “incorporates the subjectivity of the researcher into the final 
product”. Thus, analysis begins with “vague questions, or even a hunch” that shapes the research as it progresses 
through the interpretation of data, rather than seeking verification through a statistical verification (Kuypers, 
2010: 287). 
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qualitative research approaches. They propose a greater focus on seeking out a wider 
range of “frame locations” within the data by using “critical-interpretive” analyses to 
enable the researcher to go beyond purely symbolic message-receiver relationships 
and to gain a deeper understanding of the contexts in which media framing occurs 
(Sonders & Dillard, 2014: 1013). This is further supported by earlier, inter-
disciplinary work by Goffman which offers a more nuanced perspective on frame 
analysis. For Goffman’s frames are “microlevel processes of social organisation” 
(Goffman, 1959, 1974), thus providing a fit with the complex, symbolic-material 
nature of media assemblages.  
 
At each stage of analysis, a recursive pass was made of the various data sets to revise 
and update the coding and emerging themes. Finally, using this aggregated data, 
connections and relationships between themes were identified and a descriptive 
narrative for each case study was developed. These narratives will explore and 
discuss key research questions identified in Chapter 1, including to what degrees are 
the analytical pillars of the model developed in Chapter 3 present in the case studies? 
Are they widely adopted – and by whom? Does their presence evolve/adapt 
throughout the case studies? Secondly, the analysis will assess whether the analytical 
pillars influence the exertion of media power by playing a greater or lesser role in 
coding the media assemblage and establishing a particular media frame around the 
case study.  
 
Finally, the presentation of the analysis in each case study chapter will proceed by 
analysing the data according to the four analytical pillars establishing in the model in 
Chapter 3 as it arises chronologically. The decision to present the results in this way 
has been made to enable an empirical analysis that is ordered around the core pillars 
of analytical model - hybridity, materiality, choreography and coding - while taking 
into account the ontological context in which media assemblages are formed. For 
example, assemblages are highly historically contingent forms that evolve over time 
according to the specific events or interactions at a given moment (DeLanda, 2006: 
40-41; Crewe, 2010: 42-43). As such, each case study is analysed as its constituting 
elements unfold, with the discussion focusing on the different variables of 
contemporary media power established in the analytical model in Chapter 3.  
 
One further analytical layer that will be addressed in the empirical analysis is the 
significance of medium specificity. Taking this into account when analysing media 
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objects is important as, although symbolic-material media assemblages are created 
through the interaction of hybridised media actors and various media materialities, 
each medium’s particular stylistic properties will likely generate different 
affordances or effects accordingly. Understanding the challenges or opportunities of 
each created by each medium will provide greater depth to the results of the 
empirical analysis. 
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Chapter 5  
 
Empirical Case Study 1: The NUS’ #Demo2012 
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In June 2012 the UK’s national membership organisation for students in further and 
higher education, the National Union of Students (NUS), announced it would hold a 
national demonstration aimed at “step[ping] up pressure on the coalition 
government” which had recently passed legislation removing funding for 
disadvantaged students, increasing university tuition fees, and opened up the higher 
education market to greater private competition (BBC News, 2010; Mulholland, 
2010).  
 
The demonstration, held on 21st November 2012, marked an important moment for 
the NUS and the UK student movement for two reasons. Firstly, the demonstration – 
named #Demo2012 – was the first national mobilisation of students organised by the 
NUS since its previous public demonstration held in 2010 challenging the, then, new 
government’s higher education policy. This event arguably represented a watershed 
in student politics as, although the NUS organised march in central London went 
ahead as planned, a significant number of grassroots students deviated from the 
planned route, broke through police lines and occupied the national offices of the 
governing Conservative Party – which were subsequently vandalised and the scene 
of fighting between protestors and police. 
 
This seemingly spontaneous eruption of vandalism and violence at an ideological 
and geographical landmark appeared to demonstrate a renewed force among students 
to “fight back” against government policy (Hancox, 2011). Importantly, it 
represented the biggest show of student force for over a decade and proved to be a 
catalyst for a rejuvenated student movement which saw a wave of further protests, 
university occupations, vandalism and violence described by some as “the Winter of 
Protest” (ibid.).  
 
#Demo2012 was additionally significant in that it was interpreted as a test of the 
NUS’s ability to impact future government higher education policy as well as 
demonstrate continued relevance to its members. Following on from the 2010 
demonstration the NUS faced criticism from students who believed the organisation 
distanced itself from the unplanned and controversial grassroots student activism 
which led media and political condemnation, but which appeared to galvanise 
student attitudes and action towards government policy (Landin, 2012).  
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In response to this, the NUS and its president, Liam Burns, saw #Demo2012 as a 
platform with which to reinvigorate support for the organisation among student 
members and reassert its importance as a relevant political movement to “promote, 
defend and extend the rights of students” in the UK (NUS, n.d.-b). Indeed, the 
purpose of #Demo2012 is stated clearly by Burns in a speech uploaded to the film-
sharing website, YouTube: "In a year in which there are no votes in parliament and 
no legislation coming before politicians, it's about time we started setting the agenda" 
(NUS, 2012a). Such challenges to the NUS, while notable and significant to the 
empirical analysis here, are not particularly new to the organisation. Before moving 
into the analysis section, it is important to situate the current case study context 
within the NUS’ history.  
 
The NUS was established in 1922 in order to give a voice to British students at an 
international level and “promote, defend and extend the rights of students” (NUS, 
n.d.). The methods adopted by the NUS to achieve these aims have, however, varied 
over the past decades and have produced institutional processes or mindsets that 
continue to influence its actions in the present. For example, up until the 1960s the 
NUS had largely remained an educational pressure group using its research to 
influence government policy. By 1969, however, the NUS’ refusal to back 
demonstrative action and a “no politics” clause in its constitution led some members 
to claim the organisation lacked credibility (Morris, 2013). 
 
As student activism emerged and spread in the late 1960s, the NUS acquiesced and 
made a “momentous change to its constitution” which led to the organisation taking 
a more proactive stance on direct action and initiating a “new era of campaigning and 
protest” (NUS, n.d.) which can be traced through to #Demo2012. A further important 
point to consider when situating the #Demo2012 case study in the NUS’ history is 
the fact that although the NUS grew to become the largest student organisation in 
Britain in the twentieth-century, it did not represent the views of all students 
(Burkett, 2014).  
 
Both of these historical antecedents provide useful context for the analysis of 
#Demo2012 in support of students’ rights in asmuch that they confirm the 
organisation’s core mandate of using public demonstrations to help the NUS defend 
and promote students’ rights, but also highlight that the use of direct action has long 
been a tension at the core of the organisation (NUS, n.d.). Moreover, despite the 
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NUS’ claim that it is “one of the most influential organisations in the country” its 
policies, agenda and mandate arguably represents a minority of students. Again, such 
an issue will become relevant in the analysis of #Demo2012 as an increasingly 
digitally-empowered group of grassroots student activists diverge from official NUS 
policy and its organised demonstration. 
 
Building the Pre-Event Narrative 
 
Taking into account the NUS’s stated aims of using #Demo2012 to set the agenda on 
the future of higher education (NUS, 2012a) its initial actions suggest an effective 
start with consistent pre-event coverage of the demonstration featuring in both 
mainstream and social media. There are, however, a small yet significant series of 
challenges to the NUS and its agenda occurring predominantly within student media. 
While this represents a small proportion of pre-event coverage it nevertheless helps 
set the tone for a more widespread critical engagement and undermining of the NUS 
attempts to territorialise the media assemblage and created a coded media frame 
around #Demo2012. This first section will identify hybridised media behaviour 
between the NUS’ media and campaign officers and institutional news reporters. It 
also traces how the economic materialism of the NUS’ status as a semi-commercial 
organisation with full-time, paid staff (NUS, n.d.) allows it to plan and manage the 
media assemblage’s early territorialisation in favour of its agenda. This section of the 
analysis focuses on the days preceding and morning of #Demo2012.  
 
According to interview data, from the moment #Demo2012 was formally announced 
in April 2012, the NUS’ campaigns team began developing a media relations plan 
with a “clear calendar of [media] actions” designed to achieve three key aims: raise 
awareness of the NUS’ policy areas articulated by the demonstration’s slogan, 
“Educate, Employ, Empower”22, mobilise students to take part in the demonstration 
and shape the media narrative around higher education in favour of the NUS’ policy 
position (NUS, n.d.-a; NUS, n.d.-b; Hoyles, 2014; Pool, 2014).  
                                               
22 1) improve access to education; 2) improve graduate employment prospects and 3) empower students to have a 
stronger voice on issues that concern them (NUS, n.d.-a) 
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Analysis of media content data between 16th-26th November 201223 identifies that 
#Demo2012 received prominent coverage in national news and on social media 
platforms ahead of the event. Following up these findings with interviews with the 
NUS’ media and campaign managers during the demonstration, it is clear that this 
media content supporting the NUS is a result of a planned campaign by the NUS 
(Hoyles, 2014; Pool, 2014). Moreover, the data confirms that a range of techniques 
were adopted to help shape the media’s reporting of the demonstration, such as 
exclusive briefings, timely intervention in the professional news cycle and public 
opinion surveys. Looking in-depth at these techniques and their effects allows us to 
understand specifically how media hybridity and materiality were used to 
choreograph the early stages of the #Demo2012 media assemblage and territorialise 
it in the NUS’ favour. 
 
The first coverage alerting the public and policy-makers to #Demo2012 appears in 
the newspaper, The Observer, on the Sunday before the demonstration. The article 
provides the political context within which the demonstration will take place and 
cites an NUS-commissioned survey indicating pessimism among parents towards 
future education and economic prospects for their children. While leading with a 
policy-focused angle, the article also allowed the NUS to link this wider political 
situation to the forthcoming demonstration targeting current government policy, as 
NUS president Liam Burns asserts:  
 
Students from across the country will be marching through London on 
Wednesday to protest against a government which has disempowered a 
generation by abdicating its responsibility to ensure access to education and 
employment (Boffey, 2012) 
 
According to an interview with the NUS’ media officer at the time of the 
demonstration, The Observer’s Sunday coverage was confirmed as a planned tactic 
by the NUS. Known as a ‘Sunday for Monday’, a story is given as an exclusive to a 
national Sunday news publication. This has two distinct benefits: firstly, as the start 
of the week, Monday is traditionally seen as the optimum day to launch ‘news’ as it 
provides the potential to accommodate the fullest development of a story and achieve 
the longest possible uninterrupted exposure. Launching on a Sunday extends this 
                                               
23 This timeframe was selected based on a macro-analysis of media data generated around the event. There was 
little media coverage or social media interaction concerning the event outside of the dates chosen. See Chapter 3 
for a detailed discussion of research methods. 
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time-frame by one-day (Campbell, 2011). Secondly, news organisations monitor 
Sunday newspapers for stories to follow-up in their Monday editions. The Sunday 
for Monday tactic alerts other news outlets to the story in advance of their Monday 
copy deadline, thus increasing the likelihood of additional Monday coverage (Dean, 
2013: 123-4).  
 
As a result, The Observer’s Sunday article is followed on Monday 19th November by 
a more substantial announcement and analysis of #Demo2012 in The Observer’s 
sister-title, The Guardian (Walker and Ratcliffe, 2012) and a shorter article revealing 
the event in the Independent newspaper (The Independent, 2012). Both articles 
outline key logistical information, such as publishing the designated hashtag for the 
event in order to start coordinating online discussion. As will be seen in the analysis 
below, the hashtag comes to play an important role in choreographing the symbolic 
content generated by demonstration participants on social media and, in turn, plays 
an important role in territorialising and coding #Demo2012’s media frame.  
 
Coverage supporting the NUS continues to appear in The Guardian on Tuesday 20th 
November in the form of another NUS commissioned survey-led news story. Here 
public opinion research identifies that nearly half of all UK students have considered 
dropping out of their course due to concerns about money. As with The Observer’s 
previous survey-led story, findings are strategically aligned with the NUS’ policy 
agenda and again act as a bridge to trail the demonstration as “a chance for students 
to convey their feelings to the government and call on politicians to offer a better 
deal” (The Guardian, 2012a).   
 
Investigating this tactic further, an interview with the NUS’ media officer confirms 
that the use of NUS commissioned surveys was used to manage the news agenda by 
ensuring a variety of newsworthy stories were available in the run up to the event 
(Hoyles, 2014). Further news management techniques, such as offering exclusive 
briefings on forthcoming stories to selected journalists working for outlets likely to 
be sympathetic to the NUS’ position were adopted (ibid.) Hoyles reveals this 
approach was necessary as, unlike the previous 2010 demonstration timed to 
coincide with a major political vote, this time the NUS lacked a big story around 
which to achieve #Demo2012 coverage so used surveys to create lots of smaller ones 
(ibid.). Such uses of “information subsidies” (Gandy, 1982) is adopted primarily to 
maximise the likelihood of territorialising the #Demo2012 media assemblage in the 
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NUS’ favour by alleviating the problems of resource scarcity and time-sensitivity of 
the new-gathering process.  
 
Evidence of the NUS choreographing formal media actors to territorialise the media 
assemblage is further evidenced on the day of the demonstration. The national news 
outlet, ITV News, publishes a series of pro-NUS articles online. Content analysis 
provides timing of when these articles were published and analysis of this data, 
supported by interview data from Hoyles (2014) confirmed that the NUS used a 
media embargo to control the distribution or reporting of a story until a specific time. 
For example, conventional embargo strategies schedule publication of news from 
00:01 – the earliest point in a day when the news can be reported. This approach ties 
in with the publication times of the ITV News coverage which, according to the 
timestamps in the content analysis data, appeared between 00:51 and 03:34 in the 
morning of Wednesday 21st November – suggesting the stories were either 
automatically scheduled by the newsroom to go ‘live’ after the midnight embargo or 
were written up and published overnight by a duty reporter.  
 
Further evidence of the NUS using embargoed press release is identified in the 
content analysis data as the ITV News content includes substantial references to 
official NUS information which can be found consistently in pre-demonstration 
content. For example, ITV News coverage features a prediction of 10,000 participants 
for the demonstration – a figure sourced to the NUS. Following up this evidence via 
interviews Hoyles (2014) confirms this figure was generated and officially 
communicated to the media by the NUS (ITV News, 2012b). Subsequent ITV News 
coverage also focuses on NUS President, Liam Burns’, comments that students feel 
“a sense of desperation for their future” (ITV News, 2012a) and predictions of an 
“epidemic of dropouts” (ITV News, 2012). All of which messages are drawn from 
NUS funded surveys and identical to information expressed in earlier coverage and 
can be argued reinforce the NUS’ effective choreographing of media actors and 
territorialising of the emerging media assemblage.  
 
According to the content analysis data, The Guardian publishes its lead piece on the 
demonstration at 08:21, including expressive content strategically aligned with, and 
reinforcing, earlier coverage, such as NUS predictions of 10,000 participants and the 
exclusive findings from an NUS-commissioned survey. At 09:29 The Guardian also 
publishes an official route map of the demonstration on its website and launches its 
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live-blog, a novel and hybrid approach to news-reporting that blends “conventional 
reporting with curation, where journalists sift and prioritise information from 
secondary sources and present it to the audience in close to real time, often 
incorporating their feedback” (Thurman and Walters, 2013: 83). 
Although more autonomous that conventional news stories as a result of its curatorial 
function and reliance on user-generated content drawn from social media, The 
Guardian’s live-blog arguably still supported the NUS choreography of media 
actors. According to data gathered in an interview with its campaign officer, Lisa 
Pool, the NUS had agreed to help promote and share The Guardian’s content via its 
own social media channels (Pool, 2014). On the one-hand such an informal, 
reciprocal arrangement is characteristic of the “social capital” exchange adopted by 
online networks (Benkler, 2006), but it could also be read as a vital tactic in helping 
The Guardian increase its audience and receive endorsement from the NUS, a central 
actor in #Demo2012.  
 
This analysis suggests evidence of hybrid media actions between the NUS formal 
media actors and the formal media actors reporting for national news outlets being 
effective in choreographing the media assemblage. Moreover, the hybridity is 
enabled in large part by the NUS’ institutional position in being able to leverage the 
economic materialism of its commercially-supported specialist employees to 
choreograph the flow of information in the media assemblage. While the 
#Demo2012 media assemblage is by no means coded at this early stage, it can be 
argued that it is being effectively territorialised by the NUS’ media management.  
 
It is also important to note, here, that such an effect is also partly down to the 
medium specificity of institutional news media’s dominance in the assemblage at this 
stage. For instance, the news media has a long tradition of working to “news beats” 
(Shoemaker, 1989) and liaising with formal media actors, such as media officers and 
campaigners, to source news stories (Gandy, 1982). As a result, it is relatively easy 
for the NUS to go direct to news institutions and present their stories for publication. 
Moreover, the tradition of news reporting is to gather information from a range of 
sources and “package” these into discrete stories often presenting a limited view of 
an event or issue (Russell, 2011). This makes it easier for institutional organisations 
to choreograph media assemblages as the informational inputs are consistent and 
relationships with news reporters already formalised (ibid.). Moreover, there are also 
commercially-established services designed to distribute organisations’ ‘news’ to 
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publishers automatically and at scale, including news wires, such as Reuters, or press 
release distribution companies.24 These medium-specific traits differ from the 
functionality of, and relationships between, informal media actors using social media 
platforms, such as Twitter or blogs. Here hybridity between actors becomes more 
informal, premised on social, rather than economic capital, and enabled by more 
technology-driven connections (Benkler, 2006; Breindl, 2016). As a consequence, 
media choreography arguably becomes more complex.  
 
Despite this increased complexity, the NUS also actively sought to choreograph 
online networks of formal and informal media actors to produce content supportive 
of the NUS’ position across social and digital media. Lisa Pool, campaigns officer 
for the NUS with responsibility for managing social media during #Demo2012 
asserts that social media was adopted in the #Demo2012 “comm[unication]s plan as 
a whole […] We had a day-by-day plan; what to put out [and] when” (Pool, 2014).  
 
Specifically, the NUS’ approach to social media involved the creation of a range of 
supportive content tailored to groups of targeted supporters. According to Pool the 
NUS spent time “looking at different audiences and putting out different articles 
based on different policy areas and how they would affect different people” (ibid.). 
Based on this planning “different strands of content” were created, for example: 
 
membership facing content […] was about fighting the argument - what was 
happening in terms of government and policy, updates with what was 
happening with the demo and ideas and tips on how to mobilise and support 
volunteers (ibid.)  
 
This carefully targeted content was then distributed to a range of online groups and 
networks - both affiliated or ideologically aligned with the NUS and more general, 
lifestyle groups. For example, Pool acknowledges that ahead of the demonstration 
the NUS’ 650 member-unions were provided with training to help mobilise 
individual students to promote the event through social media and charities, trade 
unions and supporters were approached “to contribute to [the NUS’] social media 
work as well” (ibid.). In addition to “friendly” networks, the NUS also contacted 
groups among the wider public which the NUS “felt the [#Demo2012] issues would 
                                               
24 For example, PressWire (see: https://presswire.com/about) or Journolink (see: https://journolink.com/). 
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have affected” (Pool, 2014), such as the influential online parenting forum, 
Mumsnet, to help promote #Demo2012.  
 
Content analysis of a sample of Twitter data gathered from the period leading up to 
the start of the demonstration indicates that the overall tone of conversations is 
overwhelmingly supportive. Approximately two-thirds (45 per cent) of tweets 
published contain personal expressions of support, anticipation and excitement about 
Demo2012 (See: NextGenLab, 2012; MacDoo, 2012; Peters-Day, 2012; Woodburn, 
2012); share logistical information (See: Sewards, 2012; NUS_LGBT, 2012); 
provide formal legal advice for those on the demonstration (See: GBCLegal, 2012; 
Day, 2012); quote key NUS policy messages (Peltz, 2012) and share supportive 
media coverage (Alice, 2012). Looking in more detail at supportive Twitter content, 
it is evident that this is predominantly generated by official NUS representatives. 
Moreover, these formal NUS actors represent the most active Twitter users ahead of 
the demonstration responsible for 41 per cent of all tweets published in the pre-event 
period. 
 
On the one hand, this data appears to demonstrate that the hybridised approach to 
media choreography by the NUS appears to have been effective in terms of 
territorialising the online narrative around #Demo2012. In a way not dissimilar to its 
relationship with institutional media, the NUS identified a number of formal and 
informal actors and sought to provide pre-prepared information for them to post on 
Twitter. Where this was effective in mobilising actors, such as fellow trade unions 
and left-wing groups, it can be argued that the status and agency of the NUS as an 
organisation likely played a part in influencing the publication of content. 
Conversely, this approach was less successful with more mainstream, unaffiliated 
groups, such as Mumsnet where the NUS’ institutional position and agency has less 
influence (Pool, 2014).  
 
It is also important to be aware of the role Twitter as a medium plays in enabling this 
choreography - as well as the limitations it produces. Founded in 2006, Twitter has 
since 2007 achieved high user-growth levels with 326 million users currently active 
on the platform daily. This early growth, however, created technological problems 
for the platform in that it was prone to crashing when popular events or high-profile 
users published information (Christian, 2018). A further difficulty for Twitter was 
that it initially struggled to define its purpose and functionality. Although it was 
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originally developed as a way for groups of friends to share information with each 
other by broadcasting SMS messages, one of its founders, Ev Williams, claims that 
Twitter had “a path of discovery […] where over time you figure out what it is” 
(Lapowsky, 2013). Crucially, the original intent for Twitter evolved to create a 
platform that focuses both on multi-media short-form messages with a highly inter-
personal nature (MacArthur, 2018). 
 
A key consequence of this lack of direction, however, has led to Twitter’s users 
creating their own ways of using the platform. For example, in its early days Twitter 
users had no way of replying to each other’s messages. As a result, users began 
including an @ symbol in front a username to identify another user within a Tweet. 
This functionality was widely adopted by users and eventually became added as an 
official function on the Twitter platform. As various, user-driven functions evolved, 
such as hashtags and retweets,25 such features became formally adopted by the 
platform (MacArthur, 2018). This early lack of clarity as to Twitter’s purpose, its 
technological frailty and largely user-driven development has shaped its adoption 
among media actors with its inter-personal nature lending itself more to informal 
rather than formal actors and information exchange remaining fleeting, short-form 
and difficult for formal, commercial media institutions to adopt (ibid.).  
 
Although tweets supporting the NUS dominate the Twitter narrative ahead of the 
demonstration, criticisms of the NUS, its policies and leadership are also voiced from 
a range of left and right-wing ideological positions (See Bastani, 2012; Collins, 
2012; Grant, 2012; Morgan, 2012a; Shorthouse, 2012). Although, representing a 
minority (34 per cent) of total pre-demo Twitter content, these critical tweets are 
significant in two distinct ways. Firstly, the theme and source of the tweets further 
reinforce the apparent disconnect between the NUS as an institution and its 
grassroots members with the most prevalent single critical theme (35% of all 
negative tweets) featuring an image of the contentious chant sheet promoted by the 
NUS Vice President (Stace, 2012).  
 
These tweets, the majority published by grassroots students, amplify criticisms 
voiced by student media and thus reinforce the sense of disconnect between the NUS 
as a formal institution and its members. Importantly, and as will become increasingly 
                                               
25 Term used to describe the forwarding or re-sharing of a tweet.  
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important, such members are technologically empowered and able to make their 
dissatisfaction known, in turn undermining the NUS’ ability to effectively 
choreograph the media assemblage towards its own agenda.  
 
Secondly, these criticisms also reveal the structural limitations of the NUS as an 
institutional actor within social media. While content analysis of Twitter indicates 
that formal NUS representatives were tweeting and re-tweeting supportive material 
as per the NUS’ social media strategy, it appeared that no-one representing the NUS 
was responding to users posting critical content. Pool (2014) explained that, while 
aware of the negative content, the NUS was prevented from engaging due to the 
hierarchical and formalised organisational structure of the institution which prevents 
executive officers commenting on political issues. As a result, political responses 
require sign-off from elected members – a bureaucratic approach to media 
management which functions well for formal, deliberative decision-making but isn’t 
suited to the inter-personal nature of social media, such as Twitter, as discussed 
above. This all contributes to a shift in choreography where grassroots participants 
and activists are able to start reterritorialising the media assemblage away from its 
early pro-NUS position.  
 
Evidence of the NUS’ attempts to choreograph social media continues to be found in 
an analysis of blog content published. Of the 25 blog posts published between 
00:00am on 16th November and 11.00am on 21st November 52 per cent express 
support for the NUS. Many blogs reference or directly re-produce NUS material, 
such as mainstream media coverage (Defend The Right To Protest, 2012; Anticuts, 
2012); publish expressions supportive policy analysis (Wright, 2012); sharing 
practical and logistical information, such as the route map and rendezvous points 
(Central Students Union, 2012); and issuing ‘call outs’ to mobilise readers to attend 
the demonstration (Angela, 2012; Bellaciao, 2012). As with Twitter content, pro-
NUS content is published on blogs managed by student unions, trade unions and 
anti-cuts campaigning groups, again, supporting the likelihood that such material was 
generated through the NUS’ strategic approach of targeting affiliated members or 
ideologically aligned groups (Pool, 2014).  
 
Conversely, 28 per cent of blog posts published in the same timeframe are critical of 
the NUS and #Demo2012. Negative coverage includes further repetition of the 
stories dominating student media, such as the offensive chant sheet issued by the 
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NUS (EditorLibertine, 2012) and the student union ‘bribery’ story (Monnery, 2012). 
Politically motivated criticism is also present, with right-wing, pro-market critiques 
of NUS policy (Crossley, 2012) and left-wing critiques of the NUS’ failure to offer a 
radical alternative to pro-market reforms of higher education (Margeson, 2012; 
Sampson, 2012).  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the nature of student politics, the source of such critical 
blog posts suggests they are exclusively written by politically motivated individuals 
or groups aligned with a number of anti-NUS positions, such as right-wing, pro-
market ideology, Liberal Democrat affiliated groups unhappy with the NUS’ links 
with the Labour Party and far-left-wing radicals dissatisfied with the NUS’ moderate 
approach. Such politically dissatisfied groups are acknowledged by the NUS’ 
communications team as a persistent presence that have been defeated 
“democratically” and, while wanting to address their concerns, believe that “there's 
nothing to be gained from engaging in arguments in public forums on social media” 
(Hoyles, 2014). As will be seen subsequently, such political dissatisfaction – 
particularly on the activist and far-left – plays a significant part in the coding the 
media frame around #Demo2012 once the demonstration gets underway. 
 
While the evidence at this point in the case study continues to suggest the NUS uses 
its dominant institutional position to effectively choreograph the territorialisation of 
the #Demo2012 media assemblage in its favour, the limits of this hybrid behaviour 
can already be glimpsed. For example, successful choreography is visible when 
building relationships with formal actors, such as news reporter and informal media 
actors on social media affiliated to the NUS. Where the organisation seeks to engage 
with more media actors outside of the NUS’ organisational influence, such as student 
media or wider public groups, its ability to choreograph the assemblage has limited 
results. Moreover, the evidence points to an organisational disconnect in that the 
formal, heavily bureaucratic ways in which the NUS operates prevents it from 
effectively developing truly hybrid behaviours, such as interacting and sharing 
information with, informal groups. This limitation, combined with the critical media 
content generated by grassroots student and political groups, starts to deterritorialise 
the media assemblage effectively choreographed by the NUS up to this point.  
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Material Media Objects: Images of Space/Place & Hyperlinks 
 
As identified in the analytical model in Chapter 3, the media objects created in 
media assemblages include both symbolic content as well as material components. 
From content analysis of the media data gathered for this chapter it has been possible 
to identify material media objects that appear to play a significant role in 
territorialising the Demo2012 media assemblage. It can be argued that these objects, 
specifically physical locations and the technological materialism of hyperlinks, 
constitute an autonomous layer of media objects that function largely outside of 
direct human or institutional agency.  
 
For Endres and Senda-Cook (2011), place is a “particular location” constituted by “a 
combination of material and symbolic qualities” (Endres and Senda-Cook 2011: 
259). Similarly, space is the “more general notion of how society and social practice 
are regulated (and sometimes disciplined) by spatial thinking” (ibid.). As such, 
places and space can account for how the “confluence of physical structures, 
locations and bodies can function rhetorically” (ibid.: 261). Applying such a reading 
to social movements and protest events, Endres and Senda-Cook argue that place and 
space exert “a fluid tension between materiality and symbolism” (ibid.: 262) that can 
“have a variety of results beyond the intent of protest organisers” (ibid.). 
 
For example, although representations of significant places and spaces are included 
by news sub-editors, bloggers and Twitter users in the case study’s media content to 
evoke a particular reading of accompanying text, the imagery used is ultimately open 
to greater symbolic interpretation. The highest prevalence of place/space expressed 
rhetorically in the data is found within the institutional media coverage where 41 per 
cent of articles feature representations of key London locations. Significantly, place 
in this content is expressed entirely negatively, with recurring images of the violence 
and property destruction at the Conservative Party headquarters at Millbank during 
the previous NUS demonstrations in 2010 (Chessum, 2012; ITV News, 2012c; 
Landin, 2012; Walker and Ratcliffe, 2012).  
 
Social media, however, offers a more balanced interpretation of space/place. On 
Twitter, 11 per cent of tweets generated during the pre-event period represent 
space/place with approximately half of showing empowering images of student 
protestors reclaiming the politically symbolic space of the Embankment given its 
approach to the Houses of Parliament with a massed presence. Conversely, the 
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remaining tweets show the violent and confrontational scenes at Millbank from the 
2010 demonstration. Blog content features entirely positive images of space and 
place with pictures of students either occupying the politically symbolic place of 
Parliament Square or using their massed ranks of bodies and banners to control the 
space along Victoria Embankment, the politically potent approach to Parliament 
(Margeson, 2012; Rhianr, 2012). 
 
These results are significant as they further demonstrate how despite the NUS’ 
attempts to choregraph the media assemblage using the techniques discussed above 
the violent and confrontational representations of space and place presents a 
symbolic expression at odds with the NUS’ overall goals. One reading of this may 
follow the established view that the institutional media is more likely to adopt 
“spectacular” representations of protest, typified by confrontation, violence and 
property damage (Kellner, 2012; Cable, 2017). Conversely, more informal actors on 
social media are more likely to follow inter-personal agendas, in this case the 
grassroots coordination and mobilisation for the demonstration. This is seen in the 
expressions of physical space and place by student activists who interpret such 
confrontational scenes as positive and empowering representations of protest where 
the demonstrators take control of London’s politically-symbolic spaces. 
 
Another important feature identified in the media content analysed is the hyperlink. 
Described as perhaps one of the most ubiquitous and significant - but often 
overlooked - attributes of online content (Turow, 2008) hyperlinks operate as online 
“gateways” offering internet users “passages from one website to another” 
(Anderson, 2010).26 More conceptually, hyperlinks act as “associative trails” that 
enable “individuals and organisations to nominate what ideas and actors should be 
heard and with what priority. They also indicate to readers which associations among 
topics are worthwhile and which are not” (Turow, 2008: 4). The skills required to 
embed hyperlinks into digital content is relatively straight-forward, requiring some 
basic knowledge of HTML code to generate a feature of media content which, in 
turn, acts as a distinctly material layer in media assemblages (Hargittai, 2008: 87). 
 
Hyperlinks cannot be understood as a neutral by-product of news production. Rather 
they are deployed (or not) strategically by media actors to achieve a specific purpose, 
                                               
26 Although, as Turow (2008) notes, the nature and use of hyperlinks has multiplied in recent years to include 
functionality such as ‘hot areas’; ‘tags’; APIs and a range of additional applications the basic use of links as 
connections between websites or web content is adopted here. 
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such as highlighting specific information or directing readers to selective sources 
(Turow, 2008: 4). The adoption of such strategies depends on a variety of 
motivations, including economic, informational or promotional and are also closely 
inter-related with a range of additional macrostructural factors, such as technological 
infrastructures and affordances, media cultures, organisational routines and 
commercial strategies (Anderson, 2010: 4).  
 
As a result, the “linking strategies” (ibid.) at work within the content produced 
during #Demo2012 represent a series of complex practices centred around a material 
media object which in turn play an important role in the choreography of the media 
assemblage’s territorialisation by largely informal actors. During the pre-event 
timeframe, the majority of online news stories either didn’t include hyperlinks or 
featured hyperlinks linked to other relevant content on the same website. Only 11 per 
cent of news articles linked to external, third-party sites. By comparison, 39 per cent 
of Twitter content included external links, while 56 per cent of blog posts contained 
links to external content.  
 
While difficult to compare these data with other studies looking at the prevalence of 
links in media content due to differences in methodology and source material 
(Anderson, 2010: 2) these results appear to reflect more broader findings. According 
to Dimitrova et al. (2003) only 4 per cent of links in online news content linked to 
external sites compared with over half (51 per cent) of blogs and between 14 to 30 
per cent for Twitter (Herring et al., 2005). 
 
The type of content linked by different media platforms varies significantly. For 
example, the two institutional news media stories linking to external content is 
strikingly divided: one article linked to information about the demonstration on the 
NUS official website, the other – The Guardian’s ‘live-blog’ – featured links to a 
diverse range of third-party content, such as tweets, news reports and videos from a 
similarly diverse range of sources, including professional journalists, NUS 
representatives, grassroots students and activists (Owen, 2012). In keeping with this 
approach content externally linked to by blogs was similarly diverse with posts 
linking to news media coverage, detailed political and policy analyses and official 
NUS content – predominantly sourced from other blogs. (Angela, 2012; Sampson, 
2012; Margeson, 2012). 
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From these findings there is a clear dichotomy in the use of links between 
institutional media and social media with the former deploying outbound links in a 
very small number of instances (while extensively linking in to their own site 
content) and the latter linking to external, third-party sites routinely. Moreover, a 
clear divide is visible between the two media in terms of the type of externally linked 
content. With the exception of The Guardian’s live-blog (which is discussed 
separately below) the news media linked exclusively to formal, institutional actors 
(BBC News, 2012a and 2012b; ITV News, 2012b; The Guardian, 2012a; The 
Independent, 2012; Mulholland, 2012) while Twitter and blog content linked to a 
diverse range of information, including formal sources, such as news and the NUS as 
well as activist and public opinions and informal policy analysis by bloggers.  
 
Such results can be read on one level as potentially representative of less 
technologically-savvy formal news media actors not possessing the technical skills to 
insert links into their work (Phillips et al., 2009). However, while this may once have 
been the case, given the increasingly technical knowledge of media actors and the 
fact that all news organisations now operate professional ‘Content Management 
Systems’ capable of inserting links with minimal expertise, combined with evidence 
that the prevalence of outbound links in mass media content has declined over time it 
is unlikely to be an adequate explanation for the mass media’s linking strategy (Tsui, 
2008).  
 
Moreover, links were deployed in news media content, but only as inbound links to 
supplementary stories by the same news outlet (BBC News, 2012a and 2012b; The 
Guardian, 2012a; Mulholland, 2012). This evidence further rules out a politically 
motivated or media gate-keeper argument (Dimitrova et al., 2003) as no evidence of 
selective linking to external sources was visible in the data. A more likely 
explanation for mass media linking strategies is the increasing commercial 
imperative for professional news outlets to remain economically viable in an era 
when the traditional business models of news are being undermined by the internet 
(Anderson et al., 2012; Currah, 2009). 
 
Conversely, bloggers and Twitter users see external links as a positive feature of 
digital media offering informal media producers a number of benefits (Beindl, 2016). 
For instance, linking to external sources enables informal media actors to point 
readers to wider evidence that supports the arguments made in blog posts or online 
  134 
debates. More importantly, linking alerts informal media actors that there are others 
engaging with them and sharing their opinions, ideas or content (ibid.; Benkler, 
2006). One crucial outcome of this is the development of relational networks – 
however loose or temporary – around particular events or themes as in a “networked 
public sphere” (Benkler, 2006). In the case of #Demo2012, for example, this could 
include the theme of student politics or government higher education policy 
discussed on blogs or a shared interest in mobilising for and participating in the 
demonstration emerging through discussions around the hashtag #demo2012 on 
Twitter.  
 
Read as such, external links act as material media objects within symbolic content 
that can catalyse the spread of ideas and content rapidly by connecting with and 
leveraging reciprocal relationships across networked individuals or groups. While 
this phenomenon could technically be used by all media actors, the evidence above 
indicates that it is predominately adopted by informal media actors. Moreover, where 
linking is used by formal media actors it largely fails to connect to external networks, 
instead focusing inwardly on its own content. This suggests that informal actors 
possess a greater ability to choreograph the media assemblage through linking and 
scaling content distribution quickly, compared to news media.  
 
This phenomenon can also be related to the economic materialism of media 
assemblages. News media arguably link within their own news content in order to 
drive people deeper into their own site, in turn being exposed to more advertising, 
rather than connecting them with other interesting information. This is as opposed to 
social capital motivations underpinning linking across networked groups (Benkler, 
2006). While this evidence also highlights a hybridity of media behaviour as 
informal actors connect with each other and coalesce into hybridised groups 
producing and sharing content about #Demo2012, there is limited evidence of formal 
media actors participating in these linked networks. As a consequence, it is possible 
to argue that informal networked actors can use material links to develop hybridised 
networks that can more effectively choreograph and territorialise the #Demo2012 
media assemblage.  
 
The specific implications of this can be seen from the evidence. Whereas the NUS 
was initially effective in territorialising the #Demo2012 media assemblage in its 
favour through choreographed media management, the proliferation of content being 
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produced and linked by networked informal media actors content introduces 
information which challenges the NUS’ official position and starts to deterritorialise 
the pro-NUS media assemblage. 
 
Demo2012 Event Analysis: Space and Place as Catalysts for Coding  
 
As demonstrated above, the NUS’ techniques were effective in choreographing 
hybrid networks of media actors to territorialise the #Demo2012 media assemblage 
to their own agenda. This was, in part, due to the NUS’ ability to leverage both its 
economic materiality and organisational agency in employing specialists to manage 
the choreography of institutional actors, such as news reporters and individual and 
collective trade union affiliates. Once the demonstration gets under way, however, 
the NUS’ ability to influence the choreography and territorialisation of the media 
assemblage becomes challenged by a growth in informal media actors with 
repertoires of more radical, hybridised behaviours. The following section will 
analyse the materiality of space and place, the related spatial practices of specific 
groups of demonstrators as well as the highly hybridised media actions responsible 
for producing content which ultimately codes the Demo2012 media assemblage.  
 
According to the NUS’ media officer, the route selected for Demo2012 was designed 
fundamentally to avoid politically significant locations, such as Parliament Square, 
or focal points for the violence and property damage seen during previous student 
protests, such as The Conservative Party headquarters on Millbank and other central 
London locations targeted during protests (Hoyles, 2014). This is acknowledged by 
NUS president, Liam Burns, when he asserts that in planning the demonstration, the 
NUS has “done everything [it] can to negate violence," and that NUS members “are 
quite clear about this being a peaceful demonstration. I think we've set the tone right" 
(Sheriff, 2012b). 
 
Instead of adopting the usual London route for political protests, taking in Trafalgar 
Square, Whitehall and Parliament (Hind, 2012), the #Demo2012 route passes on the 
southside of Parliament Square and then crosses the Thames heading away from 
Parliament towards south London. It ended in a rally in Kennington Park which, 
critics argued, would lead to an “ineffective” demonstration away from the UK’s 
centre of political power (Sheriff, 2012c). As Hind (2012) asserts, every major 
protest has traditionally taken its 
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route north of Westminster Bridge, not over it to the south, because every 
protest has wanted to face the House of Parliament for the longest period 
possible, before heading along Whitehall to Downing Street. Every march 
I’ve been on slows down on this bend as people take a good old look at it, 
shout a lot and generally increase their rowdiness! (Hind, 2012) 
 
The role of the police in planning such a contentious route is revealed further by 
Hoyles (2014), who acknowledged: 
 
There was no way of getting [#Demo2012] through Parliament with the 
police. There'd have been no demo at all. We had to go to an end point: not 
Hyde Park as that was ruled out after the TUC event due to the Fortnam & 
Mason incident [occupation by anti-cuts protestors following a trade union 
demonstration].  The only choice we had in terms of getting police say so for 
it was to go to the [Kennington] Park (Hoyles, 2014) 
 
Moreover, on the day of the demonstration London’s Metropolitan Police was 
involved in enforcing restrictions through the use of Section 12 Public Order 
legislation (NUS, 2012b). This legislative form of spatial management was 
implemented to minimise disruption to the pre-agreed route and augmented by the 
physical use of rolling road-blacks and cordons to guide and control participants 
along the route with reinforced police lines and crowd-control barriers at important 
landmarks or flashpoints, such as outside the Houses of Parliament (Author’s notes).  
 
Such evidence suggests that both the NUS and the Metropolitan Police recognised 
the potential of the material environment to influence the disruptive potential of 
#Demo2012 and sought to manage it accordingly. In acknowledging such a notion, 
social movement scholars, Endres and Senda-Cook (2011), assert that the places and 
spaces of a demonstration are “more than just a backdrop for the rhetoric of social 
protest” (2011: 260)27. Rather, the authors argue that the “confluence of physical 
structures, locations and bodies can function rhetorically” (ibid.: 261) to generate “a 
variety of results beyond the intent of protest organisers” (ibid.: 262). It can be 
argued that this generative potential of space-place-body interaction is evident during 
                                               
27 The authors differentiate ‘place’ from ‘space’ by asserting that the former is a “particular location” constituted 
by “a combination of material and symbolic qualities […] imbued with meaning and consequences” whereas the 
latter is the “more general notion of how society and social practice are regulated (and sometimes disciplined) by 
spatial thinking” (Endres and Senda-Cook 2011: 259-260). 
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#Demo2012. By attempting to manage the physical environment, the NUS (with the 
Metropolitan Police) seemingly created a set of material conditions that transformed 
grassroots support for the NUS into negative sentiment resulting in a significant 
transformation in the way the media assemblage becomes choreographed and 
deterritorialised from the NUS’ earlier agenda.  
 
From the outset of #Demo2012, the NUS’ choice of a self-contained environment for 
demonstrators to congregate in the pre-march period represents a deliberate use of 
physical space. The choice of a small “assembly space” was intentional “so it felt 
like a massive demo” for participants, while the presence of “[television] cameras 
and people hanging banners on the bridge overlooking the assembly space and 
speeches on megaphones” was designed to create a sense of power and build 
excitement ahead of the march (Hoyles, 2014). This evidence suggests that the NUS 
carefully planned the material spaces of the demonstration to enhance participants 
emotions and support as well as present a more visually impactful symbolic image in 
media content. 
 
Once underway, however, participants were continually directed along the 
demonstration route and encouraged to keep moving in order to prevent a critical 
mass of participants from congregating and initiating the type of disruption seen 
during the 2010 demonstration (Walker and Paige, 2010). This containment tactic – 
implemented through coercion by NUS stewards and subsequently by the threat of 
arrest by police (Author’s notes) - is initially met with little resistance by the 
majority of the participants. This is possibly due to the fact that the early part of the 
march progresses along Victoria Embankment, a historically symbolic landmark for 
political demonstrations (Hind, 2012). This location also acts as a physical space 
which channels demonstrators into a tightly-grouped, banner-waving and chanting 
crowd. This creates a powerful and symbolically-charged demonstration of the 
solidarity and strength of the NUS and its supporters (Albury, 2012b; Parker, 2014).  
 
As the #Demo2012 route arrived at the end of the Embankment it came to a fork in 
the road, either turning right towards the politically-symbolic space of by the Houses 
of Parliament and Parliament Square or left towards the official NUS rally location 
in South London. Despite the police cordon indicating the route and NUS stewards 
directing participants across Westminster Bridge a number of demonstrators began to 
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congregate in front of the police barriers blocking entrance to Parliament Square 
(Author's notes; Kenny, 2012). 
 
At this point two significant events occur: firstly, a group of around 150 protestors 
(see entry at 12:56pm in Owen, 2012) attempt to break through police lines into 
Parliament Square. This results in “scuffles” with police (Author's notes and 
NatSam, 2012) and leads to a stand-off between police and demonstrators (Author’s 
notes). Secondly, when this attempt to reach Parliament Square fails, another group 
of demonstrators initiate a sit-down protest at the entrance to Westminster Bridge in 
an attempt to prevent the march from continuing on its route (Author's notes and 
TheFounder, 2012). This group articulates the argument that the end destination of 
the march is politically ineffective and urge demonstrators to remain at Parliament to 
have its voice heard – the stated aim of #Demo2012 (Owen, 2012 and Author’s 
notes).  
 
As noted above, place exudes “a fluid tension between materiality and symbolism” 
(Endres and Senda-Cook, 2011: 262). This oscillation between the two properties has 
a significant effect on the territorialisation of the media assemblage. On the one hand 
Parliament is significant to demonstrators as a symbolic place of political power, 
while on the other it also operates as a physical place where demonstrators can 
congregate, display the strength of their movement and express their opposition to 
the government’s policies. Moreover, the location operates physically and 
symbolically as a place where historic student protests have gathered to protest to 
parliament (Walker and Paige, 2010).  
 
Making sense of these overlapping interpretations and significances of place, 
Parkinson (2009) argues that: 
 
public space28 does convey meanings and can have behavioural effects, but 
those meanings are socially constructed, the effects socially mediated, 
dependent on narratives as well as physical factors (Parkinson, 2009: 8) 
 
                                               
 28 The interpretation of the terms space and place vary between scholars or scholarly fields. Here Parkinson 
refers to public space as “space that is public because it used for public purposes. This might be space like major 
town squares or the grounds of legislatures where the demos gathers to influence public decision making, perhaps 
through demonstrations” (Parkinson, 2009: 5). This is comparable to Endres and Senda-Cook’s notion of place 
(2011), rather than space per se. 
  139 
If we read Parliament’s significance through the lens suggested by Parkinson – that 
is, as a physical space interpretable only through a narrative socially constructed by 
protestors - it can be argued that Parliament becomes a symbolic political landmark 
central to #Demo2012, but one which the police, the NUS and the route itself prevent 
demonstrators from accessing. 
 
Having been initially imbued with a sense of physical solidarity created by the NUS’ 
choice of assembly space and the route’s politically-charged march along the 
Embankment, the actions of the NUS and police in preventing access to the 
politically symbolic space of Parliament arguably undermine any perceived political 
power possessed by the demonstrators (Hinds, 2012). In response to this physical 
disruption and political frustration, demonstrators act spontaneously. First, they 
attempt to break through barricades into Parliament Square and second they initiate a 
sit-down protest on Westminster Bridge in an attempt to force participants to remain 
at Parliament to continue protesting and, ultimately, force a way through to 
Parliament Square rather than continuing to the NUS’ planned rally location in 
Kennington Park (Author’s notes).  
 
It is at this point in the demonstration that many of the participants begin to 
recognise that the official route, turning away from Parliament, is likely to be of 
limited efficacy in achieving the NUS’ stated aims of empowering students to make 
their voices heard by the government. As a result, the initial solidarity and anger 
against government policy accrued among the grassroots student and education 
activist movement begins to be refocused on the NUS and its leadership’s apparent 
complicity with the police and political authorities in holding an emasculated 
demonstration.  
 
Arguably, events at Parliament and Westminster mark a turning point in attitude 
among grassroots students towards the NUS. For instance, the majority of media 
content generated during the march is critical of the NUS (53%) with some of the 
strongest negativity arising as demonstrators live-tweet29 anti-NUS sentiment in 
increasing volume via Twitter. Dominant themes identified in the data include 
criticism of NUS leadership and efficacy as a grassroots organisation; the absence of 
politically symbolic landmarks on the route; the demonstration’s climax in a 
seemingly insignificant and remote part of South London and the perceived 
                                               
29 The use of Twitter to report on an event or issue in a real-time or ‘live’.  
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relationship between NUS stewards and the Metropolitan Police. (Anticuts, 2012; 
PeterHunt19, 2012; Pinkichiban, 2012).  
 
It’s also possible to draw a quantitative inference of the significance of the 
Parliament/Westminster Bridge events in shifting the expressive narrative. Analysis 
of Twitter data gathered for the duration of the demonstration indicates that the 
frequency of tweets published gains momentum at times consistent with the events 
discussed (see Figure 1). This indicates that during the Parliament stand-off and 
Westminster Bridge sit-down protest that took place between approximately 
12.50pm and 1:30pm (and the stage invasion at the rally discussed later) the quantity 
of content generated is greater than at other points during the demonstration. This 
suggests that the physical, spatial environment impacts on both the qualitative (i.e. 
generating negative expressive content) and quantitative (i.e. velocity and volume of 
expression) production of media objects during the event.  
 
 
Figure 1 – Frequency of tweets produced during #Demo2012 (11am-4pm) 
 
Such an argument is also supported by an additional analysis of tweets, YouTube 
films and images shared by reporters from the student media outlet, East London 
Lines. This data plotted geographically further demonstrates that larger volumes of 
negative or anti-NUS content is expressed at key flashpoints on the route. These 
locations (circled) represent both the stand-off at Parliament and sit-down protest on 
Westminster Bridge and events at the final rally at Kennington Park (discussed 
below) (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 – Annotated Google Map visualising social media content produced along 
the #Demo2012 route. Available at: http://bit.ly/1mRVtvd.  
 
If we understand the events at Parliament as a spontaneous creation or amplification 
of critical sentiment towards the NUS triggered by the material environment, the 
spatial practices deployed by a distinct group of anti-NUS activists act as a further 
material component of #Demo2012 which plays a decisive role in choreographing 
the overall coding of the media assemblage.  
 
The activists, seemingly affiliated with the Twitter account @imaginary_party30, 
appear to have aimed to disrupt #Demo2012 through the use of high-profile banners 
(Lemmy, 2012; Qasim, 2012) and the circulation – both physically and virtually – of 
an anti-NUS manifesto – (Author's notes and Imaginary_Party, 2012) calling for 
students to “Smash the NUS” and replace it with a genuine left-wing, grassroots-led 
organisation. This activity is arguably highly hybridised in that the activists engage 
with participants physically on the demonstration as well as interacting with informal 
participants and formal news reporters on Twitter (ibid.). This all culminates in a 
group of Imaginary Party activists heckling NUS speakers and initiating a stage 
invasion at the official #Demo2012 rally forcing NUS President, Liam Burns, 
offstage (Sheriff, 2012a; Morgan, 2012b; Owen, 2012). 
 
From the outset of the rally, planned as a focal point where speakers, including NUS 
president Liam Burns, could address the crowd, a group of approximately 100-150 
demonstrators (Owen, 2012) comprising members of the ‘Imaginary Party’ initiate 
anti-NUS chants. One chant in particular came to dominate the latter stages of the 
                                               
30 Based on a term developed by the far-left French publication, Tiqqun. See: http://libcom.org/library/theses-
imaginary-party. 
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demonstration – both on the physical march (Author’s notes) and virtually on Twitter 
(Anticuts, 2012b; Albury, 2012a): “NUS, shame on you. Where the fuck have you 
brought us to?” 
 
When Burns takes to the stage, however, the group of anti-NUS activists “turned up 
the volume and then stormed the stage” (See the entry at 15.13 in Owen, 2012). They 
heckle and throw fruit and eggs at the speakers and succeed in forcing Burns offstage 
requiring him to complete his speech via a megaphone in relative anonymity among 
the crowd (Hoyles, 2014). Claiming responsibility for these events, the ‘Imaginary 
Party’ tweet a series of anti-NUS statements outlining their intent to disrupt 
#Demo2012 and challenge the NUS’ narrative: “very happy to have taken the stage 
at #demo2012 - the NUS has only ever let us down. We expect nothing different 
going forward” (Imaginary_Party, 2012) and “We hope you liked us on stage at 
#demo2012 - we love you comrades. The fight is only just beginning #nofees 
#nostudentdebt” (Imaginary_Party, 2012). 
 
By galvanising demonstrators’ disenchantment with the NUS after the organisation’s 
choice of a politically impotent destination for #Demo2012 and physically disrupting 
#Demo2012’s final rally, The Imaginary Party’s material practices succeed in 
undermining the NUS’s ability to effectively communicate its planned messages to 
demonstrators and media. More significantly, by using Twitter to produce and share 
its own media content in real-time (in contrast to the NUS’ hands-off approach to 
social media during the demonstration (Pool, 2014) as well as engage with other 
demonstrators directly, The Imaginary Party’s hybridised media actions become a 
defining factor in territorialising the #Demo2012 media assemblage against the NUS.  
 
Gerbaudo (2012) suggests this online-offline hybrid collective action is best 
understood as " a process … of spatial assembling, with its own specific 
choreography" (37) [emphasis in original]. Foregrounding the material, spatial logic 
at work within contemporary social movements, Gerbaudo critiques the 
technologically-enabled networks espoused by Manuel Castells (1996; Castells, 
2009) and Jeff Juris (Juris, 2009) as overlooking the "emplaced nature" of protest 
and viewing the virtual, expressive “space of flows” as more significant than the 
physical “space of places” (Castells, 1996: 429 cited in Gerbaudo, 2012: 25).  
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Instead, Gerbaudo argues for an emphasis on examining the physical interactions of 
contemporary activism, particularly "choreographic leadership […] a relatively 
centralised form of influence over the course a collective action will take" 
(Gerbaudo, 2012: 43). It can be argued that while the NUS organised #Demo2012 
and attempted to choreograph and territorialise the emerging media assemblage to 
their agenda, the spontaneous eruption of sit-down protestors on Westminster Bridge 
and The Imaginary Party’s activism exercise a much more hybridised, choreographic 
leadership which enabled a more effective creation of “a symbolic overlaying of 
physical space with cultural meanings and narratives" (ibid: 44). In turn, such actions 
and their effects become decisive in territorialising events and coding the 
#Demo2012 media frame emerging from the media assemblage. 
 
The Guardian’s #Demo2012 Live-blog  
 
The ramifications of the physical environment and spatial practices on the 
territorialisation of the #Demo2012 media assemblage can be seen if we consider 
how the materiality of these choreographic processes generate symbolic media 
objects. Importantly, these objects are produced predominantly from the informal 
demonstration participants but then become enrolled into institutional news media 
coverage of the event further territorialising and coding the media assemblage 
against the NUS.  
 
A central component in this choreography is the use of the live-blog media format by 
The Guardian newspaper. It will be helpful to discuss the specificities of this 
medium prior to its analysis. Live-blogs can be described as a form of hybrid media 
producing “live conversation[s] around a big story incorporating breaking news and 
verified facts with eyewitness material and audience opinion from social media 
channels” (Newman et al, 2012: 14). Thurman and Walters add further conceptual 
clarity by describing live-blogs a: “single blog post on a specific topic to which time-
stamped content is progressively added for a finite period – anywhere between half 
an hour and 24 hours” (Thurman and Walters 2013, 83).  
 
The adoption of live-blogs by institutional media organisations enables information 
gathering and production to respond to the dynamics of a digital media environment 
characterised by rapidly evolving communication structures consisting of 
heterogenous networks of formal as well as informal media actors producing news 
oriented around a complex ‘information cycle’ rather than the traditional top-down 
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approach to news (Chadwick, 2013). In this environment, narratively conventional 
news stories are superseded by stories that are oriented around the non-linear flows 
of digitally networked information (Manovich, 1999) generated by a range of formal 
and informal actors structured by the logic of databases (ibid.) and data streams 
(Manovich, 2012). As a result, live-blogging acts as a highly hybridised format for 
news organisations to make use of the "unstructured data, coming in fragments of 
raw, unprocessed journalism from both professionals and the public". By shifting 
journalistic practice towards “a more iterative and collaborative approach in 
reporting and verifying the news” (Hermida, 2012: 665) it can be argued that the 
live-blogs format is more dynamic and inclusive of alternative news sources when 
compared to other forms of institutional media.  
 
Given these unique qualities it is also important to provide historical context to the 
origins of live-blogs and The Guardian as an institution. This is particularly 
significant as the The Guardian played a central role in the medium’s development 
and, as a consequence, its form and function have been influenced by the 
organisation’s legacy and evolution. The Guardian (originally The Manchester 
Guardian) was established as a daily newspaper in 1821 to promote liberal values 
following The Peterloo Massacre in Manchester, northern England.31 
 
In order to ensure the newspaper’s commercial viability and “secure the financial and 
editorial independence” and “safeguard the journalistic freedom and liberal values” 
of The Guardian its assets were transferred to The Scott Trust in 1936 (The 
Guardian, 2002). Crucially, the Trust continues to maintain The Guardian according 
to foundational values set out by early editor C.P. Scott. These include: “honesty; 
cleanness (today interpreted as integrity); courage; fairness; and a sense of duty to 
the reader and the community”. Moreover, Scott asserted that “newspapers have ‘a 
moral as well as a material existence’” (The Guardian, 2015). 
 
Being able to maintain such public interest reporting and remain commercially viable 
has been a challenge throughout The Guardian’s history with the need to balance 
such a tension arguably requiring the organisation to innovate, typically by investing 
in its journalism, breaking big stories, adopting innovative marketing techniques and 
developing new products for readers (ibid.). The emergence of live-blogging was 
arguably one such innovative product developed by The Guardian in 1999 although 
                                               
31 The Peterloo Massacre was the dispersion by armed militia of a peaceful pro-democracy demonstration held in 
Manchester, Northern England in 1819 which killed 11 people.  
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for its first eight years of use it was “was restricted mainly to live soccer and cricket 
coverage” (Thurman and Walters, 2013).  
 
This changed, however, following the London bombings in 2005 where the live-blog 
format was adopted for reporting on rolling news coverage (ibid.) – a use which has 
since continued by the organisation. It is interesting to note, then, that despite the 
claims made by The Guardian and others that live-blogging enhances the quality and 
openness of media reporting through enabling transparency of sources, reader 
participation and an increased opportunity for a plurality of voices (Wells, 2011; 
Wilczek and Blangetti, 2017), the medium originally emerged from the newspaper’s 
sports reporting. This presents a new perspective on a seemingly radical media 
format, in that its function and format was honed in sports reporting, arguably a 
commoditised feature of news publishing, with high levels of popular and, thus, 
commercial appeal (Boyle, 2006; Newman, 2016). This adds an interesting economic 
materiality to the specificities of live-blogging as a medium which needs to be 
considered its analysis. 
 
In The Guardian’s live-blog, the symbolic media content generated during the 
demonstration is organised and absorbed into the wider news agenda in close to real-
time as #Demo2012 unfolds. This hybrid approach to news production gives The 
Guardian a competitive edge in terms of being the only formal news media able to 
gather and publish breaking news content. This is significant as it enables key 
moments in the demonstration to be rapidly identified and subsequently used as 
events for follow-up news stories – both by The Guardian and formal and informal 
media actors.  
 
As a result, The Guardian is the first institutional news outlet to break the stage 
invasion story and focus wider media and public attention on “the growing anger 
towards the NUS among grassroots students” (Owen, 2012). Approximately an hour 
after The Guardian’s live-blog reporting of the rally, the first fully articulated news 
story appears in The Guardian (The Guardian, 2012b). Leading with mobile phone 
footage uploaded to the video-sharing platform YouTube (sourced by the live-blog) 
of hecklers at the rally, a detailed description of the stage invasion and inclusion of 
the chant dominating latter stages of the demonstration: “NUS, shame on you. Where 
the fuck have you brought us to” (ibid.).  
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In turn, this sets the news agenda for subsequent formal and informal symbolic 
media content production and distribution and within hours other news outlets run 
similar stories adopting the same angle, re-using The Guardian’s video footage and 
citing the anti-NUS chant. Coverage critical of the NUS and #Demo2012 appeared 
across both right and left-wing media, with The Daily Mail (Duell, 2012) and The 
Independent (Rawlinson, 2012) while The Guardian publishes an extended follow-
up article reporting that the NUS president “Liam Burns, has been pelted with eggs 
and fruit at the conclusion of a march in London, which was marked by a low turnout 
and widespread anger over the perceived failure of the organisation to fight the 
trebling of university fees” (Malik and Ratcliffe, 2012). Of the immediate news 
coverage, only the BBC provides a post-event account of the demonstration which 
downplays both events at Parliament/Westminster Bridge and at the rally, merely 
reporting “[t]here was a small stand-off between protesters and police at 
Westminster. But the protest passed off peacefully, ending with a rally in 
Kennington” (BBC News, 2012a).  
 
The significance of The Guardian’s live-blog in choreographing hybridised media behaviour 
and territorialising the #Demo2012 media assemblage is further reinforced in interview 
data from the NUS’ media officer. Hoyles (2014) asserts that one of The Guardian’s live-
blog journalists requested an interview with Liam Burns immediately after the egging. Despite 
giving a 15-minute interview, the journalist: 
 
barely used any of it and wrote a very critical story about issues unrelated - 
[the stage invasion and general student anger towards the NUS] […] and The 
Guardian continued to use it […] despite it being an insignificant issue. I 
managed to talk it down with most people [… for] the BBC it become a 
footnote in what they wrote about rather than a big thing. The Guardian 
surprised us, really, by running it (Hoyles, 2014) 
 
This would suggest that the NUS’ media formal management was effective in limiting the 
impact of the stage invasion with the BBC, The Guardian’s hybridised news-gathering 
and publishing articulated a counter-narrative further territorialising the media 
assemblage against the NUS.  
 
Moreover, interview evidence revealed that the NUS continued to attempt to 
territorialise the assemblage using formal media management techniques post-
demonstration. The NUS’ Press Officer discussed how the organisation had briefed 
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journalists and placed an exclusive story with both The Guardian and The 
Independent to run after the demonstration (Hoyles, 2014). This story, featuring the 
NUS’ proposal for a new system of post-graduate loans as a solution to the current, 
unsatisfactory fees arrangement, gained no further coverage beyond its exclusive 
placements despite offering a relevant follow-up story for the NUS’ #Demo2012 
narrative.  
 
Crucially, the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the media content data shows 
that dominant themes emerging from the Demo2012 media assemblage is critical of 
the NUS, highlighting the political in-fighting among students and de-positioning the 
NUS as a credible policy-making organisation. These issues, driven by the informal 
media actors and hybridised media production practices of The Guardian’s live-blog 
ultimately choreograph the territorialisation and coding of the media assemblage, 
thus establishing the consistent media frame around the event.   
 
Conclusions 
 
In conclusion it can be argued that the four pillars of hybridity, materiality., 
choreography and coding developed in the analytical model can be identified 
throughout the empirical analysis of the Demo2012 case study. The following 
section will review where and how each pillar played a significant role in the 
(de)territorialisation of the codified media assemblage and ultimate production of the 
media frame.  
 
In the initial stages of the case study, the NUS built hybrid relations between its own 
formal media actors and formal news reporters, more informal networks of affiliated 
actors, such as student reporters such and digitally-enabled supporters. Leveraging its 
economic material position and institutional status it was able to devote dedicated 
resources to create and choreograph media production. As a result, the NUS was able 
to effectively territorialise the media assemblage emerging early in the case study by 
ensuring a homogeneity of pro-NUS media content being produced and distributed. 
 
Despite the NUS’ effective hybridising of media actors and choreography of - largely 
formal – symbolic media content in the build-up to the demonstration, it is also 
possible to identify how a layer of material media objects also emerge within the 
media assemblage and introduce an ambiguity or tension potentially deterritorialising 
the NUS’ efforts. For example, politically-charged material places and spaces, such 
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as Millbank and Whitehall – scenes of violence and property destruction in previous 
student demonstrations is overlaid on the symbolic media content produced. 
Although this rhetorical materiality is an integral part of the media content 
choreographed by the NUS, its symbolism arguably functions autonomously by 
simultaneously undermining the organisation’s aims of achieving a peaceful protest 
and potentially conveying a sense of empowerment for more radical student activists 
and demonstrators unwilling to take part in the NUS’ stage-managed ‘A to B’ march. 
Crucially, while such components of the media assemblage are not enough to fully 
deterritorialise the media assemblage significantly by increasing its heterogeneity, it 
does however, introduce a peripheral set of deterritorialising factors which will re-
emerge during the demonstration with greater impact.  
 
Once the demonstration gets underway and reaches the politically symbolic locations 
of Parliament Square and Whitehall, the materiality of space and place becomes a 
key determining factor in the communication and media object production around 
the event. Such spaces and their symbolism initiate a series of spatial practices. 
Firstly, demonstrators attempt to break through police lines into Parliament Square 
and while others initiate a sit-down protest that blocks the route of the demonstration 
forcing demonstrators back on Parliament. Empirical analysis of the symbolic media 
content being produced and shared by activists at this point in the case study 
confirms that such phenomena correlate with a quantitative increase in volume and a 
qualitative change in tone towards an anti-NUS position.  
 
Such anti-NUS attitudes then become crystallised by the actions of an anti-NUS 
activist group, The Imaginary Party, which choreographs growing resentment 
towards the NUS among demonstrators by building hybrid relationships on the 
ground and online with participants by creating and distributing media content 
criticising the NUS. It then deploys spatial practices to disrupt the #Demo2012 rally 
– an intervention that forces the NUS’ president, Liam Burns, offstage and 
symbolically marks a critical endnote for the official demonstration. At this point in 
the case study, it can be argued that the media assemblage is becoming bifurcated 
with pro-NUS symbolic media content choreographed by the NUS’ formal media 
actors territorialising the media assemblage in support of its position and 
increasingly anti-NUS symbolic media content emerging from #Demo2012 
participants, increasingly choreographed by informal networked media actors in 
order to deterritorialise the assemblage.  
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It is at this point that The Guardian newspaper’s innovative live-blog draws together 
both the more formal hybrid networks established by the NUS with the more 
informal networks of #Demo2012 participants. By adopting techniques typified by 
digitally-networked media, such as reciprocal linking, curating raw, unverified 
information and participating in live, conversations with participants the live-blog 
enrols the increasingly negative informal media content produced and shared by 
demonstrators. This functionality combined with The Guardian’s institutional 
agency and reputation as a credible media publisher begins to re-territorialise the 
media assemblage against the NUS. It is important to recognise, too, the economic 
materiality at play within the media assemblage here. The Guardian’s live-blog is 
highly dependent on the commercially-supported software developed by the 
organisation and operated by a range of professional reporters. While the live-blog’s 
unique hybridised functionality is important in choreographing the resulting media 
actors and symbolic content, it is important to recognise the economic material 
elements supporting its ability to re-territorialise the media assemblage. 
 
Analysis of the symbolic media content produced by the end of the demonstration 
and also in the days after the event demonstrates that The Guardian live-blog’s 
enrolment and amplification of anti-NUS media content becomes embedded in the 
dominant media coverage of the event – both in formal, institutional and informal 
digital media. This re-territorialisation of the media assemblage - choreographed by 
the informal, networked media actors and amplified by The Guardian’s live-blog - 
begins to produce a highly territorialised assemblage which, in turn, is coded into the 
final media frame critical of the NUS and #Demo2012.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Empirical Case Study 2: Animal Rights Activists Versus Adidas  
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On 21st November 2011 a group of European animal rights activists launched a 
targeted attack on corporate sponsors of the UEFA European Football 
Championships, Euro2012, due to take place in Poland and Ukraine the following 
year. The activists sought to draw the public’s attention to news reports and NGO 
claims that the Ukrainian government was responsible for the mass killing of stray 
animals to ‘clean up’ its cities hosting high-profile football matches during 
Euro2012. Evidence gathered by animal rights activists suggested that, despite 
assurances by the Ukrainian government the programme of culling animals would 
cease in response to NGO demands, it continued with “dogs […] tossed into giant 
incinerators” or being “fed food that has been laced with cheap chemicals that have 
caused them protracted suffering and ultimately death” (Osborn, 2011).  
 
With the Ukrainian government resisting pressure from civil society actors, informal 
networks of online activists reacted to these reports by planning and implementing a 
digital campaign targeting Euro2012 sponsors. They did this primarily through the 
exploitation of social media’s affordances for rapid and low-cost mobilisation of 
informal networks of online grassroots campaigners (Castells, 2009, xix-xx; Dencik 
& Leistert, 2015, 3-4). The activists focused on hijacking publicly visible digital 
spaces (although sponsors’ highly popular and public branded Facebook pages were 
a primary target) with messages and content featuring graphic images of injured and 
dead animals to criticise sponsors’ support for Euro2012. By implying the complicity 
of popular brands in the gruesome culling of animals, activists believed that the 
corporate sponsors would likely capitulate to their demands to put pressure on UEFA 
to take steps to stop the Ukrainian authorities.  
 
Although activists targeted all of Euro2012’s corporate sponsors, multinational 
sportswear manufacturer and retailer, Adidas, was made more visible in the ensuring 
crisis. This organisation received a much higher level of scrutiny and criticism than 
other sponsors and, consequently, was left with much greater damage to its 
reputation owing to the media assemblage that emerged. This chapter will analyse 
the animal rights activists’ campaign, the way in which Adidas attempted to manage 
it and how, ultimately, the event unfolded into a reputational crisis for Adidas with 
the corporation finding itself solely “in the crossfire of [activist] indignation” 
(Meedia, 2011).  
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Specifically, the empirical analysis will investigate the production of symbolic media 
content by both the activists and Adidas, the hybridity of the activists’ campaign and 
the ways in which material media objects choreograph the media assemblage – 
ultimately playing a decisive role of coding the assemblage and framing the event 
negatively towards Adidas.  
 
Crucially, the chapter will suggest that while the role of formal and informal media 
actors, such as the animal rights activists and Adidas employees, managed the 
campaign/crisis in ways that are wholly consistent with effective online activism and 
crisis management, it is important to recognise that material media objects in the 
form of computational processes and algorithms played a central part in 
territorialising media assemblages and thus exerting media power.  
 
Algorithmic visibility and sense-making 
 
Towards the end of 2011, the year preceding UEFA’s Euro2012 European Football 
Championships being held in Ukraine and Poland, the media and animal rights NGO, 
PETA, reported that “thousands of animals [were] being slaughtered by order of the 
Ukrainian authorities” (Osborn, 2011). This was done in order to “clean up” both the 
physical environment of cities hosting Euro2012 football matches as well as the 
country’s “tarnished image […] to boost tourism and foreign investment” (ibid.). By 
early November 2011, this story had featured sporadically on news and social media 
in Europe (PETA, 2011) but despite intervention by the animal rights NGO, PETA, 
the issue still had not attracted public attention or forced UEFA or any of its 
corporate sponsors into action to address and resolve the situation.  
 
In response to these news reports, animal rights activists formed a loosely connected 
online network centred on a campaign-specific Facebook page: ‘Stop Killing Dogs – 
Euro2012 in Ukraine’ (Facebook, 2011b) which functioned as the primary platform 
from which the activists planned and mobilised other animal rights activists across 
Germany, Austria and wider Europe. The aim of this network was to target UEFA’s 
sponsors for Euro2012, including McDonalds, Continental, Coca-Cola, and the 
global sportswear retailer, Adidas (ibid.).  
 
Before looking in greater detail at the ways that the activist campaign unfolded via 
Facebook, it is first useful to briefly discuss the origins and history of the platform to 
understood how this historical context potentially influences a contemporary reading 
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of the case study data. Facebook was created in 2004 by Harvard University Student, 
Mark Zuckerberg, as a social networking platform to replicate the traditional student 
directory format, including information and photographs of students (McGirt, 2007). 
The platform was opened to other, selected universities and schools internationally in 
2005 and then to anyone over the age of 13 with a valid email address in 2006. By 
the end of 2006 Facebook had 12 million users actively using the platform each 
month (Boyd, 2018). Facebook’s user growth continued rapidly and by 2009 has 
become the world’s largest social networking platform with 132 million monthly 
users (ibid.). As of July 2018, Facebook has 2.23 billion monthly users (Reuters, 
2018). 
 
Although the platform’s stated goal of “bring[ing] the world closer together” to build 
“meaningful communities” (Constine, 2017) is often understood as supporting 
positive or social ends, it can also be argued that the process of bringing people 
together is primarily a tool harnessed for commercial ends. Facebook originally, 
began life as a competing product to another Harvard-base social network (Carlson, 
2010). However, some of the early functional developments to the platform in 2007 
were designed to commercialise the site through the creation of business pages 
enabling businesses to promote themselves and market their products and services 
(Richmond, 2007). More significantly, in 2008 Facebook’s new Chief Operating 
Officer, Sheryl Sandberg, began to develop new monetisation strategies for 
Facebook with advertising generated by user data key to this (Boyd, 2018).  
 
Linked to this shift in Facebook’s focus on monetisation through advertising came 
the need to deepen its relationship with users via their personal data in order to allow 
for more efficient and effective advertising services (Matsakis, 2018; Facebook, 
n.d.). In 2009 new features were rolled out for users including the ‘Like’ button 
allowing users to display preference for certain information posted to the platform 
(Adweek, 2009; Kincaid, 2009), followed by the ‘@’ function allowing users to 
directly connect a post to a friend or other user (Rao, 2009). Such developments 
marked a shift in the platform’s functionality from one where users simply updated 
their friends to one whereby they have a greater ability to share directional 
information about particular pieces of information. A further update to the Facebook 
‘Timeline’ (later, ‘Newsfeed’) where users publish and consume content helped to 
organise this information chronologically based on a number of variables using a 
proprietary algorithm (White, 2011). Based on this historical content, then, it is 
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possible to observe that the social connectivity of Facebook has long been inter-
twined with its commercial aims. The significance of these potentially conflicting 
motivations in shaping specific features and outcomes of Facebook as a medium is 
discussed later in the chapter. 
 
Given Facebook’s commercial adoption, it can be argued that targeting corporate 
sponsors in order to exert public and financial pressure on organisations is an 
appropriate activist strategy (Crary, 2013). Moreover, the speed and efficiency with 
which activists can identify and choreograph online activists to draw public attention 
to high-profile corporations is a recent phenomenon termed “insurgent politics” 
(Castells, 2009: 300-303). Thus, as November progressed the activists became 
increasingly coordinated using social media to publicise and choreograph an “hour of 
protest” against the Euro2012 sponsors’ Facebook pages for 20:00 on the evening of 
Sunday 20th November, (Anis, 2011).  
 
In the 24 hours preceding the allotted time a message began circulating around 
animal rights forums and email lists issuing clear instructions to activists: 
 
from today [20th November, 2011] at 20:00 visit this page: 
https://facebook.com/Stop.Killing.Dogs.EURO2012. [H]ere it is explained 
how everything is supposed to run: you'll get from us a list of links to the 
sites to be attacked and multi-lingual templates, images and links that can be 
posted (Link, 2012) 
 
At 8:00pm activists started posting messages and graphic images to sponsors’ 
Facebook pages highlighting the Ukrainian city authorities’ actions. As per the 
protest organiser’s original message the activists’ content was designed to “clearly 
tell the sponsors and donors, [that] we believe the animal killings are financed with 
their resources” (ibid.). Ultimately, the activists’ aim was to “call on sponsors and 
UEFA to intervene and end the killing” (Schmitt, 2011). 
 
As noted already, one distinct advantage of this digitally-enabled digital activist 
campaign against corporate sponsors was the ease and speed with which the 
campaign spread and, more importantly, the replicability of the campaign actions 
outlined in the organiser’s original message. In this case, the organisers deployed two 
planned activist tactics which ensured the campaign achieved a significant advantage 
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over the Euro2012 sponsors at the outset of the campaign. Firstly, the “hour of 
action” was strategically planned by activists in order to maximise the campaign’s 
impact by exploiting the always-on nature of social media. Although social and 
digital media platforms are available at all times, it is not the case that corporations 
using such platforms have adapted their own routines to match these new always-on 
dynamics. As such, many corporate social media pages and channels are not staffed 
outside of working hours – an organisational flaw that can be exploited by activists.  
 
By launching their campaign on a Sunday evening, activists targeting sponsors’ 
Facebook pages could be confident that it was unlikely the communication managers 
for the Euro2012 sponsors would be actively monitoring and managing their pages 
(Lloyd & Toogood, 2014). This approach is confirmed by interview data with 
Adidas’ client relationship manager. She asserts that activist campaigns regularly 
exploited this organisational vulnerability: “attacks on sponsors happened over the 
weekend because they knew the brand team wasn’t there […] that was always the 
case” (McCarthy, 2015).  
 
The choreographing of activists to target Adidas with an “hour of action” worked 
effectively as the organisation first noticed its page had been targeted and hijacked 
by activists on the morning of Monday 21st November (Author’s notes). As a result, 
Adidas (and other Euro2012 sponsors’) Facebook pages were “flooded with protest 
comments from Sunday evening […] demand[ing] the withdrawal as a sponsor from 
the European Championships.” (Liller, 2011). Additionally, such an approach further 
ensured that the symbolic content posted by activists would be the first messages 
seen by sponsors’ Facebook fans if they accessed the brand’s Facebook page over 
the weekend or first thing on the Monday morning (McCarthy, 2015). As a 
consequence, the available evidence suggests that at the outset of the campaign the 
media assemblage being created around the issue is being territorialised in favour of 
the activists’ aims. 
 
However, even at this early stage of the campaign it can be argued that the activists’ 
choreographed actions didn’t achieve the fully desired impact on Adidas’ Facebook 
fanbase or online supporters that was intended. Already, material media objects in 
the form of algorithms controlling Facebook’s primary datastream, its News Feed32 
                                               
32 Facebook’s Newsfeed is a “constantly updating list of stories in the middle of your [Facebook profile’s] home 
page” (Patterson, 2015). 
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had started to play a role in influencing the visibility of the activists’ campaign 
(Facebook, 2015c). Specifically, the algorithm deployed to manage Facebook’s 
Newsfeed, termed the Edgerank algorithm (Patterson, 2015) is responsible for 
selecting and ordering what content is posted to users’ News Feeds – both from 
individual users and corporate or brand pages.   
 
While the exact criteria determining the Edgerank function are commercially 
protected, it is broadly recognised that it operates as a complex sorting algorithm 
(Oremus, 2016). For every Facebook user the Edgerank algorithm is designed to 
order – or sort – the News Feed posts according to a numerical value assigned to 
each one. As noted above, however, Edgerank is actually a series of inter-related 
algorithms. The ‘sort’ is performed by a further arrangement of algorithms, which 
determine a ‘relevancy score’ for each post. This is a much more complex series of 
tasks which aim to predict likely relevance of Facebook posts according to 
“hundreds” of individual attributes (ibid.).   
 
Crucially, one of these attributes down-weights the visibility of News Feed content 
originating from branded Facebook pages in order to meet user demand. Facebook 
suggests that this is because “users [want] to see more stories from friends and Pages 
they care about, and less promotional content” (Facebook, 2015b). The result of such 
a change to Facebook’s Edgerank algorithm is a consistent decline in visibility of 
Facebook Page content to individual users (Constine, 2014; DeMers, 2015). Study 
methodologies and results vary, but one comprehensive analysis of 50,000 posts 
from 1,000 Facebook pages suggests that content posted to branded or organisation 
pages is only seen in personal News Feeds by six per cent of the total fans of a page 
on average (Wittman, 2014). Other studies suggest this figure can be as little as two 
per cent and as high as 12 per cent depending on the size of page communities 
(Cooper, 2013).  
 
Fundamentally, such evidence points to a situation whereby the majority of 
information shared via organisations’ Facebook pages is unlikely to be seen by 
individual users of the platform – even when they are ‘fans’ of the corporate 
Facebook page. This situation is confirmed in interview data with Adidas’s client 
relationship manager who asserts:  
 
[Adidas] executives were freaking out because they could see what was on 
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the [Facebook] wall [i.e. News Feed] – but what people didn’t understand 
was they could see 100s of comments on the wall […] but if you understand 
the Edgerank algorithm, only a few people can see it [activists’ campaign 
content] […] you have to be going onto the wall to see it – [and] the 
percentage of people doing that is minuscule (McCarthy, 2015)   
 
This statement highlights two important points that have a central relevance to the 
case study’s media assemblage. Firstly, it can be argued that Facebook’s Edgerank 
algorithm exerts a material non-human agency in rendering the activists’ media 
content less visible despite their attempts to strategically plan the campaign in order 
to maximise its impact. This can be understood as a form of choreography in that the 
algorithm coordinates and organises how visible information is and thus influencing 
the potential actions arising. As Gerbaudo has noted: in networked environments 
media organises actors as part of an emergent process, rather than the other way 
around (Gerbaudo, 2012: 139).  
 
Additionally, it reveals Adidas’ executive management as not having a full 
understanding of the way the Edgerank algorithm influences the visibility of the 
Facebook page content, which in turn can be understood as an institutional weakness. 
This is important as it presents a situation whereby an international corporation with 
significant economic material resources and institutional agency capable of 
appointing a specialist consultancy to support its management of activism, is 
organisationally out-flanked (Clegg, 1989) by a computational process. As a result, 
despite the limited impact of the activists’ campaign, Adidas’ management perceived 
the Facebook page hijacking as a significant risk to the organisation’s reputation and 
operation.  
 
Thus, despite the reality of the activists’ campaign achieving limited visibility, 
Adidas’ executives’ concern about the potential impact of the campaign remained 
and a conference call was convened between Adidas’ social media manager at its 
head office in Germany and the organisation’s communications agency in London to 
discuss how this crisis should be managed.  
 
Before analysing the approach adopted by these actors, and the effect this had on 
deterritorialising the media assemblage’s support for the animal rights activists, it’s 
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useful to provide some historical background for Adidas in order to gain a better 
context of some of the decisions taken and outcomes identified in the case study data. 
 
Adidas is a multinational business which manufactures sports shoes, clothing and 
accessories. Founded in 1924 – originally as Dassler Brothers – by brothers Adi and 
Rudolf Dassler, the current incarnation of the Adidas corporation originates in 1949 
after the two brothers’ relationship deteriorated. The business is now the second 
biggest sportswear manufacturer in the world. (Adidas, n.d.). Adidas’ early 
commercial success originated from its innovative development of spiked running 
shoes and – significantly, its use of four-gold medal winning US athlete, Jesse 
Owens, to act as a high-profile endorser of the product during the 1936 Summer 
Olympics held in Berlin. This use of ‘celebrity’ customers, combined with its 
creation of distinctive logo, are responsible for helping to create the modern ‘sports 
industry’ (Smit, 2007). 
 
Due to this marketing-based growth, it can be argued that Adidas’ commercial 
success is closely aligned to its presentation and reputation. The Dassler brothers’ 
links to the Nazi Party during the Second World War and their factory’s use for 
weapons manufacturing, for instance, are not widely discussed in official historical 
accounts of the business (Blickenstaff, 2017). Similarly, the business has been 
criticised for its poor labour conditions, lack of attention to animal rights and failure 
to tackle its carbon emissions (Robertson, 2017). It is this combination of Adidas’ 
high profile and concern for its reputation with often controversial issues that 
arguably made Adidas as an organisation acutely aware of the importance of 
managing the activists’ campaign as efficiently as possible.  
 
Following discussion with Adidas executives and its social media manager, the 
specialist consultancy appointed a team to develop an approach to the crisis designed 
to limit reputational damage to the brand and prevent an escalation of the situation (McCarthy, 2015). 
Specific actions taken included: putting on hold creating and publishing any new symbolic media 
content to Adidas’ Facebook page. This was designed to ensure that no unrelated corporate 
information or promotional content would be published on social media by Adidas 
during the activists’ campaign. This would likely exacerbate the crisis by implying 
that Adidas was ignoring activists’ criticisms and remained focused on marketing its 
products despite the wider issues dominating the public agenda (ibid.). Importantly, 
the materiality of space and place played a significant role here in supporting 
Adidas’ response to the unfolding crisis. A ‘war-room’ was established in a meeting 
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space within the consultancy’s office which was used through-out the crisis. This 
allowed rapid and effective, face-to-face communication by the consultancy team 
which, arguably, enabled the team to work efficiently in respond to the activists’ 
campaign (Author’s notes).  
 
Next an analysis of the scale and potential impact of the crisis was undertaken by the 
consultancy’s research division. McCarthy (2015) notes that the research team was 
enlisted to review data from across online media and social networks in order to 
assess how widely the issue was being spread and how influential the individuals 
participating in the campaign were and thus what was the likelihood of its further 
spread. The aim of this task was 
 
to illustrate how few people could see this [the animal rights campaign] … 
[our] biggest role was to calm them [Adidas management] down using 
research allowing them to make decisions (McCarthy, 2015) 
 
As McCarthy suggests, this due diligence intelligence gathering was arguably the 
most significant task undertaken in the initial stages of the crisis. Such an approach 
was further supported by Adidas’ social media manager during the crisis who 
asserted in interview that he holds a strong belief “in data being the foundation of 
planning comm[unication]s campaigns” (Heising, 2015) in digital environments. 
 
Conducting due diligence research arguably helped the agency and Adidas determine 
the scale and significance of the activists’ campaign by assessing the spread of the 
issue (i.e. was it being discussed across multiple social media platforms or just 
Facebook?) as well as gauging the influence of individual actors taking part (i.e. 
were there highly connected individuals engaging with the campaign making it more 
likely to spread faster). It also enabled the measurement of awareness and attitudes 
towards the issue in the wider networked public sphere (i.e. was this a popular topic 
of discussion, or merely contained to a minority of digitally-enabled animal rights 
activists) (Robinson, 2015). 
 
Significantly, however, such research further demonstrates the centrality of 
algorithms as a material media object in shaping the emerging media assemblage. 
That is, as the campaign was primarily planned and deployed within and via digital 
networks the activists’ actions produced a range of varying qualitative and 
quantifiable “digital traces” (Preis, Moat, Bishop, Treleaven, & Stanley, 2013; 
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Welser, Smith, Fisher, & Gleave, 2008) that can be tracked and analysed. Such traces 
are routinely gathered for identification and analysis by analytical software tools 
which make use of publicly available “big data” generated by the digital 
communication platforms used by activists’ and others’ groups active in the 
networked public sphere (Ampofo et al., 2015; Collister, 2013; Olsen, 2012). 
 
Central to the identification, collection, analysis and subsequent visualisation of these digitised ‘big 
data’ sources, the software platforms necessarily rely on algorithms and a range of associated 
computational processes. As a result, it can be argued that algorithms play a vital role in the “sense-
making” - interpretive – process (Heide, 2009; Walker, 2009). For example, an essential first stage 
in the analysis of digital data is the availability of ‘clean’ data – that is: digital datasets free from 
duplicate sources or, more importantly, ‘spam’ data.33 The methods applied for de-duplicating 
and ‘’de-spamming’ digital data by software providers vary depending on their 
proprietary systems but are based primarily on recognising and removing language 
and content deemed to be indicative of spam (Shafigh Aski and Khalilzadeh Sourati, 
2014).  
 
In this approach, references to relevant keywords or phrases, such as Viagra, sex or 
‘making money’ are detected by search algorithms and combined with machine-
learning algorithms that identify new types of spam and the language used [to 
indicate spam] (ibid.). While the design and application of these computational 
processes is ostensibly to ensure high-quality, commercially viable datasets there 
nevertheless arises important questions about how the creation algorithmically of 
blacklists of words and websites can subsequently influence the analysis of data and 
the resulting ‘sense-making’ efforts. 
 
The potential impact such underlying algorithmic processes may have had on the 
management of Adidas’ response to the activist campaign is acknowledged by both 
the communication agency and Adidas. Adidas’ social media manager during the 
crisis acknowledged that “insights gained from data mining tools depend heavily on 
how you ‘feed the machine’ to begin with. I am very aware that there are ways you 
can come to different results starting with the same question but using different 
algorithms to get to the answer” (Heising, 2015). The agency’s head of research and 
insight offered a more detailed assessment of the algorithmic processing of data: 
“[t]ypically,” when conducting research: 
                                               
33 Spam refers to either ‘digital detritus’ of abandoned websites or the intentional exploitation of digital content to 
sell commercial products in an aggressive way that ‘pollutes’ useful or authentic digital information. 
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we look into the coverage [of the software]. [We ask] where is data coming 
from and how much are we getting? It is especially important in a crisis that 
we are not missing anything. A second consideration is is the [software] 
eliminating spam? Different tools do it differently and will give different 
volumes for the same [search] terms depending on their spam filter 
(Robinson, 2015)  
 
However, while such questions are asked by the communication agency’s 
researchers, Robinson also suggests that the availability of information about 
software platform’s underlying algorithms can be hard to acquire: “We don’t have 
full visibility [of the algorithms] - it's a bit of a dark art - not having access to the full 
[algorithmic] process.” (ibid.). Such secrecy results primarily from the commercial 
sensitivity of software vendors who consider the algorithms powering their 
technology as proprietary intellectual property. As such, the ability to fully interpret 
and understand how algorithms influence the gathering and processing of digital big 
data is severely limited by economically-driven commercial priorities of software.34   
 
Regardless of these limitations, such software is widely adopted within corporate 
communications teams and agencies and, according to the agency’s head of research 
and insight, is used routinely to track and monitor public behaviour in order to gain a 
better quantitative and qualitative understanding of the dynamics of the networked 
public sphere (Robinson, 2015). Specific applications highlighted include: 
understanding public attitudes towards clients or related topics; measuring the size of 
given population groups with specific interests and identifying behavioural patterns 
among a given population to infer potential future actions (ibid.).  
 
More significantly, analysis software is also used to apply certain filters to the 
resulting data in order to identify additional factors such as categorising and 
segmenting audience groups according to social and cultural phenomena, including 
perceived influence in a given context (i.e. the potential ability to initiate the wider 
spread of information across digital media through their networked connections), 
gender, age and geographic location. Some tools even claim the ability to apply 
                                               
34 For a range of possible opportunities potentially enabling academic researchers to gain access to commercially 
protected algorithms, see: Pasquale (2011). 
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algorithmic processing to big data to ascertain family status, religion and earnings 
(Ha, 2013). 
 
The ultimate purpose of such analysis, Robinson suggests, is to “paint a picture of 
how the target audience behaves in and out of social [media]” (Robinson, 2015). 
Thus, the materiality of media objects and the role of algorithms in detecting and 
tracing them are important as they enable the consultancies’ formal actors to 
understand the ways in which the activists’ campaign was unfolding. This 
intelligence in return could be used to develop a plan to either help Adidas 
territorialise the media assemblage in its favour or otherwise seek to deterritorialise 
the activists’ choreography of the media assemblage (ibid.). This demonstrates that 
while algorithmic processing of digital data enables strategic communication 
practitioners to undertake much more detailed analyses of their communicative 
environment, they are also deferring such sense-making and interpretation activities 
to computational processes. Algorithms, according to Berry, are responsible for 
converting “real-world situations into discrete processes to undertake a particular 
[…] task.” (Berry, 2011) [emphasis in original].  
 
Moreover, these computational processes are crucial for an understanding of how 
reality is mediated. Berry argues: 
 
The key point is that without the possibility of discrete encoding there is no 
object [i.e. real-world event] for the computational device to process. 
However, in cutting up the world in this manner, information about the world 
necessarily has to be discarded in order to store a representation within the 
computer. In other words, a computer requires that everything is transformed 
from the continuous flow of our everyday reality into a grid of numbers that 
can be stored as a representation of reality which can then be manipulated 
using algorithms. These subtractive methods of understanding reality 
(episteme) produce new knowledges and methods for the control of reality 
(techne) (ibid.) 
 
Algorithms, according to Berry, are vital to the rendering and shaping of reality in a 
digitally-driven society. As such, the material role played by algorithms becomes 
increasingly more powerful in shaping the information available to determine a 
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particular version of reality and, thus, influence the strategic decisions made by 
communication professionals.  
 
As an empirical demonstration of the significance of such algorithmically-led 
decision-making analysis by Adidas’ agency determined that the primary impact of 
the activists was largely contained within Facebook and the impact itself was 
significantly limited by Facebook’s own Edgerank algorithm. Therefore, there was 
little dissemination of relevant information through wider online networks and no 
engagement with the campaign by influential individuals capable of escalating the 
issue’s visibility on to the wider public agenda. Based on these insights, the decision 
was made not to engage with the activists immediately and to wait and see if the 
campaign dissipated of its own accord (McCarthy, 2015). 
 
Algorithmic hyperintermediation and Auto-Moderation as catalysts for coding 
 
In parallel with the algorithmic analysis of the activists’ digital data traces and 
Adidas’ corporate affairs department was also producing an official response to the 
crisis issue. This would be published to the Adidas Facebook page in order to 
publicly demonstrate the corporation was taking activists’ concerns seriously. This 
official statement was eventually approved and published on the Adidas Facebook 
page at 22:37 on 21st November 2011: 
 
We'd like to acknowledge and respond to the questions about our position on 
the issues surrounding animal welfare in the Ukraine and how that relates to 
adidas' [sic] partnership with the UEFA EURO 2012. We want you to know 
that the adidas [sic]group strongly opposes animal cruelty and expects the 
Ukrainian Government to investigate these allegations carefully and take 
appropriate measures. We are monitoring the topic closely and are committed 
to continue to do so (Adidas, 2011) 
 
Although an official statement had now been issued to attempt to deterritorialise the 
activists’ territorialised media assemblage, this choreographic move was quickly 
disrupted by several new problems emerging from the unique dynamics and 
infrastructure of the digitally-networked media environment. These problems 
arguably catalysed the crisis and tipped the balance in favour of the activists. Most 
significantly, they influenced a heavily territorialised media assemblage which in 
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turn created the coded media frame against Adidas. Crucially, both of these events 
can be attributed to the material function of the algorithms embedded within the 
digital research platforms and, more importantly, Facebook itself.  
 
Firstly, despite Adidas’ well-researched and strategically planned decision to not 
engage the activists immediately, the failure to issue an immediate response via the 
Facebook page was in fact interpreted by the activists and wider media observers as 
an unwillingness to engage with the issue – a development that later played an 
important role in the critical interpretation of Adidas’ handling of the activists’ 
campaign (Meedia, 2011; Gillich, 2011b; Velt, 2011). This can be interpreted as 
Adidas’ inability to engage with informal media actors and build hybridised 
networks due to its institutional limitations in operating as a bureaucratic and risk 
averse corporation.  
 
Secondly, as has been noted above, Facebook’s Edgerank algorithm significantly 
limited the visibility of activists’ messages to the small number of Adidas’ Facebook 
‘fans’ who directly visited the page. However, the planned choreography by the 
activists to flood Facebook pages with campaign content was effective in 
undermining Adidas’ official statement. While, Adidas was holding-off issuing its 
official response, activists started choreographing their networks to continuously 
bombard Adidas’ Facebook page with negative symbolic content. Thus, the 
corporation’s attempt to deterritorialise the activists’ media assemblage was limited 
in impact. 
 
Specifically, activists had created a template message which activists were 
encouraged to ‘copy and paste’ on Adidas and other Euro2012 sponsors’ Facebook 
page. Importantly, the materiality of a computational process such as ‘copy and 
paste’ is further significant technological affordance as it allows rapid replication of 
digitised information which can be shared freely at scale. As a consequence, Adidas’ 
single post of its corporate statement was quickly diluted by the deluge of activists’ 
comments on the Facebook page rapidly ensuring that Adidas’ official crisis 
response was “seldom to be found in the flood of complaints” (Liller, 2011). Thus, it 
can be argued that this material layer of the activists’ symbolic media content plays 
an equally important role in enabling the territorialisation of the media assemblage in 
the activists’ favour. 
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Such a tactic has been identified by Morozov (2012) as “hyperintermediation” where 
online actors use algorithms to identify relevant information – such as pro-
democracy debates or corporate marketing or public relations campaigns - circulating 
within the networked public sphere. With target campaigns identified 
algorithmically-powered ‘bots’35 are instructed to produce high volumes of irrelevant 
or oppositional content which is disseminated rapidly through digital networks in 
order to disrupt the digital debates or information flows. Such a tactic is not 
necessarily a constructive one. As Morozov agues: “persuasion may not be the goal. 
Some bots exist only to make it harder to discover timely factual information about, 
say, some ongoing political protests” or they are designed and deployed to 
“overwhelm […] popular hashtags with useless information” (Morozov, 2012).  
 
Such tactics, here deployed by the activists against Adidas and other Euro2012 
sponsors, can be understood as one component of what can be termed a ‘non-
representational’ approach to media. For instance, while the symbolic content 
produced is representative of an issue at a surface level, the aim of the content is to 
produce a material effect on a digital platform’s computational, algorithmic function, 
rather than to exert a representational or phenomenological response by a human.  
 
This arguably presents a further materiality layer of the media objects being 
produced and distributed by the activists. For example, the messages shared among 
activists and posted to Adidas’ Facebook page are created purely to trigger a material 
response by an algorithm that deprioritises Adidas’ corporate statement rendering it 
invisible to viewers of the fan page. This is in opposition to conventional, symbolic 
media, which is designed to establish a mutual or communicative, 
persuasive understanding based on textual or visual symbolic meaning (Perloff, 
2010).  
 
Although such an approach is adopted by the activists, it is also acknowledged as 
playing a role in Adidas’ approach to digital media. Adidas’ global social media 
manager, Mark Heising, argues that as an organisation, its digital communication 
strategies take into account factors affecting the interaction between their 
communicative content and algorithms, such as Edgerank and Google PageRank 
which can influence the visibility of content. Understanding the impact of such 
                                               
35 Bots can be understood as “software agents which perform automated tasks” (Koike & Nishizaki, 2013) – often 
with much greater velocity and at volume compared to human users. 
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computational processes on media, Heising suggests, is “a means to optimise content 
delivery and maximise reach” but does not necessarily “define the sort of story we 
want to tell” (Heising, 2015). Ultimately, then, non-representational media tactics are 
adopted primarily to create and disseminate content solely to interact with and 
generate a material, computational result, not a symbolic, persuasive outcome. While 
it should be noted that although such tactics indirectly cause an effect on the 
representation of issues by shaping their visibility, this is not the primary motivating 
factor.  
 
Furthermore, the final and most decisive moment in the case study which creates a 
highly territorialised, homogenous media assemblage in favour of the activists arises 
as a result of the computational processes operating within Facebook. Having 
assessed the potential impact of the activists’ campaign and finally published a 
corporate statement on its Facebook page, there was an expectation by Adidas its 
response to the crisis would de-escalate and limit the activists’ choreographed 
campaign and deterritorialise the media assemblage back towards a more balanced 
position (CIPR, 2015). Due to the dynamics and autonomy of Facebook’s algorithms 
operating within the assemblage, however, the crisis was already transforming into a 
more problematic situation for Adidas. In addition to the activists’ original criticism 
of Adidas’ involvement with Euro2012, a new – and highly damaging - criticism was 
emerging: censorship of activists’ voices.  
 
At around midday on 21st November comments were being posted by activists on the 
Adidas Facebook page claiming that activists’ posts, as well as new comments being 
added by activists to existing posts on the page, were being deleted and therefore 
censored, by Adidas (Author’s notes; McCarthy, 2015). For organisations that 
proactively use social media to communicate with the public, the need for corporate 
transparency and openness are paramount (McMichaels, 2012). This is largely in 
relation to the differing values that exist between formal, professional media actors 
and informal, digitally-enabled media actors. This distinction is primarily premised 
on the divide between economic motivations and social ones (Benkler, 2006). When 
these two motivations become hybridised then risks emerge which may lead to 
misunderstanding between the different groups of actors (McMichaels, 2012). As a 
result, frameworks or internal policies guiding formal institutional actors in their 
engagement and relationships with informal media actors become useful 
organisational tools (ibid.).  
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Adidas, seen as a leading corporate adopter of social media marketing (Tödtmann, 
2011), details its corporate commitment to such principles in their ‘Social Media 
Guidelines’ and social media ‘house rules’. These documents echo the values of 
socially-motivated media by stressing Adidas’ support for “open communication” 
(Adidas, 2011a). Furthermore, they encourage the public to “come and join the 
conversation, connect with other people and have fun sharing your thoughts and 
ideas” (Adidas, n.d.). As such, accusations that Adidas was actively censoring 
discussion on its Facebook page by deleting or removing comments posted by the 
activists goes against the normative values of institutional participation in digitally-
enabled, hybrid media networks (McMichaels, 2012). Moreover, given the historical 
importance of Adidas’ need to manage it reputation – both in terms of its commercial 
success and problematic corporate origins - being seen as anti-social and 
undemocratic are far from ideal. 
 
This new scenario represented a serious development for Adidas as part of the 
ongoing reputational crisis. In order to address this development an internal 
investigation was urgently initiated by Adidas and its agency to ascertain which 
employees had access to the Facebook page and were responsible for deleting 
activists’ comments (Author’s notes). After an internal investigation lasting several 
hours it was confirmed that no individual Adidas or agency employee was 
responsible for deleting activists’ posts and comments on Facebook. Moreover, 
further investigation uncovered that the missing content was being ‘censored’ by 
Facebook’s “auto-moderation” and “profanity filter” functionality without any 
knowledge of the agency or brand (Adidas, 2011b). Once again, this highlights how 
the technological materiality of media objects continue to play a central role in the 
territorialising of the media assemblage. 
 
Facebook’s auto-moderation function is an algorithmic tool programmed to detect a 
number of undesired variables, such as profane language; other pre-determined 
trigger words and phrases in a similar process to the detection of offensive content 
adopted by digital research and analytics tools discussed above. It also operates by 
looking for a range of indicators that a Facebook page is being ‘spammed’ – that is 
targeted by individual users or computer programmes designed to publish offensive, 
irrelevant or promotional material. 
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This is achieved through the automated detection of patterns of identical content 
being posted to a page; the velocity with which this content is being posted is also 
taken into consideration (Facebook, 2015a). When these patterns of communication 
are positively identified, Facebook responds by automatically holding the suspected 
posts or comments unpublished in a secure ‘spam folder’ which prevents the 
message from being displayed (ibid.). Once the unpublished messages have been 
reviewed by the administrator of the page they can published or deleted depending 
on their true status.  
 
In Adidas’ case, activists’ use of offensive language in some of their messages 
triggered Facebook’s anti-profanity filter; at the same time the activists’ centrally co-
ordinated campaign tactic of sharing a copy and paste template message for posting 
on Adidas’ page is likely to have activated Facebook’s auto-moderation algorithms 
as it (falsely) identified the activists’ campaign content as ‘spam’ based on the 
patterns of their media production and distribution. It is notable here that Facebook’s 
auto-moderation algorithm is responsible for exerting a non-human agency beyond 
the activists and Adidas in order to ‘censor’ online discourse. This acts as 
choreographic function within the media assemblage in its own right. For instance, as 
with the hyperintermediation of Adidas’ official statement discussed earlier, 
Facebook’s auto-moderation of spam or offensive content operates non-
representationally. That is, rather than by seeking to understand the representational 
dimensions of the symbolic media content it functions by seeking to computationally 
recognise patterns of text and communicative behaviour. 
 
Additionally, as a consequence of such non-representational processes Facebook 
then applies its own automated decision-making to block representational content. 
Such non-human agency, ironically, is designed by Facebook to protect brands from 
potentially damaging online content. However, in this case the unseen and material 
elements of Facebook’s algorithmic processes exacerbated the damage to Adidas’ 
brand reputation by triggering wider, more hybridised networks of formal and 
informal media actors to scrutinise the crisis. In turn, this critical attention catalysed 
the territorialisation of the media assemblage against Adidas, back in favour of the 
activists.  
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The Adidas “shitstorm”  
 
In terms of media coverage of the activists’ campaign, while this coordinated “hour 
of action” on Sunday 20th November arguably contributed to a “social media 
spectacle” (Greye, 2011b) against Euro2012 sponsors and generated official 
responses condemning the Ukrainian government’s actions, it can be argued that the 
real impact on the corporate brands was forced not by the formulaic activist 
campaign, but by the unforeseen effect of algorithms and computational processes 
operating within Facebook itself. 
 
Although sponsors’ Facebook pages were being targeted with between hundreds 
(Casabianca, 2011; InMaDa, 2011; Sandrah87, 2011) and thousands (Greye, 2011b) 
of critical posts between 20th and 22nd November, the wider visibility and impact of 
this activity was limited by Facebook’s Edgerank algorithm, as discussed earlier. 
Analysing the wider symbolic content being produced as part of the activists’ 
campaign indicates that only 22 relevant tweets were generated in relation to the 
campaign. This represents a largely insignificant outcome for a campaign aiming to 
generate widespread public awareness of the issue and force UEFA and its sponsors 
to take action as a result of high-profile reputational damage within the public 
sphere.  
 
Significantly, analysis of the Twitter content and institutional media data from the 
campaign reveals that the majority of symbolic content critical of sponsors occurs 
between 21st November and 1st December 2011, that is the period in which the 
activists’ digital campaign has already started to dissipate. From the available 
evidence this increased impact of the campaign appears to be down to two factors. 
Firstly, the data suggests an increased hybridity of the media actors involved in the 
media assemblage. While the initial campaign was coordinated and deployed using 
Facebook, from the 21st November further media actors become enrolled in the 
assemblage – both informal actors, such as bloggers and formal media actors, such as 
journalists - discover and start to choreograph the story.  
 
Secondly, the increased interest in the campaign leading to the enrolment of hybrid 
networks of actors is caused by a shift in focus of the story away from the activists’ 
campaign and towards Adidas’ failure to adequately manage the dynamic online 
protest - and the reputational damage this may cause to the business. In particular, 
the resulting coded media assemblage singles out and frames Adidas for 
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experiencing a social media “meltdown”36 (Wirtschafts Woche, 2011) or “shitstorm” 
(Vip, 2011).  
 
Based on analysis of the media content data collected for the case study, there is 
limited discussion of the crisis beyond Facebook on the evening of the campaign. 
What emerges is published by activists who post about the animal rights issue and 
asks questions whether Euro 2012 sponsors would like to be associated with the 
sitution (1ndenbirken, 2011; Greye, 2011a, 2011b). The emergence of a more 
defined choreography which catalyses the territorialisation of the media assemblage 
against Adidas can be observed in a blog post by media commentator, Bernd Gillich 
on 21st November. Gillich writes an analysis about the digital protest evolving 
around UEFA sponsors and offers guidance on how companies should manage such 
online activist tactics (Gillich, 2011b).  
 
Crucially, Gillich is the first media commentator to use the term “shitstorm” to refer 
to the crisis – although two important points need to be made: firstly Gillich uses the 
term in reference to a range of corporate sponsors, not just Adidas, and secondly, the 
focus of Gillich’s blog post is not directly about the success of the activists’ 
campaign, rather it directs critical attention to the ways in which the corporate 
sponsors have reacted and managed the ensuing events. In the post Gillich asks: 
“How do Canon, McDonalds, Continental [Tyres] and Adidas […] behave in such a 
social web crisis ("Shit Storm")” (Gillich, 2011b). It is also interesting to note that a 
number of the informal media actors pushing the Adidas shitstorm angle are arguably 
asserting their own expertise in the situation in order to demonstrate their 
commercial suitability to companies likely to find themselves in similar 
circumstances. This represents a further, important material factor influencing the 
choreography and territorialisation of the media assemblage as a number of the 
informal actors engaged in this process appear to be operating according to 
economic, commercial motivations, rather than purely social ones. 
 
However, it is also worth noting that analysis of how UEFA’s wider sponsors 
handled the activists’ campaign reveals that while some corporations are praised, 
Adidas is singled out for specific criticism: “Adidas hasn’t responded since Sunday 
                                               
36 The term ‘meltdown’ is transliterated from the German term ‘GAU’, an abbreviation of ‘größter 
anzunehmender unfall’ that is used in media coverage of the crisis (see Meedia, 2011). The term itself literally 
translates as ‘worst case scenario’ but according to pme25 (2010) the term is colloquially used to refer to a 
serious nuclear disaster. Based on this context the term ‘social media GAU’ is understood to mean a ‘social 
media meltdown’. 
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night to the wall messages on their Facebook page” (Vip, 2011). In a follow-up blog 
post published later on 21st November Gillich remarks: “Adidas has responded after 
a whopping 30 hours […] such social media crisis management is not part of the 
"Champions League" of companies on the social web” (Gillich, 2011b).  
 
Following on from Gillich’s blog post, another article appears on the VIP Room blog 
published by the newspaper, Nürnberger Zeitung. Echoing the tone and terminology 
of Gillich’s post the author makes a more explicit link between the social media “shit 
storm” and Adidas. Firstly, the blog post’s title reads: “Social Media Giant in 
Shitstorm” while the opening paragraphs asserts that Adidas finds itself with a 
“raging shitstorm” on its Facebook page (Gillich, 2011b). As evidence for its 
criticism of Adidas, the author continues to cite the organisation’s delays responding 
to activists and the deletion of activists’ posts and comments – both events that can 
be directly connected with the materiality of Adidas’ organisation structure and 
Facebook’s algorithmic processing of information during Adidas’ management of 
the crisis. 
 
From the ethnographic data collected it is possible to contextualise this public 
perception of Adidas’ actions as being primarily driven by the organisational 
processes and bureaucracy encountered in developing a response to the activists’ 
criticisms. For example, while initially Adidas paused to assess whether the situation 
would deescalate, the time taken for an appropriate response to be drafted by Adidas 
executives and to incorporate multiple rounds of revisions from internal stakeholders 
led to activists and other media actors questioning Adidas’ motivations. This 
scenario was further compounded by the need for Adidas’ specialist agency to 
‘translate’ the final statement into language more suited to Facebook. As a 
consequence, the rapidly evolving dynamics of networked media, catalysed by quasi-
autonomous Facebook algorithms, succeeded in outflanking Adidas, choreographing 
the media assemblage and territorialising it against the organisation. 
 
It is apparent, then, that while all Euro2012 sponsors were targeted by animal rights 
activists, Adidas is singled out as the only sponsor attracting dedicated criticism by 
media actors and commentators in the media content data. With the link between 
Adidas’ perceived handling of the activist campaign and the ensuring reputational 
damage featuring prominently in coverage on 21st November, it can be argued that 
these articles play a significant role in territorialising and coding the media 
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assemblage against Adidas by establishing homogeneity across the interpretation of 
events.  
 
This territorialisation of the media assemblage against Adidas is further reinforced 
by coverage appearing beyond the original campaign from 22nd to the 25th 
November. During this period national German media outlets, such as Handelsblatt, 
Wirtschaftswoche, Die Welt, RTL and Stern, and bloggers, continue to highlight 
Adidas’ prominence in the crisis for its delay responding to activists and deleting and 
censoring comments. This culminates in repeated accusations that the brand itself is 
experiencing its own “shitstorm” (Gillich, 2011c) or “meltdown” (Vip, 2011) and 
“stands in the crossfire of [activist] indignation” (Meedia, 2011; Handelsblatt, 2011).  
 
In the same period, a small flurry of 17 tweets appear reinforcing the same messages. 
Although not substantial in scale, the connection between the crisis and reputational 
damage to corporate sponsors is once more levelled primarily against Adidas. For 
example, the brand is the only sponsor highlighted in the content analysed: “On the 
basis of animal genocide in the Ukraine, I'm calling to boycott of all sponsors of 
EM2012 […] #socialmedia #adidas Please #rt” (Liller, 2011); others reaffirm the 
“Shitstorm about Adidas” (Meedia, 2011) and “social media meltdown” (Gillich, 
2011a). From an analysis of the media content data generated by the activists’ 
original campaign and the broader media coverage of the crisis beyond Facebook, it 
can be argued that the media assemblage builds from an informal Facebook-driven 
campaign, criticising all Euro2012 sponsors, to a full-blown reputational crisis with 
the coded media assemblage territorialised by formal national media and informal 
social media actors on blogs and Twitter singling out Adidas for specific criticism of 
the way it handled the social media ‘shit storm’. 
 
By tracing the choreography of media actors in the case study we can see how in the 
early stages of the campaign Adidas and the activists produce and publish symbolic 
content countering each other’s claims. Owing to the enrolment of Facebook’s 
algorithms in the media assemblage the materiality of computation impacts the 
visibility of activists’ and Adidas’ media content, influencing the media 
assemblage’s (de)territorialisation.  
 
Specifically, Facebook’s algorithmic auto-moderation of activists’ content (rather 
than the planned intentions of the activists) catalyses the coding of the media 
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assemblage and translates it into a media frame. Additionally, Facebook’s Edgerank 
algorithm significantly limited the visibility and impact of the activists’ campaign 
and the communication agency’s use of research software algorithms to analyse and 
assess the potential wider influence of the campaign both led to Adidas’ delay in 
responding to activists. These algorithmically-driven decisions subsequently led to 
specific criticism of adidas’ handling of the campaign. Moreover, the initial 
reputational damage arising from Adidas’ delayed response to activists was further 
exacerbated as a result of Adidas’ ‘censorship’ of activists’ content.  
 
Again, this pivotal moment in the framing of the campaign arose from Facebook’s 
auto-moderation algorithm hiding content believed to be spam as a result of the 
activists’ non-representational communication tactics. Thus, it can be argued, that the 
media assemblage’s territorialisation and coding in which Adidas is singled out for 
criticism as the primary Euro2012 sponsor enduring a ‘shit storm’ or ‘meltdown’ is 
primarily choreographed by the contingent algorithmic and computational processes 
operating within digital media.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The analysis of empirical evidence presented in this chapter shows that the case study 
confirms the emancipatory potential of digital media identified in Chapter 2 for 
rendering digital activism “easier, faster, more spontaneous and ultimately more 
decentralised, horizontal and participatory” (Dencik & Leistert, 2015, 3). This view, 
however, can be contrasted with the critique of technology’s inherent “progress-ism” 
(Chun, 2007). While social and digital media can make protest more effective on a 
number of levels, as Dencik and Leistert note: digital activists remain “continuously 
confronted with the restricting structures and limitations that are inherent in [social 
media] technologies” (Dencik & Leistert, 2015, 3). 
 
Moreover, critically assessing social media protest, Leistert asserts that digital 
platforms are fundamentally “engineered to maximise advertising revenue and 
consumer consumption”. Moreover, “the algorithms that shape this kind of social 
media interaction are steeped within a business model that is designed to target 
individual affect and cognition in order to sell advertisements” (Leistert cited in 
Dencik and Lesitert, 2015: 4). Such algorithms, as Manovich has suggested, are at 
the heart of the material infrastructure of the twenty-first century digital media and 
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communications environment in the form of mediating datastreams (Manovich, 
2012).  
 
However, the findings of this chapter aim to move beyond a digital optimist-
pessimist dichotomy of media power implied by Leistert (2015). Rather the chapter 
demonstrates an account of the complex ways in which social media can be deployed 
effectively by activists and corporate actors while at the same time influencing the 
effects of media at a material, infrastructural level through the algorithms operating 
within a campaign. Crucially, the evidence presented in this chapter challenges 
critical notions of digital media platforms by suggesting that algorithms developed in 
pursuit of commercial objectives do not necessarily favour the corporate exploitation 
of individuals, nor do they necessarily restrict or limit the impact of digital activism. 
 
Responding to Leistert’s argument that algorithms manipulate individuals’ affective 
and cognitive experience for commercial ends it can be acknowledged that the 
animal rights activists in this case study neatly exploited the affective and cognitive 
opportunities afforded by Facebook to choreograph a widespread, distributed 
campaign against Adidas. Moreover, although it has been demonstrated that 
Facebook’s Edgerank algorithm limited the potential visibility of the activists’ 
campaign (McCarthy, 2015), it can be argued that the same algorithm produced a 
similar effect for Adidas when they posted their own official response to activists’ 
claims. This holds Adidas to account to the same media effects as the activists and 
introduces the notion that as a material media object, Facebook’s algorithms played a 
significant part in influencing the activists and Adidas’ attempts to choreograph – 
and thus (de)territorialise and code the media assemblage into an enduring media 
frame.  
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Chapter 6  
 
Case Study 3: Empirical Analysis of The Guardian’s #AskSnowden Web Chat  
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In June 2013, the UK’s Guardian newspaper published a series of stories of 
international importance that generated a seismic shift in the way that the global 
public perceived the digital surveillance operations of the UK’s Government 
Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) and the US’s National Security Agency 
(NSA). As a consequence of The Guardian’s investigations the UK and US 
intelligence services were forced to undertake radical changes to the way they 
functioned – partly in response to the disclosure of their methods and partly due to 
judicial decisions made in light of the revelations which suggested illegality 
(Ackerman & Roberts, 2014; Chadwick & Collister, 2014; Savage, 2013). 
 
The series of investigative reports were the work of an international network of 
Guardian journalists and a ‘whistleblower’, Edward Snowden, who leaked extensive 
materials covering the size, scope and processes governing the interception of digital 
communications data. This included phonecalls to internet metadata of entire UK and 
US populations in an apparent “collect it all” strategy (Chadwick & Collister, 2014). 
According to Chadwick and Collister, The Guardian’s self-styled ‘Snowden Files’ 
and ‘NSA Files’ were arguably “some of the most significant publications in the 
modern history of the American [and arguably, UK] security state” with both the 
Guardian and Washington Post (which also helped break the initial story) being 
awarded the 2013 Pulitzer Prize for public service journalism (ibid: 2422). 
 
Without doubt, The Guardian newspaper – working closely with Edward Snowden – 
broke, shaped and defined the media frame surrounding The Snowden Files. This is 
no small achievement in the contemporary digital communications environment 
where media power increasingly appears to be located in the networked spaces of 
informal media actors. Here media frames and media agendas are influenced directly 
through the empowerment of citizen journalists (Bowman & Willis, 2003; Gillmor, 
2004) or indirectly through complex and dynamic interactions with formal media 
actors (Chadwick, 2011). However, it can be argued that the innovative approach to 
news-making deployed by The Guardian during The Snowden Files stories enabled 
it to exert a contemporary form of media power. This meant The Guardian was able 
to choreograph the media objects at work in the case study in order to territorialise 
the Snowden Files media assemblage and code an enduring media frame around the 
story. This media power arguably emerges from the market-oriented economic and 
institutional position of The Guardian as a commercial media organisation, but 
crucially, also identifies and taps into the more diffuse, non-market power of digital 
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networks. In doing so, it can be argued that The Guardian strengthens its position as 
a formal news institution (and displays features of a contemporary form of media 
power) by leveraging the norms of the digital media environment typified by 
networks of grassroots, public-service oriented informal media actors.  
 
Taking this argument as its starting point, this chapter will undertake a detailed 
assessment of the #AskSnowden story as it unfolded and was driven forward by The 
Guardian and networks of informal media actors. Although a number of recent 
studies have investigated how the Edward Snowden story was framed in terms of 
language (Madison, 2014; Salvo & Negro, 2015), its comparative reception in 
different countries (Salvo & Negro, 2015) and the differences between the story’s 
portrayal across social and digital media (Qin, 2015), this chapter will use the 
empirical evidence gathered in the case study to test and validate the contemporary 
theory of media power developed in Chapter 2.  
 
In answering these research questions, the chapter will explore whether The 
Guardian’s strategic re-positioning as a dynamic, networked institutional news 
organisation enable it to function as a digitally-driven clearing house for powerful 
public interest journalism, building on the tentative model pioneered by Wikileaks 
(Chadwick and Collister, 2014: 2429; Benkler, 2011). It will also examine the 
specific ways in which The Guardian adopted and responded to the territorialising 
and deterritorialising dynamics of digital media networks while strengthening its 
institutional position to shape the ways in which the story was coded and framed – 
ultimately exerting media power.  
This analysis will be addressed through an examination of the symbolic and material 
components and processes deployed by The Guardian and the digitally networked 
actors enrolled in the media assemblage around the story. Specifically, the chapter 
will undertake a content analysis of The Guardian’s #AskSnowden initiative. This 
was an exclusive web chat that enabled the public to question Edward Snowden 
using a purpose-built live-blog hosted on The Guardian’s website. A dedicated 
Twitter hashtag was also established and promoted by The Guardian. This analysis 
will explore how networks of informal media actors were enrolled into The 
Guardian’s formal news-gathering and editorial processes and investigate the 
economic and technological affordances operating within the #AskSnowden web 
chat. The results of this analysis will aim to determine to what extent the content 
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produced and shared by the digitally-networked actors aligned with the coded 
#AskSnowden media frame produced and distributed in The Guardian’s reporting.  
The Guardian, digitally-networked journalism and media power 
 
Locating The Guardian’s creation and use of the #AskSnowden web chat as a central 
element of the reporting of the Edward Snowden leaks requires us to understand the 
historical context in which the newspaper’s reporting should be assessed. It also 
important to recognise its place in, and response to, any commercial and ideological 
renewal of news-making institutions that has occurred. 
Originally established in Manchester, in the north of England in 1821 following The 
Peterloo Massacre37, The Guardian (originally The Manchester Guardian) has, since 
its origins, been recognised as a media institution championing “journalistic freedom 
and liberal values” (The Guardian, 2002). Central to upholding these values has been 
the news organisation’s editorial independence, in turn closely linked to its financial 
independence. One of the newspaper’s early editors, C. P. Scott, asserted the belief 
that “newspapers have ‘a moral as well as a material existence’” (The Guardian, 
2015). However, balancing the demands of these two factors has proven difficult 
through-out The Guardian’s history with externalities such as a highly competitive 
media industry and declining media readerships, as well as an, at times, “naive” 
approach to business (The Guardian, 2002). As a result, The Guardian has 
consistently adopted a variety of tactics to “secure the financial and editorial 
independence” of the newspaper in order to “safeguard [its] journalistic freedom and 
liberal values” (The Guardian, 2002). 
 
One of the first attempts to address these challenges was to place the newspaper’s 
assets in trust. This was achieved in 1936 to create distance between The Guardian’s 
financial viability and the volatility of the economic market. This move also linked 
the newspapers financial expenditure to a set of foundational principles upheld by 
trustees, including: “honesty; cleanness (today interpreted as integrity); courage; 
fairness; and a sense of duty to the reader and the community” (The Guardian, 2015). 
This institutional innovation has become typical over The Guardian’s history with 
the newspaper focusing on breaking high profile, public-interest stories, adopting 
                                               
37 The Manchester Guardian was established following the notorious Peterloo Massacre (1819) in which armed 
soldiers were used to disperse a peaceful demonstration calling for parliamentary reform, held at St Peter’s Field, 
Manchester. The soldiers charged the crowd and 11 people were killed. The name ‘Peterloo’ derives from the 
name of the location and the Battle of Waterloo, which has taken place in the recent Napoleonic Wars (Vallance, 
2013). 
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innovative marketing techniques and developing new products, such as live-blogs 
and real-time web chats for readers (ibid.). Viewed in this historical and 
organisational context, it is possible to understand how the Edward Snowden leaks 
form part of an established institutional legacy at The Guardian in which the 
blending of public interest reporting with securing commercial viability is a 
dominant and enduring theme.  
 
In addition to understanding The Guardian’s historical position in the current case 
study, it is also important to consider the challenging market context in which The 
Guardian (and other institutional news organisations) finds itself. Anderson et al 
provide a guiding narrative of this "institutional decline and collapse, […] rebirth, 
and […] institutional adaptation." (Anderson, Bell, & Shirky, 2012 45). This 
typology enables an understanding of the institutional pressures and motivations that 
arguably influence the editorial and commercial decisions informing The Guardian’s 
news-making practices and thus provides an important context for the underlying 
organisational power dynamics from which the Snowden Files stories emerged.  
Underpinning journalism’s institutional decline over the past decade has been the 
internet’s disruption of complacent commercial models and sclerotic organisational 
structures (Benkler, 2011a). As Lewis notes: 
for much of the twentieth century, both the business model and the 
professional routines of journalism in developed nations were highly stable 
and successful enterprises because they took advantage of scarcity, 
exclusivity, and control. In the local information market, news media 
dominated the means of media production, access to expert source material, 
and distribution to wide audiences – which translated to tremendous 
[economic and political] capital (Lewis, 2012: 838)  
The rise of digitally networked individuals with low-cost and relatively easy access 
to media production and distribution technologies (Benkler, 2006), however, rapidly 
created “decentralised information production” and “new opportunities for [media] 
models based on neither markets nor the state for financing” (Benkler, 2011a: 49). 
The net result for professional journalism was hyper-competition among media 
institutions, “fragmentation of the audience and polarisation of viewpoints” and a 
rapidly imploding business model (ibid. note 294). 
The commercial impact of such changes is made visible in the decline in offline 
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audiences. In the UK, circulation of national newspapers fell on average 8 per cent 
year-on-year between 2009 and 2015 (Sutcliffe, 2015a); European newspaper 
circulation fell 21 per cent while US news circulation fell nine per cent between 2010 
and 2014 (Sutcliffe, 2015b). Similarly, viewing time among UK television audiences 
fell 15 per cent between 2010 and 2015 (Ofcom, 2015) while US television 
audiences fell seven per cent over the same period (Statista, 2016). 
These declines are coupled with a broadly comparable collapse in advertising 
revenues. Print advertising revenues in the United State collapsed by more than 50 
per cent between 2007 and 2013 and UK print advertising revenues fell 43 per cent 
over the same period (Enders, Watkins, & McCabe, 2015). Conversely, online 
audiences and advertising revenues have shown a marked increase within the same 
timeframe. UK online news sites have averaged 18 per cent year-on-year growth 
(Ponsford, 2016) with US online news sites averaging nine per cent year-on-year 
growth (Statista, 2015). Similarly, US digital advertising spend rose by 58 per cent 
between 2011 and 2014 (PewResearchCenter, 2014a) while UK digital advertising 
spend continued growing to represent more than 50 per cent of all newsbrand 
advertising (Glennie, 2015; Sweney, 2015). 
It should be noted, however, that despite rises in digital advertising spend the 
additional revenue appears to not be sufficient to cover overall losses (Edmonds, 
Guskin, Mitchell, & Jurkowitz, 2013). Compounding this reality are two recent 
trends further undermining advertising revenue: firstly, dominant digital corporations 
that increasingly intermediate digital content are encroaching on traditional media 
publishers’ revenues. Facebook and Google, for example, are expected to “take half 
of the total UK digital display advertising market” (Sweney, 2015).  
Secondly, the rapid growth in adoption of ad-blocking software among online 
audiences is having a significant and detrimental effect on the future viability of 
digital advertising (Sweney, 2016). Beyond the bottom-line, the news industry has 
undergone a series of symbolic crises: the size of US newsrooms’ workforces has 
fallen by a third between 2003 and 2013 (PewResearchCenter, 2014b) and even the 
UK’s Guardian newspaper faced significant job losses despite strong performance of 
its online advertising (Alpert, 2016; Spence, 2016).  
Such challenges to the media’s economic and symbolic power have exposed the 
negative impact digital disruption is having on journalism’s civic and social power. 
Scholars argue the increased competition between traditional news producers and 
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internet-enabled start-ups, bloggers and networked communities is catalysing the 
transition from a once dominant ‘Trustee Model’ of media where journalists “decide 
what news citizens should know to act as informed participants in democracy” 
(Paulussen, Heinonen, Domingo, & Quandt, 2007: 134) to a ‘Market Model’ where 
“[c]onsumer demand is the ultimate arbiter of the news product.” (Schudson, 1998: 
135). Boczkowski’s (2010) and Boczkowski and de Santos’ (2007) multi-
disciplinary study of contemporary news work in North and South America 
reinforces this notion by detailing the increased intensification of monitoring and 
imitation of content among competing news outlets resulting in a high level of 
homogenisation in the stories produced.  
Similarly, other scholars argue that the majority of online media content being 
produced for increasingly fragmented audiences is more aligned with lifestyle or 
entertainment values rather than a Habermasian civic ideal (Curran & Witschge, 
2010; Papacharissi, 2010: 112-125; Sparks, 2001). Structurally this “compression of 
the ‘news cycle’” (Newman, 2009 2) combined with newsrooms’ reduced capacities 
for quality news reporting (Currah, 2009; Davies, 2009) further limits the available 
range of sources for journalists and consequently the range of content for audiences 
(Phillips, 2010; Redden & Witschge, 2010). Thus, critics argue, despite the apparent 
“communicative abundance” (Karppinen, 2009) of the digitally networked media 
environment the range of output is arguably narrower and more homogenous than at 
any previous time. 
The proliferation of information produced in digital networks also presents 
operational challenges for contemporary journalists with implications for journalists’ 
professional identity as well as concepts of media power and gate-keeping theory in 
particular. As digital information reorients itself away from earlier narrative forms 
and towards the distinctly digitised forms of the database and “information flows”, 
(Manovich, 1999, 2012) source materials can be best understood as entering news 
gathering and production processes as "unstructured data, coming in fragments of 
raw, unprocessed journalism from both professionals and the public" requiring 
journalistic practice to shift towards “a more iterative and collaborative approach in 
reporting and verifying the news” (Hermida, 2012: 665). This necessary 
collaboration arguably diminishes the journalist’s role as powerful arbiter of news 
values and thus undermines their professional identity as trustees of democracy 
(Hermida & Thurman, 2008).  
The notion of journalists acting as powerful gate-keepers, for example, is revised by 
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Bruns (Bruns, 2003, 2005) as “gatewatching”. Gatewatching, Bruns argues, relegates 
the journalist’s once powerful role to one of merely facilitating a flow of networked 
information from a range of formal and informal; verified and unverifiable sources. 
Delli Carpini and Williams (Williams & Delli Carpini, 2004), meanwhile, go beyond 
a reconceptualisation of the gatewatching’s “facilitative” journalism by asserting that 
such processes not only diminish the civic and democratic potential of news but risk 
generating the potential for "the capture of the political agenda by arguably 
unrepresentative interests." (ibid.: 1225). Such capturing of the media agenda by 
digitally empowered citizens is made possible through the agenda-setting potential of 
blogs (Meraz, 2007, 2009) which, Meraz argues, are “redistributing power between 
traditional media and citizen media” (Meraz, 2009: 701). Similarly, such use of 
social media also provides the ability for citizens to frame and counter-frame stories 
(Cooper, 2010; Davis, 2009; Farrell & Drezner, 2008) thus creating alternative 
discourses and challenging the authority of traditional media and individual 
journalists.  
The potentially disempowering nature of collaborative news can be further extended 
to audiences where, despite the increased opportunities in online media for user 
participation and democratic deliberation in news-making, evidence suggests that 
such collaborative processes are created primarily as commercial strategies designed 
to engage readers and ensure customer loyalty (Vujnovic et al., 2010: 291-294). 
Terranova (2004: 73) argues that this form of “free labour” operates as 
“communicative capitalism” (Dean, 2010) which not only risks undermining 
journalism’s professional status in an attempt to expropriate economic value in a 
difficult commercial environment but generates “a sense of participation - a sense of 
engagement, democratic activity and contribution - without real democratic action” 
(Vujnovic et al., 2010: 295).  
The increasing integration of technology into journalistic practice creates a number 
of further challenges to normative democratic models of news due to the role played 
by technological affordances in shaping news production. This “computational” 
model of journalism (Anderson, 2012) reveals how the potential for pluralistic and 
deliberative news enhanced by digitally networked citizens is failing to be realised 
through new technologies which are instead employed to deliver more accurate 
content based on current – and even predicted - consumer demands (Anderson, 2012) 
and known as the ‘algorithmic audience’ (Roth, 2009). Similarly, the potential 
affordances of online linking – designed to enhance the diversity of source material 
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and content for readers - is similarly undermined through commercial strategies that 
reduce the presence of external links in an attempt to maximise audience value by 
preventing the exploration of alternative, potentially competitive, content (Anderson, 
2011). Technology’s role seen in such light arguably doesn’t just reduce the civic 
potential of news, but entirely defers journalistic agency to unseen non-human 
computational forms that are largely unaccountable in the news-making processes.  
The growth of technology in the news-making process, however, also offers the 
potential for journalism’s rejuvenation in the face of media’s earlier corporate 
“exclusivity and control” (Lewis, 2012: 838). This rebirth is apparent in a number of 
areas, countering the pessimistic claims of critical scholars.  Early in the evolution of 
digital technology a wave of media scholars and practitioners identified the potential 
for technology to fundamentally transform institutionalised journalism - both 
breaking media’s corporate domination and reinvigorating the ideological potential 
of the profession.  
Rosen (2006), for instance, discusses a technologically equipped citizenry – “The 
People Formerly Known as the Audience” - that is beginning to challenge the 
hitherto commoditised notions of audiences as passive “eyeballs” to sell to 
advertisers. This “former audience” is empowered to actively create and shape the 
news agenda, in turn leading Bowman and Willis (2003) and Gillmor (2006) to 
articulate the notion of an emerging ‘citizen media’. These citizen journalists, they 
assert, strengthen journalism’s democratic function by reinvigorating its power as a 
civic watchdog previously undermined by commercial imperatives (Curran, 2002).  
As the complexities of digitally mediated news-gathering and reporting became 
better understood, terms such as “citizen journalists” - which perpetuated a distinct 
and largely misplaced professional/amateur divide – evolved to recognise a more 
fluid “networked journalism” (Beckett & Mansell, 2008; Jarvis, 2006a). The notion 
of networked journalism crucially addresses the role the public plays both in 
publishing their own stories and in contributing “additional layer[s] of information 
and comment” (Newman, Dutton, & Blank, 2012: 18) as well as “corrections, 
questions, facts, and perspective” (Jarvis, 2006) to mainstream news stories. 
Such positive opportunities for the role technology can play in strengthening 
journalism’s democratic power is identified by Newman et al. (2012) who propose 
that a ‘Fifth Estate’, comprised of informal, technologically empowered media 
actors, operates symbiotically with the traditional Fourth Estate in producing 
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contemporary news. These informal and formal media actors revive journalism’s 
democratic role by providing traditional media with “a level of independence from 
control” combined with a strong adherence to the normative online values of 
transparency and openness (Newman et al., 2012: 15-16).  
Feeding this narrative, Beckett (2008) argues that networked journalism’s symbiotic 
operation is "transforming the power relationship between the media and the public" 
(ibid.: 43) by enhancing journalism’s oldest virtues, including providing 
marginalised groups with a voice and listening and responding to public needs and 
concerns and, as a result, helping increase the diversity and depth of news reporting. 
Benkler (2006) situates such normative ideals within the historical context of the 
Habermasian public sphere by proposing the existence of a new networked public 
sphere that “enables many more individuals to communicate their observations and 
their viewpoints to many others, and to do so in a way that cannot be controlled by 
media owners and is not as easily corruptible by money as were the mass media” 
(Benkler, 2006: 32). 
The strengthening of journalism’s new digital norms arguably produces beneficial 
changes in the day-to-day practice and processes of journalism. For instance, Lewis 
(2012) suggests that the values inherent in informal, networked communities, 
including: 
iteration, tinkering, transparency, and participation, each embedded in the 
open-source ethic, can be brought into the newsroom […] as a structural 
retooling of news technologies and user interfaces. (Lewis, 2012: 638) 
Such transformations can be found in the analysis of a range of phenomena prevalent 
in networked media environments that are increasingly becoming standard practices 
in news production. 
For example, Newman et al (2012) recount how the adoption of “live-blogs” - 
defined as “live conversation[s] around a big story incorporating breaking news and 
verified facts with eyewitness material and audience opinion from social media 
channels” (ibid.: 14) – by institutional media demonstrates how journalists are 
adapting to the compressed news-cycle and diverse, often unverified, content 
produced by informal media actors. By refocusing their efforts on “being the best at 
verifying and curating” (Newman, 2009: 2) information, rather than searching out 
and breaking exclusive stories, media can effectively compete with the dynamics of 
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networked news to ensure “their agendas and discussions continue to shape 
conversations around major news stories” (Newman, 2011: 6). 
As journalists participate in these new, networked spaces they begin to establish 
identities for themselves as “network nodes” (ibid.) helping them establish influence 
within digital networks and consequently building their own audience communities. 
This enables networked journalists to quickly and easily identify breaking stories, 
distribute news content, source public feedback and achieve a heightened trust 
among audiences who value the human interaction available with once elite and 
inaccessible media actors (Newman, 2011: 48).  
The technological affordances of “computational journalism” (Anderson, 2012) also 
presents practical value to contemporary newsrooms where the rise of “programmer-
journalists” (Lewis, 2012: 614) have helped develop technological tools that enable 
newsrooms to rapidly analyse the vast, yet potentially story rich, volumes of publicly 
available data to break exclusive stories or identify hitherto unknown aspects of 
existing ones. Cohen (2011) and Schudson (2010) assert that such developments 
possess the potential to reinvigorate journalism’s civic role in the contemporary 
technologically-driven news environment. Indeed, both of these trends are evidenced 
in The Guardian’s strategic adoption of digital news-making in the Snowden Files 
case. 
Finally – and perhaps most significantly for the #AskSnowden case study - while 
strengthening journalism’s democratic values, political power and professional 
integrity is important, it can be argued that without a stable and solid commercial 
foundation the future of public interest journalism is largely unsustainable. Newman 
et al. (2012) and Newman (2009) offer empirical evidence indicating that the 
increased level of networking among media organisations and journalists, such as 
that outlined above, is helping to improve content exposure and grow audiences, and 
thus increase revenues.  
Some news organisations, including The Guardian, have experimented with the use 
of new technologies to bolster business models, for example, using socially 
networked journalists and readers to distribute and share news stories (Dutton & 
Blank, 2011; Newman et al., 2012: 6); targeting growing international news 
audiences as a result of the internet’s global reach (Newman, 2011 6) and a focus on 
the recruitment and use of digital marketing specialists (Newman, 2011: 11; Owens, 
2012).  
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Perhaps the most significant story in the transformation of the media industry is the 
way in which established news institutions are adapting to the new technology 
empowered environment. Anderson et al. (2012) assert that researchers “need to ask 
how traditional news organisations are reshaping their processes to adapt to a 
changing information environment”, understand how “news institutions try to 
routinise disruption with as little change to their work processes and ideological self-
image as possible” and ultimately account for how “new institutions become old and 
stable and how old institutions become new and flexible” (Anderson et al., 2012: 47-
48). 
The Guardian newspaper is one high-profile example of a legacy institution learning 
from the dynamic, distributed, open and flexible ethos of the networked media 
ecosystem and applying such knowledge to its news-making operations. This 
approach is arguably part of The Guardian’s dedicated and strategic attempt to 
reconfigure itself as a “digital first” media institution (The Guardian, 2011) that 
undertakes “mutual journalism” (Greenslade, 2011) with the paper’s journalists and 
audience working together to co-create its output. These changes are visible in the 
organisation’s use of live-blogging to curate and aggregate breaking news stories 
(Wells, 2011), actively involving audiences in shaping the newspaper’s editorial 
agenda (Roberts, English, & Finch, 2011), hosting open Q&As with key journalists 
and key figures within news stories (The Guardian, 2013) and encouraging  
journalists to participate with audiences and sources continuously via social media to 
“weave content into the fabric of the web” (Wing, 2010).  
These emergent news-making practices are important to the development of this 
chapter’s analysis as while on the one hand they point to The Guardian’s innovative 
adaption and attempted renewal in the networked media environment, while at the 
same time they can be seen as vital to the organisation’s economic viability. Unlike 
other corporate news institutions placing content behind subscription-only paywalls, 
The Guardian has openly committed to ensuring its news reporting remains free and 
open (Ponsford & Turvill, 2015; Turvill, 2014; Viner, 2013). Such a development is 
closely related to the organisational evolution of The Guardian throughout its 
history, as discussed earlier. 
As such, it is imperative to The Guardian’s commercial viability that it seeks to 
innovate and align its news-making and publishing strategy with that of the 
networked media environment. However, this also presents a tension that while 
seeking to replicate the practices of free and open of information production typified 
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by the networked environment (Benkler, 2006: 2-7), it has also to balance these non-
market motivations with a fundamental need to earn revenue through such networked 
practices in order to remain economically viable. 
This tension is at the heart of The Guardian’s institutional renewal. For instance, has 
the newspaper’s digital-first “practice and philosophy” (The Guardian, 2011) 
approach to contemporary news-making helped it integrate and collaborate with the 
new network-powered citizen media? Or has it enabled the legacy news institution to 
leverage its traditional position as a corporate news outlet to develop and exert a 
revitalised elite media power under the ideological guise of networked or mutualised 
journalism (Charlie Beckett & Robin Mansell, 2008; Greenslade, 2011; Jarvis, 
2006b).  
#AskSnowden?: ‘News values’ versus ‘network values’  
 
Chadwick and Collister (2014) have identified a number of ways in which The 
Guardian demonstrated “mastery over the networked affordances of social media” 
(Chadwick & Collister, 2014: 2432). These include: encouraging its journalists 
writing Snowden Files stories to interact with online networks, distribute content, 
enrol a plurality of formal and informal actors in the shaping of the story and 
extensive use of ‘live-blogging’.38 Such an approach arguably helped The Guardian 
operate according to the logic of digitally-networked media by adopting media 
production practices premised on linking to and embedding third-party materials - 
practices primarily derived from the normative behaviour of bloggers and online 
communities.  
 
The most significant development in The Guardian’s use of technology to report the 
Snowden story is the way in which it used its own website to host an exclusive live 
web chat with Snowden. This web chat, known by the explicitly Twitter-friendly title 
#AskSnowden, was significant for two reasons. Firstly, the web chat itself was a 
novel and cleverly planned news-making format designed to overtly enable The 
Guardian to engage online networks that existed around the Snowden revelations. In 
fact, the newspaper itself trails the web chat as “the interview the world's media 
organisations have been chasing for more than a week, but instead Edward Snowden 
                                               
38 First developed in sports reporting, the live blogging of political news first emerged during the late 
2000s and has quickly become the most important genre for breaking news online (Thurman & 
Walters, 2013). It is typified as a hybrid newsgathering and publishing format that integrates formal 
news reporting from formal sources with the curation and presentation of user-generated information 
from informal sources. 
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is giving Guardian readers the exclusive” (Greenwald, 2013) [emphasis in original]. 
To reinforce just how exclusive the opportunity is, Glenn Greenwald, The 
Guardian’s lead journalist responsible for breaking the Snowden story, urges its 
readers: “Ask him anything” (ibid.). 
 
Secondly, The Guardian’s exclusive web chat was coordinated and managed through 
a specially created live-blog webpage on The Guardian’s website. This live-blog 
displayed a number of innovative features already discussed as indicative of 
institutional media’s adaption to and renewal in the digitally networked 
communication environment typified. Specifically, these features included a live-
blog of the #AskSnowden chat which according to Thurman and Walters is the most 
important genre for breaking news online (Thurman & Walters, 2013) in that it 
functions as a hybrid newsgathering and publishing format integrating news 
reporting from formal sources with the curation and presentation of user-generated 
information from informal sources.  
 
In addition, the #AskSnowden live-blog incorporates commenting which allows 
readers to post questions direct to the live-blog and interact with other members of 
the live-blog community. The development of The Guardian’s own digital platform 
is a significant development here in that the media institution sees it as a beneficial 
step to develop its own media platform for the web chat. Rather than relying on the 
functionality of the platform being designed by another technology company and 
having its web chat content being generated and owned by a potential competitor, 
The Guardian used its own institutional and commercially-powerful position to 
develop its own platform. As a result, The Guardian had full control of the emerging 
#AskSnowden story and was able it to choreograph and territorialise the media 
assemblage more effectively. 
 
Finally, the use of the #AskSnowden hashtag in the title of the web chat suggests an 
explicitly Twitter-friendly approach to news-gathering and production. This is 
designed to enable networked actors to engage with The Guardian’s initiative as well 
as making it easier for the live-blog coordinators to find relevant Snowden-related 
questions being asked via Twitter’s dispersed networks of users and to integrate them 
into the web chat.  
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The specifics of Twitter as a platform also need to be taken into account when 
contextualising The Guardian’s role in choreographing the #AskSnowden media 
assemblage. For example, Lapowsky (2013) has noted that one of Twitter’s 
limitations as a media platform is that its founders had found difficulty in defining its 
purpose and, therefore, its specific functionality. As a result, Twitter’s design and 
evolution was largely driven by its users focusing the platform on the production and 
sharing of multi-media, short-form messages with a highly inter-personal nature 
(MacArthur, 2018). This development potentially suits the purposes of The 
Guardian’s own online, networked #AskSnowden question and answer session. 
Firstly, Twitter offers the media publisher both an established forum for informal 
networked actors to interact with one another and discuss topical issues. Secondly, it 
is a largely community-led platform, with minimal oversight by the platform owners 
making providing The Guardian with a strong potential to co-opt and make use of 
Twitter content for its own purposes (Thompson, 2017).  
 
Despite this self-conscious approach to using social media and other forms of online 
engagement in its news-gathering and production, the question remains whether this 
was really an attempt to adapt to the networked norms of the contemporary digital 
media environment or whether this was a merely a “shrewd and strategic approach” 
(Chadwick and Collister, 2014: 2432) that gave a semblance of collaboration with 
online networked actors as part of a commercial plan. If the latter, it would mean that 
The Guardian was able to continue “controlling their source and their scoop” to 
maximise its economic position in the hyper-competitive news industry (Benkler, 
2011b: 49) in order to exert a contemporary media power. These questions are 
answered through empirical analysis of media content data generated by the 
#AskSnowden web chat – both on Twitter and The Guardian’s live-blog platform.  
 
This content was analysed and codified into themes to explore how the choreography 
and territorialisation of the media assemblage converged or diverged between the 
different formal and informal media actors operating in the case study. From the 
analysis four main themes were identified as dominant concerns within the 
#AskSnowden live-blog community (see Table 1).  
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Table 1 – Dominant themes of questions asked by #AskSnowden live-blog 
participants as a percentage of the overall community 
 
Theme As a % of the community 
Democratic implications of Snowden’s leaks 23% 
Personal privacy concerns 26% 
Operational questions about NSA systems and 
software functioned 
20% 
Personal questions directed to Snowden on a range of 
topics 
18% 
 
The first dominant theme to emerge from the reader community questions pertains to 
democracy and the democratic implications of Snowden’s actions. Within this group 
a number of sub-themes can be further identified according to whether the 
community member displayed a bias towards or against Edward Snowden.39 For 
instance, a small number (12 per cent) of democracy-oriented questions were made 
by community members with an anti-Snowden bias. These questioned Snowden’s 
decision to by-pass democratic processes and take individual responsibility to 
publicly reveal the NSA’s alleged abuses of domestic (and international) legislation.  
 
One community member, PizzaioloMike, asks: 
 
The NSA was and is, operating under the laws of the United States, as passed 
by Congress. FISA Court is in the loop and in concurrence. To me, this seems 
legal.; You signed a legally binding oath and non-disclosure agreement. You 
broke that oath and non-disclosure agreement.; So, which of the two are law-
breakers, and which should be prosecuted? (PizzaioloMike, 2013)  
 
Similarly, Reality_701 asks:  
 
How do you justify revealing operations that are not a violation of American 
law? American laws do not prohibit intelligence agencies from breaking laws 
against trespassing and computer intrusion in foreign countries for a good 
reason. You decided, on your own, that intelligence agencies should obey the 
                                               
39 Questions were coded for bias according to whether they were evidently supportive or oppositional to 
Snowden’s actions. For example, questions including praise or thanks were coded ‘Pro-Snowden’ whereas 
questions referring to Snowden as a traitor or criticizing Snowden for acting outside of the law were coded as 
‘Anti-Snowden’. Questions without evidence of judgement or opinion were coded ‘Neutral’. 
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"law as it should be according to Edward Snowden." We did not elect you. If 
you want to change the law, run for office (Reality_701, 2013)   
 
Another smaller group of questions (seven per cent) fall into a neutral category 
which consists of users requesting confirmation on previous statements made by 
Snowden. These include whether he believes members of congress to be betraying 
democracy and US citizens by being complicit in lies made to Congress by 
representatives of the NSA (JoshC2013, 2013) or whether Congress had lied to the 
US public about the 9/11 attacks (Taylor_Hatfield, 2013). 
 
The majority of questions (76 per cent), however, emerge from the Pro-Snowden 
contingent within the web chat community. Although the specifics of each question 
differ slightly, all comments made by Pro-Snowden members seek to understand 
whether Snowden believes that the NSA acted undemocratically and as a result has 
eroded civil liberties for US (and at times, global) citizens. One particular sub-theme 
emerges from community members who are concerned by the fact that the NSA and 
US government could deploy its powers of surveillance to prevent democratic 
representation and accountability being achieved. HenriBetancourt asks whether the 
NSA’s “mass surveillance is [used] to predict patterns of domestic political 
organisation beyond the Democrat/Republican scheme? [And] to get a handle on 
tendencies and certain individuals before organised movements begin to challenge 
the system?” (HenriBetancourt, 2013). Another user, daking1, asks whether the 
NSA’s mass surveillance machine could be turned on the Tea Party or Occupy 
movement to prevent political change (Daking1, 2013).  
 
The second significant theme emerging from the web chat community is the issue of 
privacy. Breaking out ‘question’ themes by Snowden-bias again reveals sub-thematic 
differences: Anti-Snowden community members (7 per cent) all question whether 
Snowden was naïve enough to believe that the NSA and US government wasn’t 
engaged in routine, mass surveillance and query his ultimate motives in leaking the 
information he has (Cram, 2013). Conversely, the neutral questions arising (15 per 
cent) all cover broader privacy concerns, such as whether citizens not suspected of 
crimes are being monitored (Rdbrewer, 2013), whether the NSA monitored delegates 
at the 2010 G20 summit (SECRETOFKOREA, 2013) and whether Snowden has 
evidence of eavesdropping on politicians or other whistleblowers’ phone calls 
(Rlewebecky, 2013). 
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Again, questions arising from supporters of Snowden’s actions make up the majority 
of the comments, with community members querying Snowden on a range of privacy 
related topics, including how – and whether – the US government can adequately 
resolve the perceived loss of privacy by US citizens. Community member Valerie 
Tongue asks if it is possible “for people to have a reasonable sense of security about 
their privacy again merely by introducing new regulation and oversight, or would 
any such effort be insufficient?” (JulienOffray, 2013) while TheSeanW asks whether 
US society can “put a premium on privacy, or has it been lost forever in the name of 
"fighting terrorism and keeping people safe"? (TheSeanW, 2013). Similarly, others 
query whether the government will seek to use Snowden’s revelations as the “perfect 
opportunity to legalise such monitoring” rather than securing the public privacy 
(ValerieTongue, 2013). 
 
If the first two dominant themes reflect the understandable public concerns of what 
Snowden’s revelations means for either individual privacy at the micro-level and 
democratic institutions at the macro-level, the third theme identified arguably 
represents an interesting development in terms of seeking out granular detail from 
Snowden as to the operation of NSA systems. This theme can be termed ‘operational 
questions’ and presents little variance in terms of content biased towards or against 
Snowden. Rather than expressing support or hostility for Snowden and his actions, 
these community members are more interested in gaining insights into how they can 
adapt their personal web behaviour and software choices to be effective against the 
NSA.  
 
Specific queries are highly technical and include whether the NSA can access Tor 
networks40 (Greenberg, 2013) or VPNs41 (Aileronica, 2013) or whether Linux is a 
more secure operating system than Windows (Moulder, 2013). A greater number of 
questions on this theme, however, are designed to uncover how the NSA’s systems 
operate. These cover topics such as what methods are used within the PRISM 
programme to trigger target surveillance, e.g. key words or behavioural patterns 
(IntegrityAboveAll, 2013; RobertClark, 2013). Also, whether NSA datasets are 
encrypted when being transferred between analysts/partner agencies (dpiUSA, 2013) 
                                               
40 Tor is free, publicly-available software designed to enable anonymous communication. 
41 VPNs are virtual private networks that offer users that have access secure and ‘private’ communications across 
a public network. 
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and to what extent the NSA are running backdoor surveillance exploits42 in the 
Linux/Unix software families (DroneTarget, 2013). Such specific and highly 
technically questions reveal a particular interest from members of the public in terms 
of how the NSA operates and, equally, suggests a that a not insignificant proportion 
of the #AskSnowden network are potentially technically-minded or software 
developers.  
 
Finally, the most prevalent theme of questions (30 per cent) from The Guardian’s 
web chat community can be those termed ‘personal’; that is questions directed at 
Snowden which are primarily intended to learn what opinions, feelings or 
preferences he holds on a range of issues. As with the operational questions, the 
nature of these questions does not seem to reflect any particular bias towards 
Snowden. Rather they seem primarily concerned with the ways in which the 
unfolding events surrounding Snowden and his flight from US law enforcement 
leaks have affected him, and his family, personally. 
 
The questions asked of Snowden range from trying to discover whether he is “afraid 
what might happen next?” (Vickifm, 2013) and, more broadly, if he has fears for the 
safety of his friends and family remaining in the US (MacGruber, 2013). Derhund1 
asks what languages he speaks and what his favourite computer game is (Derhund1, 
2013). Other questions within this theme focus more on Snowden’s motivations to 
leak the information, such as whether he went to “work with the CIA with the 
intentions of uncovering a government scandal to try to help the American people 
(JazzyJay16, 2013); why he waited until after the 2012 election before revealing the 
material (rkl3dkl, 2013) and what advice would he give to others in a similar position 
considering leaking information (jessicatesta, 2013).  
 
A smaller number of community members express an interest in how the leaks have 
impacted on his relationship with his girlfriend (Leolll, 2013; livisan, 2013) - with 
one concerned community members even asking: “Do you have a message for your 
girlfriend?” (FayeKane, 2013). Given the arguably serious or weighty topics 
emerging in previous questions’ themes, it might seem out of place for the most 
prolific question theme to be one focused on more ‘soft news’ angles. Such a reality, 
however, could be indicative of the broader trend in news-making to reflect a ‘human 
                                               
42 A backdoor exploit refers to the process of obtaining unauthorized absence to computer software or hardware. 
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interest’ angle or more entertainment-focused agenda when reporting ‘hard news’ 
(Reinemann, Stanyer, Scherr, & Legnante, 2011). Such a development has been 
identified by some scholars within digitally-networked media, despite the popular, 
idealised notion of the networked public sphere being discussed in relation to 
political and policy debate in a digital environment content (Curran and Witschge, 
2010; Papacharissi, 2010).  
 
From content analysis of the tweets featuring the hashtag #AskSnowden it becomes 
immediately clear that they are predominantly not used to take part in The 
Guardian’s web chat with Edward Snowden. From the sample of 500 tweets 
gathered for analysis, 60 per cent (n=298) do not pose a question. Of the 202 tweets 
asking questions for inclusion in The Guardian’s web chat, the two dominant themes 
featured were ‘operational questions’ (15 per cent of tweets) and ‘personal questions’ 
(33 per cent). Other themes, such as concerns over democratic implications, personal 
privacy, national security and Snowden’s location represent only between four to 
eight per cent of the dataset.  
 
This suggests a thematic overlap with the live-blog community’s interest in 
Snowden’s personal attributes and granular detail as to NSA operations. This could 
suggest that the primary role of the Twitter chat appears to contradict the notion, 
suggested by previous analyses of the #AskSnowden web chat, that Twitter would 
prove an effective way for The Guardian to “sourc[e] questions to put to Snowden” 
from the “real-time conversations emerging on Twitter around the #AskSnowden 
hashtag” (Chadwick & Collister, 2014, 2433). Rather, analysis of the 60 per cent of 
tweets not posing questions to Snowden suggests that these primarily operate as 
helping The Guardian achieve a range of promotional outcomes.  
 
For example, a meta-analysis of the tweets not posing questions, indicates that in 
terms of content, 63 per cent (n=187) of tweets were directly promotional. That is, 
they explicitly made other networked actors aware of The Guardian live web chat 
with Edward Snowden and, significantly, helped drive website traffic to The 
Guardian’s live-blog platform by posting a web link to the Q&A. Additionally, a 
large proportion of these tweets (24 per cent; n=71) feature soundbite-esque 
quotations from The Guardian’s own coverage itself. The implications of this mean 
that even if Twitter users don’t click through to the web chat itself, they have at least 
been exposed to the content that reinforces The Guardian as provider of exclusive 
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and ground-breaking journalism. In turn, this supports exposure to The Guardian’s 
brand – itself creating powerful commercial opportunities (Aaker, 2009; Bick, 2009). 
 
Looking at the functionality of these promotional tweets, 79 per cent (n=235) are 
‘retweets’43 (RTs) of other actors’ original tweets. This is further significant as it 
demonstrates that a majority of the promotional Twitter content didn’t contain 
original material – rather it acted as a promoter network raising awareness of The 
Guardian’s initiative. Again, original content here is dominated by The Guardian. 
Within these promotional retweets, 37 per cent are of The Guardian’s own tweets 
that were originally posted to raise awareness of the #AskSnowden web chat. Other 
notable promoters of The Guardian’s tweets include left-wing organisations, 
particularly those affiliated (or claiming affiliation) to the online hacker network, 
Anonymous, (Thought-Criminal, 2013), and the digitally-driven protest movement, 
OccupyWallStreet (OccupyWallStreet, 2013). 
 
Perhaps most interestingly, almost one in ten (nine per cent; n=17) of promotional 
retweets are made up of competing media organisations, ranging from contemporary, 
‘digital native’ news outlets, such as the Huffington Post and Vice, through to more 
traditional news organisations, such as the Wall Street Journal and USA Today 
(USAToday, 2013; WallStreetJournal, 2013). This reveals that The Guardian’s 
presumed strategy for enrolling informal grassroots and citizen media actors into 
news-making network to enable it to spread its content also works, albeit perhaps 
inadvertently, in enrolling more established competitive media actors to help 
promote The Guardian’s content. 
 
These findings from the close reading are further substantiated by an analysis of the 
top 100 retweeted content drawn from the complete Twitter dataset (see Table 2 and 
Table 3). These reveal that the second most retweeted actor was The Guardian 
newspaper itself; while the most common feature of the top 100 #AskSnowden 
retweets was a link to The Guardian’s web chat, representing more than half of the 
100 tweets. Similarly, the second and third most prevalent features were pithy, 
tweetable, soundbite-esque quotes from Edward Snowden himself or general 
promotional copy, such as “HAPPENING NOW: Edward Snowden is answering 
your questions http://t.co /UzrQRXst54 #AskSnowden #NSAfiles” (GuardianUS, 
2013) or “LIVE Q&A w/ Edward Snowden: NSA whistleblower answers your 
                                               
43 A ‘retweet’ refers to a Twitter post that is reposted or forwarded to a user’s own network of followers. 
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questions at 11am EST | 4pm BST http://t.co/UzrQRXst54 #AskSnowden” 
(GuardianUS, 2013).  
Table 2 – Content attributes of the top 100 retweeted #AskSnowden tweets 
Attributes from Top 100 RTs No. of tweets 
Containing link to #AskSnowden web chat 56 
Quote from #AskSnowden web chat 31 
Promoting #AskSnowden web chat 27 
Humorous question 20 
Operational question 9 
Personal question 5 
National security question 2 
Spam 2 
Criticism of Guardian 1 
 
As per the manual analysis, a significant volume of the most retweeted tweets came 
from other media outlets (n=14), including ‘hard news’ sources, such as ABC News 
and the Wall Street Journal as well as ‘soft news’ sources, such as Cosmopolitan 
magazine. Online activist groups were also prevalent in promoting The Guardian’s 
hashtag, with Anonymous and Occupy Wall Street both active in generating some of 
the most retweeted content (n=12) from the complete Twitter dataset.  
Table 3 – Most frequently retweeted actors from the Top 100 retweeted 
#AskSnowden tweets 
 
Top actors from Top 100 RTs No. of times RT’d 
Individual actors 33 
Guardian 21 
Anonymous actors 17 
Other media 14 
Online activists 12 
Spoof accounts 3 
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However, despite distributing its promotional activity to other media networks and 
online activists, analysis of the top 10 individual most mentioned sources in the 
complete hashtag dataset reveals The Guardian and affiliated contributors are highly 
active across the hash-tagged conversations. For example, Guardian sources 
represent half of the top 10 most mentioned sources within the complete 
#AskSnowden dataset, while a further third of the top sources are affiliated with the 
online activist group, Anonymous thus supporting the above findings (see Table 4).  
Table 4 – Top 10 most mentioned sources from complete #AskSnowden hashtag 
dataset 
Top 10 most 
mentioned sources 
 
Name 
Description 
@GuardianUS Guardian US 
 
Official Twitter account of the Guardian’s US 
edition 
@Guardian Guardian Official Twitter account of the Guardian’s UK edition 
@attackerman Spencer 
Ackerman 
Personal twitter account of Guardian journalist and 
contributor to the #AskSnowden web chat 
@YourAnonNews Anonymous Account representing hacktivist group, Anonymous 
@Jamesrbuk James Ball Personal twitter account of Guardian journalist and contributor to the Edward Snowden reporting 
@_cypherpunks_ Michael Unknown individual. Free speech advocate. 
@AnonGhostt N/A Unknown account. Appears to be affiliated with the Anonymous network. 
@DellCam Dell 
Cameron 
Personal twitter account of Vice journalist. Free 
speech advocate. 
@Asher_Wolf Asher Wolf 
Personal twitter account of journalist and 
campaigner against state surveillance. Guardian 
contributor. 
@TheWallenWay The Wallen 
Way Personal Twitter account of writer. and life coach. 
 
In fact, the promotional nature of the tweets dominating the #AskSnowden hashtag 
seems to have been so overwhelming that they generated a backlash from the left-
wing UK politician, Tom Watson, who tweeted: “The @Guardian is now openly 
selling a story instead of telling a story. #AskSnowden was journalistic farce. (And 
I'm a big Guardian fan).” (TomWatson, 2013) [emphasis added]. Indeed, the fact that 
such a criticism of the hashtag discussion for being too promotional receives enough 
retweets to place it in the top 100 further reinforces this finding.  
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Before delving into the thematic findings from an analysis of the #AskSnowden web 
chat answers, it is worth highlighting the narrow range of sources represented in the 
Q&A. From the 20 questions selected by The Guardian journalists coordinating the 
web chat for Snowden to answer, two of these are drawn from the 17,176 tweets 
published with the #AskSnowden hashtag, 13 are drawn from 3,845 live-blog 
comments. More significantly, five of the final 20 questions selected come direct 
from Guardian journalists reporting on the Snowden leaks. This raises pertinent 
questions about the representation of networked actors participating in the web chat.  
Given the important role in choreographing the media assemblage and coding the 
media frame around the story played by the final web chat questions, further 
questions can be asked as to what methods were adopted by the journalists 
coordinating the web chat in order to source questions from the live-blog and Twitter 
hashtag communities. Such considerations are key to understanding the context and 
underlying dynamics that influenced the ways The Guardian choreographed the 
territorialised the #AskSnowden media assemblage in ways which largely preented 
its deterritorialisation by other (opposing) actors.  
 
An important consideration to explore further is when selecting the final questions 
from its online communities and networks for Snowden to answer, did The 
Guardian’s journalists choose them according to market-based principles? Did they 
use their institutional power as a globally-recognised media organisation (one with a 
legacy of producing public-interest journalism) to choreograph a selection that 
appeared to encompass views from the “networked public sphere” (Benkler, 2006)? 
However, in reality The Guardian carefully choreographed the content selection to 
ensure a particular cohort of the Twitter network aligned with The Guardian’s 
editorial position and thus supportive of its commercial aims was chosen?  
 
Conversely, did The Guardian’s journalists select user-generated web chat content 
through a non-market choreographic process? That is, did the web chat content 
chosen territorialise the media assemblage in favour of the majority interests of the 
networked community? It can be argued that ensuring such a public interest 
choreography would have been possible through the use of technological tools 
available to The Guardian journalists and community managers working the 
#AskSnowden web chat. For example, the live-blog comment section includes a 
standard feature in The Guardian allowing users to vote up or vote down specific 
questions. By seeking out questions with the most ‘community approval’ it would be 
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possible for journalists to identify the most popular questions among the live-blog 
community. Similarly, using digital media analytics software44 The Guardian 
journalists could have identified questions popular within the #AskSnowden hashtag 
by filtering tweets according to the volume of retweets (the number of times each 
tweet has been forwarded by a particular user). Such a measure could be interpreted 
as endorsement by the community, and thus a question worthy of being included.  
 
Analysis of the final 20 questions selected for answer by Snowden reveals that a 
quarter of them were asked by Guardian journalists. In total, three journalists from 
The Guardian put questions to Snowden (including Glenn Greenwald who 
moderated the web chat). This suggests an over-representation of The Guardian’s 
own staff in the web chat, especially given that in the sample of 380 questions by the 
community the majority 95% were asked by informal rather than professional media 
actors. Moreover, in the sample of questions posted to the web chat live-blog 3% 
(n=11) were asked by rival media outlets, including Forbes, ABC News, the LA 
Times and Reuters.  
 
Thus, despite the #AskSnowden web chat being promoted by The Guardian as 
offering its readers an “exclusive” opportunity to ask “[t]he whistleblower behind the 
biggest intelligence leak in NSA history” anything (Greenwald, 2013) a quarter of 
the available questions were asked by its own reporters who had already spent 
months debriefing Snowden prior to breaking the ‘The NSA Files’ stories. This 
further supports the hypothesis that despite its appearance as carefully choreographed 
public interest journalism enrolling professional and amateur news-making networks, 
The Guardian’s #AskSnowden’s web chat seemed to be designed to engage digital 
networks primarily to mobilise them in promoting The Guardian’s content, rather 
than enable them to play a serious and well-structured role in networked news-
making.  
 
Deeper analysis of the full set of questions selected by The Guardian for Snowden to 
answer reveals a significant skew (47 per cent; n=9) to questions that are in the 
‘personal’ category, followed by ‘operational’ (21 per cent; n = 4) and then questions 
about Snowden’s choice of country in which to seek asylum (16 per cent; n = 3).45 
                                               
44 Such as that used in the collection and analysis of empirical data in this chapter 
45 Although this latter category is broken out from the larger ‘personal’ questions category it can be argued that 
there is potential overlap between these two categories if the interest in Snowden’s location is also read from a 
human-interest perspective representing a mystery ‘where is he now?’ or ‘thrill of the chase’ angle. 
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Interestingly, this latter category represents a new topic not identified as a dominant 
or popular topic for the web chat community and Twitter network.  
 
However, its presence as a relevant theme in the final questions is due to the fact that 
the three questions constituting this category were asked by The Guardian’s 
journalists. This can be interpreted as The Guardian’s reporters trying to leverage 
their exclusive access to Snowden in order to gain an advantage over competing 
news organisations which were, at the time of the web chat, preoccupied with 
ascertaining Snowden’s exact whereabouts. The operational questions broadly mirror 
the granular interest in NSA processes and protocols, such as defining how “direct 
access” operates (DeRosa, 2013), what processes were in place to allow wiretaps 
(MonaHol, 2013) and whether email encryption is effective against NSA 
surveillance, as expressed by The Guardian’s community (Mathius1, 2013). 
 
Focusing analytical attention on the ‘personal’ coded questions it is possible to see a 
distinct overlap between the most dominant theme of user queries both within the 
final #AskSnowden Q&A as well as the web chat community. As with the online 
community, these questions are primarily designed to gauge Snowden’s opinions, 
feelings or motivations on a number of topics, but predominantly personal or family-
related subjects. For example, AhBrightWings asks Snowden: 
 
given the enormity of what you are facing now in terms of repercussions, can 
you describe the exact moment when you knew you absolutely were going to 
do this, no matter the fallout, and what it now feels like to be living in a post-
revelation world? (AhBrightWings, 2013) 
 
Adding to the line of questioning about Snowden’s personal opinion, tikkamasala 
[sic] asks: “So far are things going the way you thought they would…” (tikkamasala, 
2013) while D. Aram Mushegian II seeks clarity about Snowden’s claims regarding 
his previous salary:  
 
Did you lie about your salary? What is the issue there? Why did you tell 
Glenn Greenwald that your salary was $200,000 a year, when it was only 
$122,000 (according to the firm that fired you.) (D.AramMushegianII, 2013) 
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Moreover, where other questions arise that seek to address the more ‘hard news’ 
topics which were also dominant within the community’s questions, such as the 
democratic implications of Snowden’s revelations or concerns over personal privacy, 
it can be argued that these questions too incorporate a personal – or ‘human interest’ 
– dimension. The American journalist and hacker, Jacob Appelbaum46, seeks to 
ascertain whether Snowden believes in the ability of the democratic process to 
adequately deal with Snowden’s whistle-blowing activities. 
 
He asks: “Do you believe that the treatment of Binney, Drake and others influenced 
your path? Do you feel the "system works" so to speak? #AskSnowden” 
(JacobAppelbaum, 2013). Rather than filtering his query through the efficacy of 
Congress, US legislation or the political process to adequately deal with Snowden’s 
actions, he cites other high-profile or ‘celebrity’ whistleblowers, William Binney and 
Thomas Drake, (O'Cleirigh, 2014; Welna, 2014) to understand Snowden’s personal 
motivations in leaking top secret material. User, ActivistGal, makes a similar 
comparison between Snowden and celebrity whistleblowers, Daniel Elsberg and 
Chelsea [Bradley] Manning, (Ricks, 2013) in seeking to understand Snowden’s 
personal motivation:  
 
You have said […] that you admire both Ellsberg [sic] and Manning, but 
have argued that there is one important distinction between yourself and the 
army private... "I carefully evaluated every single document I disclosed to 
ensure that each was legitimately in the public interest," […] Are you 
suggesting that Manning indiscriminately dumped secrets into the hands of 
Wikileaks and that he intended to harm people? (ActivistGal, 2013) 
 
Taken together it is evident that in general terms the two dominant themes of 
questions that is, ‘personal’ and ‘operational’, selected by The Guardian for the 
#AskSnowden web chat broadly align with two of the four dominant themes 
identified in the web chat community and online networks. However, it is pertinent 
to note that the other two dominant themes to be found in the web chat community 
questions, i.e. the democratic implications of Snowden’s leaks and individuals’ 
concerns about personal privacy do not feature substantially in The Guardian’s final 
                                               
46 It should be noted that this question, while relevant to the analysis, is posted by an independent journalist, 
hacker and digital privacy activist, Jacob Appelbaum, who has been previously involved with the Wikileaks 
website and digital privacy tool, Tor. In 2016 Appelbaum left Tor following accusations of sexual misconduct, 
although as of 2018 no charges have yet been brought (Farivar, 2016). While the question posted as part of the 
#AskSnowden web chat remains relevant, the context surrounding the user should be recognized. 
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Q&A. One interpretation of this finding is that such editorial priorities made by The 
Guardian fit the pattern of the rise in the ‘human interest’ or ‘celebrity politics’ 
angles for soft news stories (Cushion & Franklin, 2015 71). 
 
Adopting the terminology put forward by this thesis’ theoretical approach to 
contemporary media power, it can be argued that The Guardian carefully 
territorialises the #AskSnowden media assemblage to meet its own formal, 
institutional aims, while producing the appearance of the assemblage’s 
territorialisation by the networks of informal media actors acting in the public 
interest. Further supporting this line of argument – and pointing to the ways in which 
The Guardian territorialised - and ultimately coded - the #AskSnowden media 
assemblage is the way it choreographs the selection of the media content produced 
during the web chat. As is shown in the empirical analysis above, the questions being 
asked in both the web chat and on Twitter, and those that The Guardian chose to put 
to Snowden show a strong divergence between topics. Those gaining prominence in 
the final media produced by The Guardian is ultimately useful to its commercial 
aims, rather than those topics pertinent to the online community. 
 
Celebrity whistle-blowing and soft news: economic influences in the 
#AskSnowden media assemblage  
 
In recent decades media scholars have demonstrated how news reporting in the West 
has shifted in theme and tone from “hard news” to “soft news” (Barnett, Gaber, & 
Ramsay, 2012; Cushion & Franklin, 2015). Such a shift is characterised by a 
displacement of stories about “major issues, or significant disruptions in the routines 
of daily life” with news focusing on “celebrities, human interest […] and other 
entertainment-centred stories” (Reinemann, Stanyer, Scherr, & Legnante, 2011: 
224).  
 
Furthermore, coverage of political and international affairs stories has not escaped 
this trend, in turn giving rise to a “celebrity politics” (Marsh, Hart, & Tindall, 2010; 
West & Orman, 2002). This can be understood as an increasing “tabloidisation” of 
news coverage with the lines between news, information and entertainment 
becoming blurred, causing politics to become a form of “entertainment and 
spectacle” where political figures “become celebrities and […] are packaged and 
sold like the products of the culture industry” (Kellner, 2015 114). Moreover, such 
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figures are “increasingly covered in the same way as celebrities, with tabloidised 
news media […] obsessing about their private lives” (ibid.). 
 
While it may not be entirely fair to argue that The Guardian’s coverage of the 
Snowden materials was tabloid-esque given the wide-ranging and substantial impacts 
the news outlet’s reporting had on legal, political, policy and intelligence spheres on 
a global scale (Chadwick & Collister, 2014: 2422), it is certainly possible to observe 
that even such major reporting has been influenced by the softening effects of the 
commercially-driven forces of contemporary news-making.  
 
The Guardian’s selection of ‘personal’ questions for the final #AskSnowden web 
chat designed to ascertain Snowden’s personal feelings about whether he felt his 
whistleblowing was “going the way [he] thought they would” (tikkamasala, 2013); 
what advice he might have for other “wannabe” whistleblowers (Latvaitis, 2013); the 
comparisons with other ‘celebrity’ whistleblowers such as Binney, Drake, Elsburg 
and Manning, all seem to suggest a territorialisation of the #AskSnowden media 
assemblage and, ultimately, coding of the media frame around the story and its main 
protagonist through a celebrity politics lens.  
 
This argument is further evidenced by the way The Guardian intentionally developed 
a sense of entertainment around its coverage of Snowden’s leaked materials by 
‘packaging’ the stories on dedicated parts of The Guardian’s website, rather than just 
within the news section. Moreover, each packaged section of the story was given 
what Chadwick and Collister term “the filmic banners The NSA Files and The 
Snowden Files” suggesting that even such events of global significance can be 
“packaged and sold” as part of an entertainment-driven media industry (Kellner, 
2015: 114). 
 
This is significant as it means that the territorialisation and coding of the 
#AskSnowden assemblage by The Guardian’s choreography around the leaked 
Snowden materials differs substantially from that being choreographed by the 
networked web chat and Twitter communities. While the prevalence of ‘personal’ 
questions asked by the web chat community can’t be overlooked, it must be noted 
that this category of questions is one of four dominant themes each representing a 
broadly comparative volume of questions.  
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While a section of the online community was interested in the human-interest 
dimensions behind Snowden’s actions, overall the community was more concerned 
with finding out what implications the NSA’s activities had for democratic 
institutions in the US and overseas; what impact Snowden’s revelations had on 
individual freedoms and personal privacy and technical detail as to how the NSA’s 
surveillance programmes operated (and how to circumvent them). Moreover, there 
were attempts – albeit limited – visible in the data to deterritorialise The Guardian’s 
choreographing of the media assemblage, such as the complaint by the British 
politician, Tom Watson, of The Guardian “selling” its rendering of the story, rather 
than reporting it (TomWatson, 2013).  
 
However, it is not simply the case that the economically materialist dynamics of the 
media industry are responsible for The Guardian’s choreography of the 
#AskSnowden assemblage. It is also important to recognise that this was achieved as 
part of a two-pronged strategy that used digital media and online networks to both 
choreograph, territorialise and code the media frame around the #AskSnowden story 
and then disseminate that media frame around the world using globalised media 
networks. As identified above, the first of such strategic moves was made by The 
Guardian’s overt enrolment of online networks into the story. By opening up the 
Q&A web chat to Twitter users already engaged in following and debating 
Snowden’s revelations via various hashtags and building its own community within 
the dedicated live-blog platform on its website established to host the debate, The 
Guardian explicitly adopted tactics designed to maximise participation.  
 
Firstly, the newspaper offered networked media actors an exclusive opportunity to 
help it co-create (and, thus, territorialise the story. This leverages the non-market 
currency of social capital, arguably the primary motivation for choreographing 
online networks (Benkler 2006: 95; 117). Secondly, The Guardian adopted a much 
more contemporary tactic to drive participation by networked actors: it established 
itself as what appears to be a digitally-native news platform (i.e. its live-blog and 
web chat) within a networked online environment helping it earn credibility and trust 
among broader networks of informal online media actors. In turn, this increased 
network actors’ propensity to fulfil tasks outside of the scope of traditional news 
organisations including contributing to stories, fact-checking and distributing content 
(Thurman, 2013; Thurman & Walters, 2013).  
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From the media content analysis comparing networked communities’ contributions 
to the live-blog and Twitter hashtag against The Guardian’s final selection of web 
chat questions put to Snowden, the evidence outlined in the section above suggests a 
strong divergence between online networks’ interest in the democratic and privacy 
implications of the story as opposed to Snowden’s personal motivations selected by 
The Guardian. This is reinforced by the over-representation of questions from 
Guardian journalists in the final web chat combined with the editing out of those 
from competitive media organisations. Taken together, this points to the fact that 
there is a distinct commercial agenda driving the choreography and territorialisation 
of the media assemblage, ultimately coding the media frame as a ‘soft news’-based 
celebrity whistleblower story. As a consequence, it can be argued that such evidence 
represents more closely the narrow, selective, commercially-driven media production 
and distribution model of traditional, institutional media power, rather than the more 
open, networked, collaborative, socially-driven and non-market motivated media 
power idealised in concepts such as “networked journalism” (Jarvis, 2006b) and the 
“networked public sphere” (Benkler, 2006: 10-12). 
 
While these findings are useful in pointing out some of the limitations with 
optimistic accounts of digitally-networked media power (Bimber, 2003; Bennett, 
2003b; Castells, 2009; McNair, 2006) or conversely providing an account of the 
opportunities for the digital renewal of institutional media power (Anderson et al., 
2012; Chadwick and Collister, 2014)], it can be further argued that The Guardian not 
only exerts a contemporary media power to enrol and choreograph networked actors 
in territorialising and coding the #AskSnowden media frame but moreover uses the 
same networks in marketing and promotion of The Guardian – further supporting its 
commercial agenda (Chadwick and Collister, 2014: 2434). 
 
Based on this evidence it can be argued that the coded #AskSnowden media frame 
choreographed and territorialised by The Guardian is heavily influenced by an 
economic materialism. This can be interpreted in symbolic terms – that is, the way 
media content produced and published diverges from the democratic and privacy 
interests of the networked media actors and instead territorialises the story around a 
soft, ‘human interest’ news agenda. It can also be understood from a digital 
materialist perspective in that The Guardian is able to leverage its organisational 
resources and capital to build its own digital platform, arguably making it easier for 
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The Guardian to design and control the technological affordances at play. This 
enables it to choreograph the flow of media objects in, and around, the story.  
 
As a consequence, by territorialising the media assemblage to its own agenda and 
coding the assemblage into a media frame advantageous to achieving commercial 
outcomes, the opportunity then emerges for The Guardian to leverage its network of 
engaged media actors to embed and distribute the coded media frame around the 
world through their own distribution networks. The impact of this can be recognised 
through the dominance of The Guardian’s soft news media frame appearing in 
analyses the Snowden story across the UK, US and Chinese media (Madison, 2014; 
Salvo & Negro, 2015: 7-9).  
 
From the empirical evidence in the case study, then, it can be concluded that The 
Guardian exerts a contemporary media power. Moreover, the empirical evidence 
suggests that although The Guardian adopts a hybridised approach to news-gathering 
and media production, this is not choreographed by networks of informal media 
actors. Rather The Guardian uses its institutional resources and organisational power 
is used to out-flank (Clegg, 1989) informal networked information flows allowing it 
to choreograph and territorialise the media assemblage to its own – commercial - 
agenda.  
 
Such results open up a number of interesting conclusions. It can be argued, for 
example, that while the analytical pillars of hybridity, materiality and choreography 
are all present in the creation of the #AskSnowden media assemblage, the dynamics 
through which it emerges and the role that these factors play in coding the 
assemblage into a media frame is predominantly determined by the institutional 
media actors in the case study. This is significant as it provides a counter-balance to 
the optimistic perspectives of media power which view digitally-networked media as 
possessing intrinsic potential for disruption and an upending of traditional, that is 
largely commercial (or state-based) motivations under-pinning media power 
(Williams and Delli Carpini, 2004; Benkler, 2006; McNair, 2006; Tewksbury and 
Rittenberg, 2009). Rather, the empirical evidence analysed in this chapter suggests 
that while contemporary media power is complex and emergent, it remains open to 
co-option and out-manoeuvring by institutional media and may well play a part in 
the media industries’ wider renewal (Chadwick and Collister, 2014).  
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Recognising the potential for a reconfiguration of institutional power in networked 
societies, Castells (2009) has provided a useful approach to reading some of the 
phenomena discussed in relation to The Guardian’s possible adaptation and renewal. 
In Communication Power (2009) Castells asserts that: 
 
In a world of networks, the ability to exercise control over others depends on 
two basic mechanisms: (1) the ability to constitute network(s), and to 
program/reprogram the network(s) in terms of the goals assigned to the 
network; and (2) the ability to connect and ensure the cooperation of different 
networks by sharing common goals and combining resources, while fending 
off competition from other networks by setting up strategic cooperation 
(Castells, 2009 45) 
 
The two mechanisms in turn give rise to two types of power holders that are termed 
‘Programmers’ and ‘Switchers’ respectively. Crucially, for Castells, “[s]witching and 
programming […] networks are […] forms of exercising power in our global 
network society” (ibid.: 52). Furthermore, Switcher and Programmer roles are not 
identifiable a priori owing to the complex material and human interactions within 
Latourian “actor-networks” (Latour cited in Castells 2009: 45). Thus, the act of 
programming and switching networks is wholly dependent on a range of forces and 
components (not purely economic ones) that are identifiable in each individual case.  
 
By recognising the symbolic-material complexities of networked actors  
Castells’ approach takes into account the fuller range of material (i.e. economic, 
technological, spatial, etc) components as well as the symbolic (image, text, 
interpersonal communication, etc) ones, thus moving beyond the symbolic-material 
(economic) dichotomy of previous analyses of the media industry. Crucially, such a 
notion helps confirm a central tent of the revised theory of media power established 
in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Moreover, being able to locate and explore the current 
case study from the perspective of media actors operating as Switchers or 
Programmers can potentially add further detail to an understanding of how the 
dynamics of contemporary media power, identified as choreography and 
(de)territorialisation in the thesis’ analytical model, operate. 
 
For example, it can be argued that The Guardian’s choreography of media actors and 
media objects around the #AskSnowden story displays characteristics of both 
switching and programming. By establishing its own live-blog platform to host and 
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contain its web chat and creating and promoting the #AskSnowden hashtag on 
Twitter The Guardian effectively created a “cultural and organisational interface, a 
common language [and] a common medium” (Castells, 2009: 52) with which the 
networked actors discussing the Snowden story could coalesce.  
 
Such an approach is essential, Castells argues, for switching networks and networked 
actors. In this instance, the case study evidence suggests that The Guardian designed 
the #AskSnowden initiative as a way to act as a focal point for – and ultimately to 
attract - the globally connected and ideologically diverse networks of actors. It is 
visible, for example, in the way The Guardian positions the web chat as an approach 
to news-making that explicitly seeks to integrate the wider networks of informal 
actors by telling the public, the web chat is the “interview the world's media 
organisations have been chasing for more than a week, but instead Edward Snowden 
is giving Guardian readers the exclusive” (Greenwald, 2013) [emphasis in original].  
 
Such promotional language and design, it can be surmised, are planned to attract the 
public’s attention and ensure their awareness of, and participation in, the web chat 
and its rapid spread through digital networks. Beyond the way in which the interview 
is communicated, the titling of the web chat ‘#AskSnowden’ further demonstrates 
the ways in which The Guardian instinctively taps into and switches the prolific 
Twitter networks discussing the story to its own hashtag. Moreover, while it can’t 
directly control the conversations taking place on Twitter’s third-party platform, the 
creation of its own live-blog enables The Guardian to switch Twitter users (and other 
online actors) to its own, purpose-built online space.  
 
Next, once these networks have been switched to the #AskSnowden web chat 
community, The Guardian then displays its network programming power to 
territorialise the media objects being created and shared to territorialise the 
assemblage and code a soft-news media frame – which is arguably more appealing to 
the public and therefore commercially appealing to The Guardian (Marsh, Hart, & 
Tindall, 2010; Reinemann, Stanyer, Scherr, & Legnante, 2011). Such programming 
can be seen in the way that, although it encourages networked actors to ask Snowden 
“anything” (Greenwald, 2013) [emphasis added], the empirical analysis of the case 
study suggests that The Guardian selectively chooses a narrower range of topics 
suited to its interests than those posed by the switched networks.  
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Moreover, The Guardian then uses this ‘soft’ media frame to choreograph and 
program the networked media actors it has switched to further promote The 
Guardian’s content and its role as a public interest news producer. This is achieved 
by leveraging the networks’ interest in the #AskSnowden story as hard-news and 
political reporting par excellence and encouraging the networks to share and 
distribute The Guardian’s commercially advantageous narrative to a global audience 
under the guise of public interest journalism, ultimately strengthening its commercial 
position in a highly competitive business environment and suggesting that an 
economic materialist logic continues to influence and shape the seemingly socially-
motivated, networked public sphere (Benkler 2006: 2-7). 
 
While this may be partly accounted for by the “digital savviness” expected of its 
journalists by The Guardian (Wing, 2010), it can also be aligned with The 
Guardian’s organisational legacy context (outlined above) whereby throughout its 
history it has sought to use innovation to overcome challenging economic conditions. 
The same can be argued here, as, Viner notes: “the business model of most digital 
news organisations is based around clicks [and] frenzied binge-publishing, in order 
to scrape up digital advertising’s pennies and cents” (Viner, 2016). The empirical 
evidence analysed in this chapter arguably demonstrates that The Guardian was 
shrewdly blurring its commercially-motivated media production practices with its 
public interest journalism in order to ensure the organisation’s financial viability 
(Chadwick and Collister, 2014: 2432).  
 
In fact, The Guardian’s enrolment and co-option of digital networks in pursuit of 
commercial motivations while creating the semblance of grassroots, networked and 
collaborative news-production (Charlie Beckett & Robin Mansell, 2008; Jarvis, 
2006b) may indicate a further interesting feature of contemporary media power. That 
is, despite arguments for the democratising and emancipatory effects of digitally-
networked media identified in Chapter 2, instead of becoming transformed by non-
market-oriented networks of media actors, traditional economic materialist 
motivations of corporate media have instead begun to adapt to the contemporary 
media landscape and, moreover, have co-opted, switched and (re-)programmed 
public interest news production as a commercially-motivated soft news, confirming 
some critical scholars’ early hypotheses (Dean, 2010; Terranova, 2004; Vujnovic et 
al., 2010).    
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Despite this reading, however, Castells is clear that within networks “there is no 
unified power elite capable of keeping the programming and switching operations of 
all-important networks under its control” (Castells 2009: 47). This further renders a 
straight-forward interpretation of the space where the commercial logic of legacy 
media meets networked media problematic. Rather, “more subtle, complex, and 
negotiated systems of power enforcement must be established” (ibid.). This is visible 
in the #AskSnowden case study, for example, when within The Guardian’s live-blog 
community there is evidence of meta-discussions taking place where individual users 
initiate and choreograph their own debates, share information and generally help 
each other make sense of – that is, territorialise - the wider story (Erikson, 2013; 
Hunt, 2013; Smyth, 2013). Similarly, a variation of this phenomenon can be 
identified in the Twitter network. Rather than sharing or forwarding content about or 
generated by The Guardian, a number of actors try to choreograph their own 
discussions and, significantly, attempt to de-territorialise The Guardian’s 
choreography of the story and its promotion by injecting inane, facetious and 
humorous questions into the hash-tagged content.47  
From The Guardian’s perspective, too, there is evidence that the economic influence 
on the territorialisation and coding of the #AskSnowden media frame is not as 
intentional as it might appear. Rather the legacy institutional processes and wider 
economic motivations of the hyper-competitive news industry may act as 
determining forces in the choreography of the media assemblage. For example, 
interviews with employees of The Guardian suggest that its standard practice for 
gathering news content from networked actors were not shaped by particular 
editorial or commercial agendas (Cummins, 2016; Freeman, 2016). Furthermore, as 
Bimber has demonstrated, the disruptive potential of networked communications 
means that even institutions with the best intentions of integrating networks into non-
networked legacy processes effectively are likely to find this difficult (Bimber, 
2000). 
 
 
 
 
                                               
47 Taking this further, such content could, perhaps, be seen as a strategic deployment of trolling (the 
act of intentionally offending or upsetting internet users) in order to switch the Guardian dominated 
network back to the non-market driven grassroots. Strategically planned uses of trolling have been 
recently noted for political purposes. See: (Seddon, 2015; Spruds et al., 2016).  
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Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, then, the empirical analysis conducted in this chapter indicates that the 
choreography and territorialisation of the #AskSnowden case study into a coded   
media frame is shaped predominantly by formal media actors and institutional media 
imperatives. Thus, the evidence of contemporary media power primarily appears to 
be shaped by an economic materialism, despite the enrollment in the media 
assemblage of hybridised networks of informal media actors motivated by non-
market forces. While the commercial motivations of news and media production and 
its relationship with media power is not a new scholarly notion (indeed, Marx and 
Engels noted such a relationship (Marx and Engels, 1932)) the empirical evidence 
analysed in this chapter allows a re-interpretation of these dynamics as more 
complex and nuanced factors influencing media power.  
 
Crucially, however, while the empirical evidence in the case study recognises the 
continued importance of economic materialism in shaping the coded media frame, 
this materialism nevertheless works within a hybrid media landscape where media 
power is diffused through digitally-networked actors and contingently shaped by 
technological affordances. This enables a move beyond deterministic approaches to 
economic materiality within the context of contemporary media power.  
 
Similarly, there are also attempts in the case study where informal, networked media 
actors to reterritorialise the #AskSnowden media assemblage by creating their own 
“cultural and organisational interface[s]” (Castells, 2009: 45). This is achieved 
through the formation of “hard news” meta-communities within The Guardian’s 
live-blog or adoption of Twitter trolling as a cultural phenomenon to disrupt The 
Guardian’s promotional content. Thus, although it can be concluded firmly from 
analysis of the empirical data that contemporary media power in the case study is 
influenced by the economic materialism of The Guardian’s institutional legacy, it is 
important to recognise that the data also suggests that The Guardian’s economic 
motivations do not have an a priori advantage in the choreography and 
territorialisation of the coded #AskSnowden media frame.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
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This thesis set out to make an original contribution to knowledge by advancing both 
a new theoretical perspective and empirical exploration of the field of contemporary 
media power. It aimed to do this by answering three research questions: 1) what 
could a revised theory of media power look like given the transformations that have 
occurred within the media landscape over recent years? 2) can an analytical model be 
developed that will allow researchers to effectively identify and analyse 
contemporary media power? 3) can the analytical model of contemporary media 
power developed in RQ2 be validated through empirical analysis? This chapter will 
firstly review the thesis’ original contribution to knowledge by reviewing each 
chapter and how each of the research questions have been answered. Secondly, it 
will provide a discussion of findings and highlight potential directions for future 
research. 
 
Main findings of the thesis 
 
A revised theory of contemporary media power  
In addressing the thesis’ first research question a review of relevant literature 
examining conceptual developments in both political, sociological and philosophical 
approaches to power and media power was undertaken. This review highlighted the 
convergences and divergences between each field with the resulting assessment 
being used to establish a ‘shape’ – that is, the constituent parts, operational forces 
and boundaries - of what a contemporary theory of media power might look like.  
 
The first step in developing this revised theory of media power was to establish how 
media power is currently understood. Chapter 1 provided the definition of media 
power adopted in the thesis as a “definitional, analytical, and interpretive authority” 
(Freedman, 2015: 273) that functions by processing and creating meaning within 
society (Hackett and Carroll, 2006: 27) and, ultimately, “by framing what we take in, 
providing context and understanding and creating understandings that shape attitudes 
and action” (Russell, 2016: 143). Building on this definition the ways in which 
media power operates was reviewed to map “the relationships—between actors, 
institutional structures, and contexts—that organise the allocation of the symbolic 
resources necessary to structure our knowledge about […] the world around us 
(Freedman, 2014: 274). 
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Taking these foundations as representative of the boundaries and constituent parts of 
media power, Chapter 2 surveyed the broader political, sociological and 
philosophical traditions of power and discussed their inter-relation with the 
development of approaches to media power. This review argued that discussions of 
media power have largely remained locked in the liberal-critical dichotomy. As 
Gillespie, Boczkowski & Foot (2014) have noted “[m]ore often than not” media 
power scholarship has “borrowed conceptual and theoretical lenses developed in 
earlier studies of traditional print and broadcast media” (Gillespie, Boczkowski & 
Foot, 2014: 2).  
 
To move beyond such a perspective, a revised theory of media power was developed 
addressing the above concerns. Firstly, given the rapid rise of digitally-networked 
media the thesis builds on Chadwick’s exploration of an “increasingly congested, 
complex, and polycentric […] hybrid media system” (Chadwick, 2013) in which 
older, traditional and newer, digital media logics and actors inter-relate, rather than 
supersede one another. As identified in Chapter 2 this shift in the context of media 
power from a formal, institutionally dominated media landscape to a hybridised, 
polycentric one where the ability to produce, distribute and consume media – and 
thus the potential to exert media power – has become diffused across the social realm 
represents one of the over-arching characteristics of contemporary media power.  
 
Chapter 2 also articulates an account of hybridity as the shift from mass 
communication to mass self-communication (Castells, 2009) – or more specifically, 
the move from a “mass media” to “networked media” logic. This is typified as a 
coming together of institutionally-coordinated formal media actors producing media 
content according to rigid news values designed to appeal to mass audiences (Curran, 
2003; Benkler, 2006: 176-180) with more fluid, networks of informal media actors 
producing media content largely selected according to personal (or wider group) 
interests.  
 
In this context, the scalability and speed of media content distribution becomes 
transformed based on the size, inter-connectedness and personal commitment of 
networked, informal media actors which, when compared to the often bureaucratic or 
commercial models of formal media, can produce and share media content more 
rapidly than mass media logics traditionally allow (Klinger and Svensson, 2014). 
Moreover, this quantitative shift is premised on a qualitative change in media 
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production motivations. As noted above, whereas institutional media are motivated 
and structured around commercial or public interest effects, the informal networks of 
digitally-enabled media production are much more motivated by social or cultural 
drivers (Benkler, 2006).  
 
The second major divergence between social power and media power identified in 
Chapter 2 and which required resolving was the importance of a neo-materialism. 
This was addressed by developing an approach to media power that takes account of 
both the symbolic as well as material aspects of media – their “front-end” and “back-
end” (Russell, 2016: 149). The thesis argues that a range of material qualities need to 
be incorporated in a contemporary theory of media power, including algorithms, 
hyperlinks, bodily interaction and physical place and spaces.  
 
The importance of such material qualities in contemporary society is addressed by 
Lash (2007) who highlights the increasing role of digital technology in shaping 
social relations. For example, to understand how media power is exerted in a 
digitally-networked society it is important to look beyond the creation and 
distribution of symbolic content. Rather, given the extent of media technologies 
adopted by formal and informal actors, media power can be said to operate according 
to (and in accordance with) parameters established by a range of context-dependent 
material objects and infrastructures. As a result, whereas media power was once 
exerted through the control or management of production, distribution or 
consumption of symbolic content produced by formal media actors and institutions, 
it now requires a more complex and fluid choreography (Gerbaudo, 2012) of 
symbolic content as well as the material relationships, physical infrastructures and 
digital technologies in the extended, networked social realm (Lash, 2007: 66). 
 
By acknowledging the hybridity of media functioning across networks of older and 
newer, formal and informal actors and organisational structures as well as the 
contextually dependent affordances generated by media’s materiality, the thesis next 
developed an analytical model with which to empirically analyse and validate this 
revised account of media power.  
 
An analytical model of contemporary media power 
Having mapped out the potential shape of contemporary media power, next the thesis 
sought to develop an analytical model which I could test with empirical evidence. In 
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answering this research question the ontological status of contemporary media power 
was presented and developed using the neo-materialist notion of assemblages 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987), and Assemblage Theory (DeLanda, 2006) in particular. 
The ontological framework allows for the recognition of both the symbolic and 
material media objects operating in media production, distribution and consumption. 
It also allowed for the adoption of hybridised roles and behaviours of media actors 
across a spectrum of formal to informal. It focused on the ways media actors inter-
relate, become enrolled in a media assemblage and organise symbolic and/or material 
media objects into coherent patterns through processes of (de)territorialisation. 
Finally, it allows us to account conceptually for the stabilisation of these networked 
actors, processes and objects into ‘coded’ media assemblages that provide a 
consistent and enduring interpretation of events.  
 
Building on this conceptual context, the analytical model I operationalised in the 
thesis’ empirical analyses set out the who, what, how and why of contemporary 
media power and synthesised these into four central analytical pillars: hybridity, 
materiality, choreography and coding.  
 
Empirically validating contemporary media power 
The third and final research question addressed in the thesis was whether the revised 
theory of contemporary media power developed in RQ1 can be validated through 
empirical analysis using the analytical model in Chapter 3. This analysis was 
undertaken in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 where three case studies were investigated through 
ethnographic, media content and interview data based on the four pillars of the 
analytical model – hybridity, materiality, choreography and coding.  
 
I now review the role played by each of the pillars in the case studies and the scale at 
which they operated.  
 
Hybridity, Materiality, Choreography and Coding in Action Across the Three 
Case Studies 
 
Hybridity 
The case studies’ empirical findings confirm the presence of media hybridity. 
Information flows from, and among, digitally-networked participants were 
interpolated into formal news reporting and media production through relations of 
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interdependence among traditional institutional and informal actors. This builds on 
and augments other scholars’ work exploring such emerging media practices in other 
contexts, such as collaborative news production using information sourced or 
“mined’ from digitally-networked flows (Beckett & Mansell, 2008; Chadwick, 2013; 
Hermida, 2012; Malika & Pfeffera, 2016; Martin, Corney, & Goker, 2015; Vis, 
2013; Wall & Zahed, 2015). For example. the Demo2012 case study offers an 
analysis of the specific practices deployed by the NUS to strategically influence the 
public and political agenda by choreographing the media assemblage through formal 
methods (such as press releases, ‘newsworthy’ surveys and exclusive media 
briefings) as well as the engagement and coordination of more informal, networked 
media actors, such as local student unions, affiliated institutional actors and 
sympathetic online networks (Pool, 2014).  
 
In addition, the Demo2012 case study also provides insight on the ways through 
which the institutional media reported the NUS’s initial position and the subsequent 
demonstration in real-time through the use of live-blogs, which acted as a clearing 
house for informal and formal media content produced during the demonstration. On 
this point, the case study reveals two significant empirical findings that demonstrate 
the tension between attempts to choreograph dynamic and fluid networks of informal 
media actors. 
 
On the one hand the NUS established a formal relationship with The Guardian’s 
live-blogging team which meant that the NUS’ media team agreed to cross-promote 
Guardian live-blog content to its own informal networks (ibid.). This reciprocal 
relationship is mutually beneficial in that it enables The Guardian to extend the reach 
of its news content among informal networks while helping the NUS to territorialise 
the media assemblage towards its own agenda through the selection and re-
circulation of pro-demonstration content. 
 
On the other hand, however, the case study demonstrates how the NUS’ formal 
media actors struggled to react effectively to the negative shift in sentiment towards 
the NUS curated by the live-blog and other sources of real-time reporting. This 
began to deterritorialise the hitherto pro-NUS media assemblage. Furthermore, at the 
pivotal moment when participants were directed away from the symbolically 
powerful space of the Houses of Parliament the informal networks of actors 
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catalysed the anti-NUS content and begin re-territorialising the media assemblage 
against the NUS. 
 
As the diverse sources of informal, online networked actors started producing high 
volumes of critical content outside of the NUS’ formal control the earlier effective 
plan to coordinate such networks failed and The Guardian’s live-blog, initially 
connected to the NUS’ social media management, became a clearing house for 
informal media content dominated by an anti-NUS agenda. As a result, according to 
the NUS’ Press Officer, despite their best efforts to mitigate the situation, The 
Guardian’s live-blog effectively enrolled a vast array of fluid, networked content 
which eventually coded the media assemblage into an enduring and stable media 
frame ultimately critical of the NUS and #Demo2012. 
 
If #Demo2012 offers a detailed account of informal-formal media actor interaction 
as a central feature of the case study, the Adidas and animal rights activists case 
study in Chapter 5 further reinforces its importance. The aim of activists here was to 
highlight animal abuse by local authorities ahead of the Euro 2012 football 
championships by targeting corporate sponsors to generate public and media interest 
in the story. Although the activists’ campaign was well-planned, the effective coding 
of the media assemblage and creation of a media frame was the result of hybridised 
actions by networked activists and Adidas’ corporate response combined with the 
unforeseen effects of Facebook’s algorithms.  
 
For example, the activists’ initial actions on Facebook were arguably successfully 
contained by Facebook’s technological infrastructure in that its algorithms 
inadvertently minimised the visibility of the activists’ complaints. Similarly, Adidas’ 
behaviour as a corporate entity meant that while it dealt with the activists’ concerns, 
it could not respond as quickly and efficiently as would have been expected by the 
logics of digitally-networked media. Moreover, the organisation leveraged its 
institutional power to request a specialist consultancy to conduct due diligence 
research on the crisis in order to shape Adidas’ response. Given the digitally-led 
nature of the campaign, the consultancy used tools making use of algorithms to fully 
understand its ‘digital footprint’ and make recommendations that no significant 
response was required.  
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Up to this point, the activists’ campaign and Adidas’ response was working 
efficiently to territorialise and then de-territorialise the media assemblage first in 
favour of one group and then another. These events were, however, catalysed by 
Facebook’s moderation algorithm which created the appearance of Adidas’ 
censorship of activists’ voices (1ndenbirken, 2011; Busch, 2011; Creazwo, 2011; 
Gillich, 2011; Greye, 2011; Liller, 2011; Medienblase, 2011; Ponta, 2011; Vip, 
2011). This created a wider network of bloggers and Twitter users who began 
publishing media content about the campaign and, in particular, Adidas’ missteps.  In 
turn, this extended interest via wider informal networks was identified by formal 
media actors (Meedia, 2011, 2011b, 2012; Busch, 2011; Handelsblatt, 2011a, 2011b) 
who then translated events into a clearly territorialised media assemblage which 
became coded against Adidas: the media frame defined the ‘reality’ that Adidas had 
mis-handled the crisis and censored activists’ voices.  
 
Finally, the #AskSnowden case study in Chapter 6 provides insight into how a global 
news organisation used live-blogging, Twitter hashtags and a live web chat – all 
essential components of hybrid “networked journalism” (Jarvis, 2006) – as part of a 
dedicated commercially-orientated plan to increase its audience. This was made 
possible firstly through the deployment of the media institutions’ economic material 
resources to create a digital platform and hashtag which enabled it to gather globally 
dispersed and networked users in one place and then leverage them to territorialise 
the media assemblage for commercial aims.  
 
Specifically, through its platform, The Guardian created a focal point around which 
networks of hybrid actors were choreographed to source crowd-based questions for 
the institution’s Edward Snowden reporting. Crucially, the case study reveals how 
The Guardian used its platform and hashtag to generate an appearance of a credible 
networked actor through collaboratively producing news reporting while actually 
misrepresenting the views and interests of the wider network.  
 
For example, while the top four themes of questions submitted to The Guardian’s 
web chat platform by networked actors were as follows: 1) democratic implications 
of Snowden’s leaks; 2) personal privacy concerns of citizens; 3) operational 
questions about NSA systems and software; and 4) personal questions directed to 
Snowden, the dominant theme of questions put to Snowden by The Guardian’s 
reporters were focused on his personal life and status as a ‘celebrity whistleblower’. 
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This suggests that despite The Guardian’s intentions of engaging in innovative 
networked journalism integrating hybrid networks into its reporting, the 
territorialisation and coding of the #AskSnowden media assemblage was organised 
around the commercial motivations of ‘soft news’. As a consequence, one of the 
biggest ‘hard news’ stories of modern history (Chadwick & Collister, 2014: 2422) 
was framed as an entertainment and lifestyle story. 
 
Furthermore, not only did The Guardian code the media assemblage as a soft news 
story, it then leveraged its relationships with the networks of informal media actors 
gathered on its own platform and hashtag to promote its own Snowden stories and 
web chat to a global audience. For example, of the tweets containing the 
#AskSnowden hashtag a majority (60 per cent) did not direct questions to Snowden 
as part of the web chat and, moreover, 63 per cent of these were promotional in 
content. That is, they explicitly made other networked actors aware of The Guardian 
live web chat with Edward Snowden and, significantly, helped drive website traffic 
to The Guardian’s live-blog platform by posting a web link to the Q&A.  
 
In addition, 24 per cent of the tweets without questions for Snowden featured 
soundbites and quotations from The Guardian’s own coverage. This implies that even 
if Twitter users did not click through to the web chat itself via a tweet, they were at 
least exposed to The Guardian’s content. This challenges more optimistic readings of 
such networked behaviour in territorialising and coding media assemblages. It 
suggests that commercial imperatives or institutional structures can effectively 
choreograph networks of media actors, while giving the appearance of being public-
interest motivated behaviours.  
 
Materiality  
The materiality of media found in the case studies played a part in shaping the 
(de)territorialisation and coding of media assemblages. This occurred through a 
range of different materialities, such as the built-environment and bodily interaction, 
media technological and economic materialism. One of the most prevalent material 
features identified and documented in the case studies was the role of new media 
platforms in influencing the ways hybridised actors constitute and choreograph 
networked media.  
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Across all of the case studies real-time information gathering and live-blogging 
(Thurman, 2013; Thurman & Walters, 2013) were adopted by both formal and 
informal media actors to shape the visibility, production, distribution and 
consumption of media content which, in due course, influenced the coding of each 
media assemblage and the ultimate media frame produced.  
 
For example, The Guardian, as an institutional media actor, was able to build and 
deploy its own formal live-blogging platform used in both the Demo2012 and 
#AskSnowden case studies. This approach – in turn made possible by the 
institution’s commercially-supported economic resources – enabled The Guardian to 
publish high-quality and professionally produced information curated from networks 
of informal media actors. Moreover, this gave The Guardian greater control in 
determining the context in which this networked information was received.  
 
The Demo2012 live-blog allowed The Guardian to earn credibility as a networked 
news actor by linking to and sharing informal networked content. At the same time, 
it enabled The Guardian to promote other relevant Guardian content by providing 
related content to readers. This approach, which leverages the social capital at the 
heart of hybrid, digitally-networked media in order to maximise commercial impact, 
was refined and further deployed in the #AskSnowden case study. In that case, 
networked actors were enrolled into The Guardian’s reporting in order to earn the 
organisation media credibility which it could then leverage to distribute and promote 
its story to a global audience for free.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, a number of informal media actors who live-
blogged on publicly-available platforms about the animal rights campaign against 
Adidas were also pivotal in connecting the activists’ niche, targeted Facebook 
campaign with a wider network of media actors. In turn, this real-time commentary 
and reporting helped catalyse a crisis in which both of the protagonists were evenly 
matched in (de)territorialising the media assemblage into a much bigger story with 
widespread public visibility and – ultimately – a heavily territorialised and coded 
media assemblage critical of Adidas. 
 
Evidence for this is visible in the fact that the media bloggers were instrumental in 
understanding and translating the significance of the activists’ accusations that 
Adidas was censoring online debate. While the institutional media may have been 
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aware of the wider campaign against UEFA’s sponsors it was the informal network 
of media bloggers that were able to spot the newsworthy development in relation to 
Adidas’ alleged actions which in turn led to the wider media interest.  
 
Moreover, there is additional evidence that this informal live-blogging further shaped 
the final media frame at a micro-level. The language used by live-bloggers went on 
to inform the language used by institutional media to report and frame the story. 
Content analysis shows a correlation between the informal media content which 
appeared initially on 21st November and was subsequently followed by news 
coverage of the story on 22nd. Moreover, it was this informal media content that 
singled out Adidas for criticism and started using the term ‘shitstorm’ to describe the 
campaign, which remained targeted at all UEFA sponsors. Both of these 
developments were present in the media content analysis I performed on the resulting 
institutional media content. 
 
Crucially, then, the practice of real-time media publication (and live-blogs as a 
specific media production and distribution function) gave networked media actors 
the advantageous ability to draw on real-time flows of information emerging around 
a news event, interpret and analyse it and shape its representation and – ultimately – 
reception. Central to this were the digital media platforms and their associated search 
functions, which enabled informal media actors to track and collate events or issues 
as they emerged, collate and select related content and publish and distribute new 
media content at a global scale.  
 
In many of these instances, the collection, filtering and presentation of data in these 
platforms is performed by proprietary algorithms unseen by those making use of the 
software. Individuals may therefore be unaware of the potential impact these material 
factors may have on the interpretation of information. In the animal rights campaign 
case study, for example, software algorithms were put to use by Adidas’ media 
consultancy in order to search for and analyse the large quantities and diverse 
qualities of the information being produced by the activists – and broader networks 
of actors - as part of the campaign. The resulting information was used to make sense 
of the direction and scale of the unfolding crisis and to enable Adidas to make fully 
informed and strategic decisions in its response (McCarthy, 2015; Robinson, 2015). 
In the same case study, however, algorithms also exerted non-human agency in 
shaping the representation and reception of information in the Facebook newsfeed. 
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By design, Facebook’s Edgerank algorithm down-weighted information published by 
official brand pages (Facebook, 2015; Oremus, 2016), thus the activists tactical 
approach flooding of Adidas’ Facebook page with critical messages generated little 
impact on the organisation (McCarthy, 2015). 
 
The presence of such seemingly autonomous algorithms as central features of the 
media and communications environment is growing and increasingly being adopted 
by media actors as digital short-cuts to determine objectively news-worthy events 
(Chakraborty, Ghosh, Ganguly, & Gummadi, 2015; Thurman et al, 2016). The nature 
and function of such algorithms are increasingly being questioned and challenged, 
however, as complex socio-technical features incorporating human oversight, 
subjective analysis and computational processes. Thus, the role of these unseen 
computational processes raises conceptual questions (as well as practical challenges) 
to media actors and researchers. The alternative to making use of such algorithmic 
tools and methods, however, is similarly problematic. 
 
For instance, in the #AskSnowden case study The Guardian created online networks 
- within its own live-blog and through the use of a twitter hashtag – as a news-
gathering and, ultimately, promotional resource. While some scholars see this 
formal-informal media actor interaction as a positive and productive relationship in 
news-making (Beckett & Mansell, 2008; Gillmor, 2006; Jarvis, 2006; N. Newman, 
Dutton, & Blank, 2012), the sheer scale of The Guardian’s initiative meant that 
accurate and representative selection of information could only fully have been 
achieved through the use of sense-making digital analytics tools. 
  
The case study, however, suggests that such tools are not routinely adopted by The 
Guardian as the digital interface between grassroots networks of informal media 
actors and professional journalists. Instead, the questions selected for inclusion in the 
#AskSnowden web chat over-represented Guardian journalists. Content analysis of 
the final 20 web chat questions selected for answer by Snowden reveals that two 
were drawn from the 17,176 tweets published with the #AskSnowden hashtag, 13 
were drawn from the 3,845 live-blog comments while the remaining five were asked 
directly by The Guardian’s own journalists. Moreover, the final 20 questions 
selected diverged significantly from the dominant themes of the questions actually 
asked by the broader networked actors. Thus, it can be argued, traditional newsroom 
routines prevailed in interpreting and making sense of the networked information 
  224 
flows where algorithmic interpretation of the data – while available – was not 
adopted. 
 
The materiality of media technologies also includes the metadata contained within 
the vast volumes of symbolic content produced and shared by informal and formal 
media actors. This type of data – often hidden or unseen by users - expresses 
information pertaining to the physical environment, such as a user’s location, the 
date and time as well as the type of device being used. Mobile devices’ affordances 
for producing, sharing, consuming and searching for information in close to real-time 
creates rapid feedback cycles that enable individual and collective actions in physical 
space to be tracked and represented remotely (Boczkowski, 2010; N. Newman, 2011; 
Revers, 2015). Conventional notions of the separation of digital and physical 
domains become problematic: the digital networked world becomes intertwined with 
everyday practices of the physical world (Frith, 2015: 2; Revers, 2015: 6). 
 
In this sense, digitally-networked mediation can be understood as a locative media 
production process (Evans, 2015; Frith, 2015; Wilken & Goggin, 2014). There are 
material behaviours and practices in the physical realm of place and space, but the 
representation of place and space is mediated in an ongoing, inter-related exchange 
of meaning. Thus, digitally networked communication exerts a “dynamic 
temporality” (Sheller, 2015: 20), which creates distinct spaces of media and news 
production. These spaces are increasingly shaped by digital platforms and the 
technological infrastructure that surrounds them (Revers, 2015: 18).  
Such a phenomenon could be observed in the Demo2012 case study where a group 
of demonstrators, dissatisfied with the organisers’ route directing them away from 
the Houses of Parliament (London’s historical centre of political protest), initiated a 
spontaneous sit-down protest blocking the official route and attempting to force 
participants back to Parliament. Moreover, at the end of the demonstration a group of 
anti-NUS activists interrupted the official speeches from NUS spokespeople and 
high-profile supporters by heckling, throwing eggs and invading the stage forcing the 
rally – the planned (and strategically staged) culmination of Demo2012 – to be 
abandoned. This additional physical action switched the demonstration’s official 
space and was designed to create a sense of symbolic significance for the 
demonstrators and assembled media as they moved against the NUS (Hoyles, 2014).  
The materiality of these physical actions noticeably shifted the territorialisation of 
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the media assemblage. Ultimately it led to a coding of the media assemblage and 
established a frame critical of the NUS. This was achieved when critical symbolic 
content was produced by informal actors participating in the demonstration – in part 
through their interaction with the materiality of the physical environment.  It enabled 
the wider sharing of their dissatisfaction with the NUS through their own media 
networks. This was subsequently integrated by formal, institutional media actors 
who, in turn, adapted their reporting to reflect the criticism of the NUS.  
One final material factor influencing the ways in which the three case studies’ media 
assemblages are produced, (de)territorialised and coded is economic: commercial 
imperatives and financial motivations. These were particularly notable in the 
#AskSnowden case study where, despite the overt attempt by The Guardian to adopt 
a non-market network logic (Benkler, 2006: 2-7) in its reporting of a significant 
political ‘hard news’ story, the final coded, media frame defined the story through a 
‘soft news’ focus (Marsh, Hart, & Tindall, 2010; Reinemann, Stanyer, Scherr, & 
Legnante, 2011; West & Orman, 2002). Such an outcome was arguably motivated by 
the commercial imperative to ensure sales, rather than social capital (Benkler, 2006: 
7) – although, as discussed in the case study analysis, The Guardian used the 
language of social responsibility to promote the story. 
 
The economic imperatives of soft news were also visible in more peripheral ways in 
both the Demo2012 and animal rights activist case studies. For example, analysis of 
the media content produced and distributed ahead of the 2012 demonstration focused 
on hard news angles, such as higher education policy, the impact of higher education 
funding cuts on the availability of education and student employment opportunities 
(ITV News, 2012; Chessum, 2012; Walker & Ratcliffe, 2012). Despite the extensive 
planning by the NUS (Hoyles, 2014) designed to ensure ‘on message’ hard-hitting, 
political reporting ahead of the demonstration, the resulting news coverage 
prominently featured visual imagery illustrating the ‘hard news’ news content with 
“riot porn” (Aguayo, 2014; Rasza, 2014), i.e. sensationalist images of vandalism and 
violence, which had occurred during previous NUS events. Such a divide between 
policy-focused stories and sensationalist images can arguably be explained by a 
commercially-oriented, soft news imperative focused on presenting serious reporting 
as eye-catching and promotional content in order to increase readerships.  
 
Similarly, while the animal rights activists in the Adidas case study sought to 
highlight state-sanctioned animal abuse and challenge public opinion (Anis, 2011; 
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Casabianca, 2011), the media reporting of the story focused almost entirely on the 
ways in which the high-profile, consumer brand responded to the campaign. Such a 
news angle was a way for media to address the hard news story intended by the 
activists through a softer lens, diminishing the challenging aspects of the story in 
order to ensure higher commercial success of news content.  
 
Economic materialism also shaped the territorialisation of media assemblages 
through indirect means. For example, while the technological requirements necessary 
to set-up a blog for the collation of real-time information are minimal (Carlson, 
Djupsund, & Strandberg, 2014: 21-22), there remains, nonetheless, the need to 
provide resources to manage and coordinate the live-blog, track information flows, 
source appropriate material, publish and respond to interaction from the relevant 
networks. Such capacity arguably requires individuals with sufficient economic 
resources to volunteer their time – or makes it more likely that such platforms will be 
created and managed by media actors with commercial motivations. Significantly, 
empirical evidence supporting this phenomenon is identifiable in all three case 
studies - and across both the formal and informal domains of hybrid networks.  
 
While a number of other formal media actors, including The Guardian, the BBC and 
East London Lines (Howell, 2012; Owen, 2012; Ryan & Sellgren, 2012) adopted 
live-blogs to undertake real-time reporting of the Demo2012 protest, perhaps most 
interestingly the animal rights campaign case study reveals how economic 
imperatives also played a part in shaping the territorialisation and coding of the 
media assemblage by informal media actors. 
 
As noted above, the catalyst for the activists’ campaign reaching wider, institutional 
media networks was a small number of informal actors working in the media and/or 
marketing industry who spotted the alleged censorship of activists by Adidas and 
blogged and tweeted their own analysis of the development. Significantly, analysis 
of the sources of this content reveals that many of these informal actors were 
freelance consultants or journalists likely to be using their blogs and Twitter feeds to 
provide analysis and commentary about topical issues in order to promote 
themselves and – ultimately – secure new customers or readers. Thus, the informal 
media actors amplifying the activists’ campaign and catalysing the media 
assemblage’s coding against Adidas were also driven by commercial and self-
promotional motives rather than ethical or public interest motives. 
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It is important to note, however, that while the economic context is an important 
factor shaping the (de)territorialisation and coding of the various media assemblages, 
its ability to determine outcomes—as hypothesised by some scholars (Curran & 
Witschge, 2010; Dahlberg, 2005; Hargittai, 2006; Hindman, 2008)—is rendered 
problematic by the highly-contingent nature of media assemblages. In the Demo2012 
case study, for example, while the commercial media used sensationalist imagery to 
create a soft news frame around a policy-focused issue (Chessum, 2012; Walker & 
Ratcliffe, 2012) there is additional evidence that activist networks circulated the 
same imagery as a way to galvanise supporters and generate a sense of solidarity 
based on the political revival among student groups created by the vandalism and 
violence of the previous NUS event (Lloyd, 2012; Margeson, 2012; Rhianr, 2012).  
 
Similarly, while The Guardian established a soft news frame around #AskSnowden 
to help promote itself through digital networks further media content data suggests 
that a significant number of actors within The Guardian’s own #AskSnowden 
community shared disruptive content using the #AskSnowden hashtag in an attempt 
to undermine the promotional nature of The Guardian’s content. Thus, while 
economic materialist factors influence and shape networked media environments, in 
keeping with the emergent and relational nature of the theoretical framework 
underpinning the thesis the reality is that this is a subtle and negotiated process 
(Castells, 2009: 47). 
 
Choreography 
As defined in Chapter 3, choreography can be understood as the ways in which 
networked actors coordinate themselves (Gerbaudo, 2012: 134-135) or as protocols 
governing the emergence and organisation of networks (Castells, 2009: 56; 
Chadwick, 2007). As a consequence, choreography shapes information flows and 
influences media production, distribution and consumption which in turn impacts on 
processes of (de)territorialisation and the coding of media assemblages and thus 
media power. 
 
Arguably, choreography is a process emerging from the interaction between 
individual or collective agency (human and non-human) as well as material media 
objects. As Castells has asserted: the ability to coordinate networks is exerted by the 
“networks themselves” [emphasis in original] (Castells, 2009: 45). This implies that 
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while networks through their form reject direct central coordination, a form of 
coordination is possible through indirect means, such as communal and collective 
behaviours, expressions of intent or shared meaning. 
 
It is essential, however, to recognise that such an approach to organisation and 
coordination is predicated fundamentally on the complex, emergent interaction and 
inter-relation between the range of formal and informal media actors and the media 
objects being produced, shared and consumed within those networks. It also depends 
on the material infrastructures that shape information flows within networks. While 
economically well-resourced actors are more likely to possess the ability to dominate 
communication, and thus direct or choreograph networks, this is not always the case. 
 
It is possible to identify some of the dominant ways in which actor networks were 
choreographed at different points of their evolution in the three case studies I 
examined. For example, in the Demo2012 case study initially the NUS’ formal 
media actors effectively choreographed the flow of information in the media 
assemblage because the build-up to the demonstration involved largely formal actors, 
such as journalists and affiliated institutions supporting the NUS’ position. In this 
relatively stable network environment media objects were produced and distributed 
through established hybrid relationships with minimal disruption and this efficiently 
territorialised the media assemblage in the NUS’ favour. 
 
Once the demonstration got underway, however, and the critical materiality of the 
route became enrolled with anti-NUS activists, the NUS could not respond 
effectively. As a result, the spontaneous and event-driven choreography of informal 
media actors de-territorialised the media assemblage. This, combined with The 
Guardian’s live-blog – a media form suited to capturing the live flows of 
information being produced by fluid, networked actors – helped crystallise the 
interpretation of events emerging from this (re)choreography and coded the media 
assemblage against the NUS.  
 
Similarly, in the animal rights activists versus Adidas case study, both the activists 
and Adidas planned and deployed tactics typical of effective public awareness-
raising campaigns and corporate crisis response. As a consequence, media content 
and interview data suggests that the media assemblage was territorialised, de-
territorialised and re-territorialised to-and-fro between both sets of actors.  
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This situation was changed by the materiality of algorithms operating within the 
media networks. It was the algorithm’s ability to operate in ways that were unseen 
and rapidly and adaptively to the behaviours exerted by the human actors in the 
media assemblage that were most effective in shaping the territorialisation of the 
media assemblage against Adidas. The outputs of this algorithmic choreography 
were then picked up by a wider, more publicly visible network of informal media 
actors who, crucially, were connected to institutional media actors who, in turn, 
further territorialised and coded the media assemblage to establish a frame that went 
against the interests of Adidas.  
 
Finally, in the #AskSnowden case study free-flows of information from a range of 
formal and informal media actors were generated in response to the news story and 
web chat, but it can be argued that the driving force choreographing this network, 
and thus effectively shaping the territorialisation of the media assemblage, was the 
economic materialism of The Guardian’s commercial strategy. Specifically, the 
materiality of The Guardian’s technological infrastructure and journalistic resource 
was highly effective in shaping the production, distribution and consumption of 
media content around the story. This choreography was further used for the 
continued marketing of The Guardian’s output around the story. This was successful 
despite some attempts by informal media actors critical of The Guardian’s approach, 
who also sought to choreograph other like-minded actors to challenge The 
Guardian’s reporting.  
 
Coding 
The role of coding in my analytical model is to identify when a media assemblage 
becomes territorialised to such an extent that it achieves a consistent and stable 
identity beyond its individual components (DeLanda, 2006: 14-16) and thus comes to 
frame the event or issue around which the assemblage was created (Reese, 2001; 
Hertog & McLeod, 2001). This outcome effectively demonstrates when the 
definitional authority of media power is being exercised (Couldry and Curran, 2003 
Freeman, 2014). 
 
The presence of coded media assemblages is confirmed in each case study through 
quantitative analysis of the media content data. For example, Demo2012 was framed 
negatively against the aims of the organisers, despite the NUS’ best efforts to 
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choreograph the media assemblage in support of its own agenda; the Adidas versus 
animal rights activists episode was framed in a way critical of Adidas, but in relation 
to the corporation’s behaviour responding to the activists, rather than due to its 
involvement in the original animal rights issue. Finally the #AskSnowden case study 
framed the web chat with Edward Snowden around human interest issues, rather than 
the policy-based interests of the online community enrolled in the media assemblage. 
 
In the Demo2012 case study, informal, networked media actors were able to 
outmanoeuvre and outflank the NUS, which had aimed to co-ordinate the event to 
achieve institutional outcomes (Clegg, 1989). Crucially, The Guardian’s role in this 
media assemblage saw it function more like a networked actor – building its own 
platform to act as a node within the hybrid networks of informal and formal media 
actors and, ultimately, choreographing events much more efficiently than the NUS. 
Interestingly, while the NUS planned the event effectively, the emergence of human-
interest issues – e.g. student dissatisfaction, spectacular scenes of protests outside the 
Houses of Parliament and personal attacks on the NUS president – were what really 
catalysed the widespread production and sharing of content. And while this was 
informal, networked media actors initially, these media objects were then enrolled by 
The Guardian and wider institutional media, effectively coding the media 
assemblage and defining the media frame against the NUS’ agenda. 
 
In the animal rights activists versus Adidas case study there was further evidence of 
informal, networked media actors outflanking a more bureaucratic institution. There 
was also, however, evidence of the organisation using its economic resource to 
employ a specialist consultancy to enable it to operate like a networked actor and to 
respond accordingly to the activists’ networked choreography of events. While both 
these groups of actors territorialised and deterritorialised the media assemblage, they 
were both then out-flanked by the algorithmic infrastructure of the software tools and 
platforms being used.  
 
Furthermore, despite the important ‘hard news’ issue of animal rights abuses being 
brought to light by the activists it was, arguably, the more sensationalist issue of a 
high-profile corporation such as Adidas appearing to censor activists’ online 
comments which transformed the scale and rate of the territorialisation, as wider 
networks of informal and formal media actors became interested in the event and 
heavily territorialised the media assemblage around this development. This created a 
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coded media assemblage that critically framed Adidas, despite the fact that, in 
reality, this online ‘censorship’ was falsely produced by Facebook’s algorithms. 
Finally, in the #AskSnowden case study... The Guardian rapidly and efficiently 
choreographed hybrid networks of a diverse range of informal and formal actors to 
code the media assemblage around its Edward Snowden reporting to suit its own 
preferred outcomes. As discussed above, The Guardian was able to leverage its 
institutional position and economic resource to build a dedicated web chat platform 
to act as focal point for the story, as well as create and manage the dedicated 
#AskSnowden Twitter hashtag. This enabled it to leverage its commercially-
supported resource of formal journalists to act as informal, networked media actors 
operating according to the principles of social responsibility. This meant The 
Guardian could territorialise and code the media assemblage in support of its own 
‘soft news’ frame and, more strikingly, further choreograph the #AskSnowden 
network to amplify and promote The Guardian as a globally renowned example of 
public interest reporting. 
 
In conclusion, a number of converging points arise in the coding of the media 
assemblages I examined in the three case studies. The networked behaviours and 
logics of informal media actors allow them to organisationally out-flank (Clegg, 
1989) more institutional media actors in content production and distribution. 
Institutional actors are able to respond if they possess the necessary skills, tools and 
organisational processes, as did the NUS with its use of affiliated supporters and as 
did Adidas in its hiring of a specialist consultancy. However, this does not 
necessarily guarantee success in the longer term. 
 
Another recurring theme across the case studies is that formal, institutional media 
still appear to perform an important role in enrolling media objects from the 
networks of informal media actors, interpreting and making sense of this dispersed 
content and, arguably, taking it to a wider mainstream public audience. Thus, while 
the emergence of important media objects and the choreography of media production 
and circulation can be initiated by informally networked media actors it is the 
enrolment of this content by institutional media actors which leads to the 
development of heavily territorialised and coded media assemblages. 
 
Finally, a major driver of both networked interaction and media production and its 
enrolment by formal media actors is the human-interest frame. The choreography of 
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networked informal media production and distribution is motivated primarily by 
social capital, in that networks emerge from intrinsic motivations such as 
communicating with others and supporting each other in pursuit of culturally or 
socially specific shared interests (Benkler, 2006: 91-128). At the same time, as 
Gerbaudo has shown, networks establish the emotional narration of events required 
to bring individuals together to act (Gerbaudo, 2012: 12). 
 
In all three case studies, these personal and socially-oriented motives converged with 
the commercial needs of institutional media to produce ‘soft news’ in the form of 
human interest or emotionally charged angles designed to appeal to readers. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the rise in digitally-empowered networks of informal 
media actors perceived by optimistic/liberal media power scholarship as a potent 
media counter-power (Bennett, 2003; Couldry and Curran, 2003; Castells, 2009: 
299) appears to be aligned with a rise in institutional media’s interest in reporting 
sensational or human-focused soft news (Barnett, Gaber, & Ramsay, 2012; Cushion 
& Franklin, 2015; Reinemann, Stanyer, Scherr, & Legnante, 2011). Scholars might 
want to reconsider arguments relating to the ‘innately disruptive and ultimately 
empowering’ (Freedman, 2014: 7) potential afforded by ‘new technology’ (Kember 
and Zylinska, 2012: xiv; Chun, 2006: 9). Rather, we could be facing a recombination 
of media power by institutional media, who absorb and instrumentalise the strengths 
of informal, networked media actors. 
 
Future Directions for Research  
This thesis has proposed a revised theoretical approach to media power in a 
networked environment. It has developed an analytical model with which to 
undertake empirical work and has used three diverse case studies to demonstrate the 
utility of the theoretical approach. I turn, finally, to how this thesis might contribute 
to further research in this field. 
 
Institutional Adaptation 
Despite predictions of a decline in the ability of institutional media to exert power to 
influence and define events in the public sphere (Newman, Fletcher, Levy, & 
Nielsen, 2016; Preston, 2016), the empirical evidence discussed above suggests that 
institutional media still play an important role in coding media assemblages. 
 
Therefore, one direction for future research will be to investigate in greater detail the 
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qualitative changes occurring in institutional media production in the context of the 
revised theory and model of media power developed in this thesis. For example, do 
formal, institutional media operate on the same terms as other, informal networked 
media actors? That is, does the institutional role of traditional media organisations 
dissolve into media assemblages when its reporters and journalists participate in  
networked flows of information.  
 
Alternatively, does the theory and model of contemporary media power set out here 
open up new opportunities, roles and practices for institutional media? For example, 
in each of the case studies, the institutional media (and in particular, The Guardian) 
played a decisive role in enrolling the diverse range of media content produced and 
shared through informal networks and in choreographing this information – often by 
leveraging economic resources. However, it is also important to note that this coding 
process would not have been possible without drawing on the media content already 
produced and choreographed by informal media actors.  
 
Specific research opportunities could explore further the “institutional adaptation” 
(Chadwick and Collister, 2014: 2427) that some scholars have begun to identify 
within the field of media boundary-drawing (Carlson and Lewis, 2015). As has been 
identified in the empirical evidence in this thesis the increasingly hybridised media 
behaviours, the material role of economic resources and technology and the complex 
choreography of networked media actors all point to a period of “media instability” 
(Singer, 2015) where the boundaries of what can be consider formal or informal are 
breaking down. Given the continued role played by formal media institutions in this 
environment an important opportunity for future research by media power scholars 
could be to better understand where the boundaries of media institutions end and 
where they begin.  
 
Specific questions could be addressed, such as how are institutions adapting their 
operations to newly networked, hybridised, material media environment? How do 
“new institutions become old and stable [and] old institutions become new and 
flexible?” (Anderson et al., 2012: 47–48) and what does this mean for our 
understanding of contemporary media power? 
 
Moreover, presuming this institutional transition is an ongoing process, how does it 
affect media power as it evolves? And, what does this evolution look like in a 
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comparative context given that different nations and/or markets around the world 
operate under different media systems (Hallin and Mancini, 2004)? Finally, building 
on this research trajectory, a further direction for future research can be identified by 
looking at this opportunity in reverse: how are the originally informal networks of 
media actors becoming formalised as institutions? 
 
‘Soft News’ and Emotionally-driven Media Power 
As discussed above, the empirical evidence in this thesis also suggests there is an 
overlap between the motivations of informal, networked media actors and formal, 
institutional ones in the form of human-interest, often emotionally-charged, ‘soft 
news’ (Barnett, Gaber, & Ramsay, 2012; Cushion & Franklin, 2015; Reinemann, 
Stanyer, Scherr, & Legnante, 2011). This presents an opportunity for future research 
as it appears that the values and logics of media production are converging, rather 
than diverging as suggested by previous networked media scholarship which asserted 
a hard distinction could be drawn between the motivations and consequences 
informal media actors motivated by social capital and formal media actors motivated 
by commercial outcomes (Benkler, 2006).  
 
There are arguably a number of ways into this research space. For example, Singer 
(2015) has defined the emergence of an ‘entrepreneurial journalism’ which may be 
playing a more significant role in media production. This could be due to the 
commercial decline encountered by news institutions in a digital environment and 
the rise in ‘freelance’ journalists no longer employed by media publishers. These 
autonomous and financially precarious formal media actors are expected to compete 
with other as entrepreneurial reporters as well as informal media actors (Edmonds, 
Guskin, Mitchell, & Jurkowitz, 2013; Fleming, 2013; Rosenstiel, Jurkowitz, & Ji, 
2012). 
 
In this instance the ‘entrepreneurial’ media producer becomes more like an informal 
networked actor producing content that must engage and interest audiences by 
creating an affective response in order to generate clicks, ‘Likes’ and shares 
(Christin, 2014; Murtha, 2015) among the increasingly vast quantities of formal and 
informal media content being produced (Beckett and Deuze, 2016). This media 
behaviour and its associated logic shifts the focus of formal media production from 
“the public, the people who rely on me for credible information” to “my customers, 
the people whom I rely on to keep my journalistic enterprise going (and who also 
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continue to rely on me for the credible information that forms the basis of my 
enterprise)” (Singer, 2015: 17). As a consequence, it arguably closes the gap between 
the civic, fact-based quality reporting conventionally typified by the institutional 
media and populist, emotive or sensational content that will generate interest among 
the networked audience and, therefore, revenue for the producer (Beckett and Deuze, 
2017; Boczkowski, 2010).  
  
This development opens up a number of avenues for further exploration of 
contemporary media power. Specific questions include: how widespread is this shift 
in the behaviour and logics of ‘quasi-formal’ media entrepreneurs? Does it increase 
the significance of materialism in shaping the choreography and territorialisation of 
media assemblages – for example, although such media practices are arguably far-
removed from traditional institutional forms, they nonetheless have an economic 
materialism at their core. Moreover, important questions need to be asked regarding 
the materiality of new, media technologies used by these entrepreneurial actors to 
identify popular or affectively effective stories on which they can capitalise. To what 
extent do actors test and improve the popularity of media content (and therefore 
improve its performance and thus revenue) through automatic and computationally-
driven distribution and adaptation (Vermeire, 2017). Finally, a further issue is 
whether this shaping of symbolic media content to meet the popular or affective 
demands of networked media actors re-orients media values away from rational, fact-
based content and toward sensationalist content – a scenario where the truth may 
become secondary to achieving clicks and shares. 
 
Media Power in a Post-Fact Era 
As institutional media adapt to the digitally-networked media environment and 
compete for attention among networked actors the role of emotion in shaping media 
production, distribution and consumption, according to Beckett and Deuze (2017) is 
“becoming a much more important dynamic in how news is produced and 
consumed” (Beckett and Deuze, 2017). My case studies demonstrate how 
assemblages can be territorialised and coded in ways that frame events or issues 
according to a more sensationalist or emotive angle. For example, in Demo2012 the 
media frame focused on the spectacle of the spontaneous protests, scuffles with 
police and the angry scenes at the rally culminating in the stage invasion. The Adidas 
case saw the activists’ campaign focusing on the apparent, but factually incorrect, 
account of Adidas’ censorship of activists’ posts. The #AskSnowden case saw the 
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predominantly hard news questions from readers framed as a ‘celebrity 
whistleblower’ story. As a result, the choreography and territorialisation of media 
assemblages does not necessarily followrational or fact-based norms of traditional 
media power.  
 
In foregrounding a non-rational, affective motivation in the coding of media 
assemblages and framing of events, the theoretical perspective on media power 
developed in the thesis offers an approach to understanding the role of media in what 
is npw being called the ‘post-fact era’ (Maxmen, 2016; Renwick, Flinders, & 
Jennings, 2016). This conceptual turn is typified as a historical moment in which 
public debate and political engagement based on empirical evidence and verifiable 
facts is replaced with one premised on a rejection of expertise and a preference for 
sensationalist and emotive information (Colvile, 2016; Drezner, 2016).48 
 
One potential consequence for scholars seeking to analyse and understand the way in 
which society makes sense of everyday events and choose appropriate actions is that 
they reframe their theoretical positions away from a normative, empirical rationalism 
and towards an affectively-driven or non-rational approach. Arguably, the theory and 
model of contemporary media power developed in this thesis can offer a framework 
for organising future research in this area. For example, the evidence that the 
hybridised networks of formal and informal media actors choreograph media 
production and distribution through “emotional scene-setting” (Gerbaudo, 2012: 12) 
could be a useful starting point to identify and understand how non-rational or 
affective media content becomes produced, distributed and consumed in order to 
code media assemblages and frame everyday events.  
 
Computation and Algorithms 
Additionally, as identified in the empirical case studies in this thesis, the materiality 
of digital platforms being used by individuals and institutions to produce, distribute 
and consume media content raises questions for further research, specifically 
pertaining to the role of – the largely invisible - material forces such as algorithms 
and computational processes which play a part in influencing and shaping the 
(de)territorialisation and coding of media assemblages.  
                                               
48 Although it can be argued that propaganda and misinformation has been in use for hundreds (Helfand, 2017), if 
not thousands, of years (Harris, 1989) the post-fact era sees the extension of non-rational information into 
mainstream communication and public debate. 
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The significance of such questions has been brought to the fore recently by the ways 
digital platforms have been applied in high-profile political campaigns to 
choreograph emotionally-driven information which has had a greater efficacy in 
coding media assemblages and framing events and issues to a non-rational – at times, 
even false – agenda. For example, both the 2016 United States Presidential Elections 
and Brexit Referendum campaigns used algorithms and computational data analysis 
of the kind identified in the case studies to choreograph and (de)territorialise the 
media assemblages more efficiently than opposing campaigns (James, 2016; 
Johnson, 2016; Wood, 2016). This arguably enabled the identification of networked 
individuals and groups affectively or culturally aligned with the campaign’s agenda 
to choreograph supportive media content (Halpern, 2017). Building on such initial 
evidence, the theory and model of contemporary media power could be used to 
explore further the role and significance of algorithms and approaches to political 
campaigning at a systemic level.  
 
In both the examples cited above, two more detailed areas emerge as potential 
directions for future research. Firstly, specific questions and areas for further 
investigation arising from the above examples could include gaining a deeper 
understanding of ‘bots’ and their role in exerting media power. Bots are algorithms 
that can automate the dissemination of information to individuals and groups within 
online networks (Albright, 2016a). This automated process – identified as 
hyperintermediation in the Adidas case study (see Chapter 6) - can scale misleading 
and emotive content at a rate never previously possible. The velocity and scale of 
media production and dissemination could yield interesting new developments for 
the conceptualisation of media power in networked environments – particularly as 
the technology underpinning such processes evolves and starts to enable the creation 
of ever-more effective content (Albright, 2017). 
 
Secondly, as identified in the case studies, when emotionally-charged content is 
consumed and re-shared by networked actors (both formal and informal) a further 
algorithmically-driven ‘multiplier effect’ can be observed. As affective content flows 
through and interacts with networked actors’ data signals are created that indicate to 
the digital platforms being used that the content – factual or otherwise – can be 
considered valuable and useful to the public. As a consequence, Facebook’s 
Newsfeed or Google’s PageRank algorithms, for example, improve the visibility of 
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the content within results or algorithmically-powered data streams (Manovich, 1999; 
2012) creating a validation of emotionally-charged media content as relevant, 
legitimate news (Albright, 2016b; Ingram, 2016). The specific role that this 
infrastructure plays in influencing contemporary media power could be investigated 
in much greater detail – given its significance in choreographing and 
(de)territorialising the media assemblages analysed in this thesis.  
 
This research can be further extended by exploring the relevance of economic 
materialism in shaping the motivations, development and deployment of such 
computational processes by digital platforms. For instance, Google, Facebook and 
Twitter all make use of algorithms to weight the visibility of media content flowing 
their platforms as well as generate a commercial need for advertising across their 
networks. Thus, the effects of such material process on the choreography, 
(de)territorialising and coding of media assemblages could be intricately related to 
platforms’ business models, which are primarily based on selling advertising 
inventory to commercial customers (Morris, 2016). 
 
Undertaking such research, however, is also likely to present potential 
methodological challenges to researchers. As has been identified in this thesis the 
materiality of technological infrastructure and its effects on media production, 
distribution and consumption are often not as visible as, for example, the symbolic 
media content operating at the “front-end” of media power (Russell, 2016:149). 
Therefore, the effective investigation of both the functionality and implications of 
algorithms and computational processes often requires an in-depth understanding of 
relatively complex technology and datasets. Compounding this challenge is the 
reality that conducting such analysis often requires access to proprietary data or 
technology (Diakopoulos, 2014). While some steps have been taken in developing 
ways to understand how computational processes shape contemporary media and 
communication (Eslami et al., 2015; Hamilton, Sandvig, Eslami, & Karahalios, 
2014; Sandvig, 2014) there are still significant opportunities for further research. 
 
Framing Research 
While I have used framing theory to develop this thesis due to its usefulness in 
interpreting media power (Gamson and Wolfeld, 1993), there were times when the 
conceptual limits of framing were reached. These include framing’s interpretation of 
media as discrete and distinct ‘locations’ and its focus on formal, institutional actors 
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in shaping frames before presenting them to audiences in a linear and unproblematic 
way (see Chapter 3). In response, the thesis bridged framing theory with assemblage 
theory to provide a more fruitful conceptual context in which to study media power. 
It will be helpful, therefore, to revisit current framing scholarship to identify routes 
for further expansion and development of the field. 
 
First and foremost, one significant development in the field has been the question of 
whether framing theory still remains relevant in the contemporary media landscape. 
Cacciatore, Scheufele and Iyengar (2016) assert that the notion of framing should be 
discarded as a distinct theoretical and operational concept, and instead viewed as “a 
bridge between paradigms as we shift from an era of mass communication to one of 
echo chambers, tailored information and microtargeting in the new media 
environment” (Cacciatore, Scheufele and Iyengar, 2016: 8). Such a step is supported 
by Bennett and Iyengar (2008) who argue that “[t]he advent of new media and Web 
2.0 technologies, including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and other forms of social 
networking, is forcing communication scholars to rethink traditional effects models 
(Bennett & Iyengar, 2008).”  
 
This theoretical move echoes and, arguably, validates the similar theoretical step 
made in this thesis whereby framing theory is ‘bridged’ with assemblage theory. The 
aim, as detailed in Chapter 3, was to enable a more robust analytical approach to 
contemporary media and communications allowing scholars to adequately take into 
account the complexities of new media and Web 2.0 technologies, as recognised by 
Bennett and Iyengar above. The analytical inputs and empirical outputs developed in 
this thesis may provide a useful starting point for framing researchers seeking to 
move beyond conventional uses of the concept. 
 
Other recent discussions of framing theory, however, have challenged the 
‘retirement’ argument, asserting instead that the “friction” within the framing 
research community is a sign, not of the theory’s increasing redundancy, but rather 
as auguring a potent future and renewed opportunities for framing in light of changes 
in the media environment (Lechler and de Vreese, 2018: 94). At a macro-level, for 
example, some of the latest discussions seek to re-invent framing using a multi-stage 
approach which accounts for the stage at which information is organised into frames 
(frame-building), the point at which these frames are disseminated (frame-
distribution) and frames’ reception (frame-setting) (Tewksbury and Matthew Riles, 
2018). Such a process is proposed in order to address the impact of digital media and 
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technology, which it is argued changes the way media stories are constructed. 
Specifically, while Tewksbury and Matthew Riles assert that the new layer of frame 
distribution is crucial in any frame analyses owing to the fact that “dissemination and 
delivery of content online is not neutral” they concede that their argument is “highly 
speculative” owing to there being no research available to validate their proposed 
approach (ibid.: 138). 
 
It is possible to recognise how Tewksbury and Matthew Riles’ proposed adaption to 
framing theory presents a degree of alignment with the way framing is bridged with 
assemblage theory in the analytical model adopted in this thesis. Specifically, both 
‘frame-building’ and ‘frame distribution’ can be potentially understood through the 
notions of choreography and (de)territorialisation, thus enabling framing researchers 
to account for the actors, factors and dynamics of “frame distribution”. Moreover, 
the emergent and open-ended qualities of media assemblages could offer further 
benefits to framing scholars by allowing them to recognise and account for the 
fluidity inherent in media frames during the ‘frame-building’ process - at least, up to 
the point of ‘frame setting’ at which point an issue or story arguably becomes coded 
as a media frame.  
 
In addition to Tewksbury and Matthew Riles’ attempts to reinvent framing theory at 
a macro, conceptual level Borah (2018) argues for a re-thinking of framing theory in 
light of the changing media landscape. This, however, largely focuses scholarly 
attention on the changing nature of media linked with the rise of technology and 
presents a range of challenges for the use of framing, including where frames can be 
located in the real-time information flows created by social media platforms (ibid.) 
or whether frames created in digital media are individual or institutional (Qin, 2015). 
There is also the question of how (methodologically) new media forms, such as 
hashtags and hyperlinks or tweets or Facebook posts diverge from more conventional 
news articles (Borah, 2018). 
 
While it is important that framing scholars are considering the implications of digital 
media platforms for the field, it appears that this exploration is still in relatively early 
stages of development because it still views social/digital media as distinct and 
separate entities, rather than as hybridised and networked. It could be argued too that, 
it is not yet clear to framing scholars how they can make sense of, and re-combine, 
these new and emerging features of contemporary media with existing theories of 
framing. Moreover, with the exception of Schuck and Feinholdt (2015), Lecheler, 
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Bos and Vliegenthar (2015) and Lecheler (2018) who have tentatively started to 
explore the role of emotions in framing there is little evidence of the role of material 
factors and qualities being considered in contemporary framing research. In 
response, it can be argued that the way this thesis adopts framing theory, placing it in 
the context of hybrid, symbolic-material media assemblages which span individual 
and institutional scales may offer useful findings that can help scholars reconfigure 
framing theory at both a conceptual and methodological level. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis set out to investigate how media power has changed in light of the rapid, 
recent developments of networked digital media platforms and their adoption by a 
range of formal and informal media actors alike. Central to this research project was 
the dual aim of devising a revised theoretical perspective on media power as well as 
investigating its validity through empirical analysis of three case studies. In 
conclusion, the work undertaken throughout the thesis has established and confirmed 
the significance of a revised theory of contemporary media power, built around the 
interaction between the culturally and communicatively symbolic components of 
media communication and the material features and processes through which 
meaning is established. This chapter summarises its presence in the case studies 
empirically analysed and articulates directions for further research. It is hoped these 
will offer media and communication scholars a range of opportunities with which to 
build on the results of this research and ensure a fertile future for the continued 
exploration of media power in a digitally-networked environment.  
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